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9Abstract
The evolution and impact of North-North and North-South trade have been among the main
areas of research in the literature of international trade. But how trade shocks emanating from
a low-wage southern country affect the manufacturing sector of other low-wage countries has
been little researched. In particular, there is a lack of evidence on firm-level adjustment to low-
wage trade shock in a low-wage developing country context. The main objective of the thesis
is to fill this gap in the literature by empirically examining the impact of import competition
shock from China on the evolution of manufacturing sector in India. This thesis combines plant
level data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-2009 with the product level trade
data from UN Comtrade database. The thesis contains two main chapters –chapter 2, which
explores the impact of a sharp rise in Chinese import exposure on overall plant performance
and product reallocation dynamics within-plant, and chapter 3. The latter dwells on wage
inequality and employment within-plant.
Chapter 2 finds that increased import competition from China following its WTO accession
leads to improvements in revenue productivity and a reduction of product scope at the plant-
level. A 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import exposure leads to a 3.7 percent increase
in large plants’ total-factor productivity. The same amount of increase in exposure to Chinese
imports leads to a one percent decrease in the number of products produced by the plant. Plant
product-level analysis suggests that the impact on selection of products is not symmetric. Plants
drop the product in which Chinese import exposure is higher; however, the closer the product
is to the core competence of the plant, the less likely it is to be dropped. Although import
competition from high-wage countries has no statistically significant impact on plant
performance or product scope, plant product-level adjustment shows that import competition
shocks from both high-wage countries and China have a similar impact on the selection of
products within a plant.
Chapter 3 finds that the rise in import competition from China leads to a general increase in
within-plant wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in large plants. But the
overall pattern is driven by much greater adjustment in flexible labor markets or states that
have employer friendly industrial relation regulation, while no significant adjustment is evident
in the inflexible market. I find that a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import exposure
leads to a 1.35 percent increase in skill premium in the sample of large plants, whereas the
same change leads to a 2.65 percent increase in skill premium in the flexible market. It is also
observed that increase in import competition from China causes a downsizing of low-
productivity plants through employment destruction, and an expansion of high-productivity
plants via employment creation. Again, the reallocation of employment is only evident in the
flexible labor market.
JEL Classification D22 D24 F14 F15 F16 F61 F66
Keywords: Firms, Trade, Import Competition, Globalization, Wage Inequality, China, India.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent times, one of the most significant developments in the world economy is the booming
trade between developing countries, termed as South-South trade. The evolution and impact of
North-North and North-South trade have been among the main areas of research in both the
theoretical and empirical literature of international trade. The expansion of trade between
southern countries is a new phenomenon in the history of globalization. In particular, South-
South trade has been growing at a spectacular pace in the 2000s, driven by China’s rapid
integration in the world economy following its accession to WTO in December 2001.1 In fact,
in the 2000s, high-wage northern countries have also been greatly affected by the surge of
Chinese imports in domestic market. A few recent studies highlight the importance of low-
wage country trade shocks in general and Chinese import competition shocks in particular on
the evolution of advanced economies. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) evaluate the impacts
of low-wage country import penetration on various plant-level outcomes (e.g., plant survival,
employment growth, product mix etc.) of U.S. manufacturing industry. Acemoglu et al. (2016)
and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) explore the effects of Chinese import growth on the U.S.
labor market. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) look at the impact of import competition
from China on innovation and productivity dynamics of the firms in a set of EU countries.
Martin and Mejean (2014) explore the impact of low-wage competition on the quality content
of French exports while Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2013) investigate the impact of Chinese
import competition on the selection of products within plants. Mion and Zhu (2013), and Utar
1 Between 2001 and 2011, world merchandise exports increased by 12 trillion US Dollar. Remarkably, trade
between southern countries also increased at a spectacular rate -South-South trade alone has increased by USD
3.6 trillion over the same time.
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(2014) study the impact of Chinese import competition on skill upgrading in the manufacturing
sector of developed countries. These studies provide new insights into the impact of low-wage
trade shocks on the evolution of high-wage countries, primarily. The focus of this study centres
on identifying the competitive effect of low-wage import exposure on the performance of
India’s manufacturing plants using China’s accession to WTO and subsequent Chinese import
escalation in India as the identification strategy.
1.1 Institutional Background
India is the world’s largest democracy and a home for about 18 percent of world’s population.
India became independent in 1947 and largely adhered to an inward-looking, import
substitution strategy and enforced state’s control on industrial production activity in the first
three decades. During the era, entry and production activity in the industrial sector were tightly
regulated by licensing requirement under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act
(IDRA), 1951.2 Between 1980 and 2000, the Government of India undertook major reform
initiatives in several phases. Though the steps toward liberalization started in the second-half
of 1970s, policy changes were rather ad-hoc. The first major phase of reform was materialized
in 1985 with the de-licensing of one-third of the organized industries at the 3-digit level.
However, on the external-sector, there was no such development at that time: trade and foreign
direct investment restrictions remained abound during the whole 1980s. While, the second
phase, compared to the first, was rather drastic and much comprehensive in scope, –prescribed
by IMF as pre-conditions for much needed financing at the time of balance of payment crisis
that had been gradually building up in the late 1980s. The key elements of 1990s reform
program include: de-licensing, FDI liberalization and trade liberalization. Licensing
2 For a detailed discussion on the License Raj see Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2008), Panagariya
(2008) and Chamarbagwala and Sharma (2011).
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requirement almost abolished in 1991 except for few exceptional cases (Aghion, Burgess,
Redding, and Zilibotti 2008). In addition, exchange rates liberalization and abandoning the
licensing requirement for the imports of capital and intermediate goods were also initiated
(Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj 2012).
India’s growth trajectory has changed after it has crossed a decade of significant
liberalization in its economic environment both externally and internally. India achieved an
amazingly high average growth rate of 8.5 percent during 2003-4 to 2010-11 period. Despite
rapid growth acceleration its speed of poverty reduction has been rather slow relative to other
faster growing economies. Many believe that the growth process has been largely driven by
capital- and skill intensive manufacturing industries rather than unskilled labor-intensive
sectors. As a result, the process could not attract a large number of agricultural workers into
manufacturing sector. A large proportion of India’s huge workforce is employed in small
informal enterprises where labor productivity is very low. As a result, the real wage of a large
proportion of employed individuals has been trapped at a low-level even though the economy
has been growing rapidly. Studies find that even after decades of liberalization changes India’s
restrictive labor market regime still constrains the growth of the economic establishments in a
significant way. Among various labor legislations, Industrial Development Act (IDA) of 1947
is considered the most significant one for the rigidity of India’s labor market. One key part of
this act requires that a plant with more than 100 workers must obtain permission from the
government to retrench any worker or close its operation even while incurring losses. In several
studies, it has been argued that the labor market regulations that are created to preserve the
well-being of labor are limiting their welfare in reality.
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1.2. Pattern of India’s International Trade
Direction of India’s foreign trade has changed significantly over the last two decades. India’s
imports and exports have been leaning towards developing countries from its traditional
reliance on the EU and North America. This pattern of changes in imports and exports are
reflected in Table 1 and Table 2 below.3 First, total import share of OECD countries declines
steadily throughout the period, from 57 percent (row sum of columns 1 to 4) in 1987-1991 to
32 percent 2007-2011, mostly due to fall in EU’s share by 18 and North America’s share by 5
percentage point. In contrast, share of developing countries increases by 13 percentage point
over the same period. Apparently, China’s share grows sharply after its WTO accession, which
increases from just 3 percent in 1997-2001 to 11 percent in 2007-2011.
Table 1–Share of Different Countries in India’s Imports
EU North
America
Asia
and
Oceania
All
Other
OECD
OPEC Eastern
Europe
Developing
countries
Others China
1987-1991 31 12 11 3 15 8 19 0.03 0.3
1992-1996 28 11 10 4 23 3 22 0.01 2
1997-2001 23 8 8 6 15 2 25 13 3
2002-2006 17 7 6 5 15 2 28 20 7
2007-2011 13 7 6 6 33 2 32 1 11
Source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
Table 2–Share of Different Countries in India’s Exports
EU North
America
Asia
and
Oceania
All
Other
OECD
OPEC Eastern
Europe
Developing
countries
Others China
1987-1991 26 18 11 3 7 16 17 3 0.2
1992-1996 27 20 8 2 10 4 27 2 1
1997-2001 25 22 6 2 11 3 29 2 2
2002-2006 21 18 4 2 15 2 38 0 6
2007-2011 19 12 3 1 20 1 40 4 6
Source: Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
India’s exports scenario exhibits some of the long-term patterns we have observed for its
imports. Firstly, OECD countries’ share of India’s exports declines gradually throughout the
3 Data are reported in financial year basis (For example, period 1987-1991 implies 1987-88 to 1991-1992).
Share of China is included in developing countries, hence, the row-sum is 100 excluding China. Columns 1 to 4
are OECD countries.
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period, from 58 percent in 1987-1991 to 35 percent in 2007-2011, where the share of EU, North
America and Asia and Oceania declines by 7, 6 and 8 percentage points respectively. On the
other hand, developing countries’ share of India’s exports increases by 23 percentage point
over the same period. As in the case of imports, there is a spiky increase in China’s share of
India’s exports in 2002-2006 compared to 1997-2001.
1.3 Some Anecdotal Evidence
In India, there is a growing concern among the policy makers and stakeholders regarding the
future of India's manufacturing sector in the face of heightened Chinese competition both in
the domestic and export markets. Such concerns are documented in different reports and policy
statements published by different government institutions in India. One interesting case of
Chinese competition faced by Indian producers both at home and abroad is the electrical
equipment industry. Recently, the Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises
(MHIPE), Government of India (2013) published a mission statement (for 2012-22) for
electrical equipment sector which documents different dimensions of competitive constraints
Indian firms confront including recent intensification of Chinese competition at home and
abroad. According to the report, during 2011-12, 45 percent of Indian imports in this sector
were contributed by China, which was approximately twice as much of the combined share of
Germany (10 percent), Japan (7 percent) and USA (6 percent). In contrast, only 3 percent of
India’s exports shipped to China. The report claims that Indian manufactures are finding it
difficult to compete with foreign suppliers in general, Chinese suppliers in particular, as on the
one side they have to pay duties on critical imported materials and taxes that are not applicable
to foreign producers, and on the other side, foreign suppliers enjoy lower tariffs on imported
inputs. It further claims that Chinese producers benefit from low cost financing, subsidized raw
materials and protected domestic market in China. Based on its analysis the report recommends
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increase in tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect the domestic industry from foreign
competition. Another similar report, again by the MHIPE, Automotive Mission Plan 2006-
2016, states that mainly because of higher taxes, the cost of manufacturing a passenger vehicle
is 23 percent higher in India relative to China. It points out that China has a competitive
advantage vis-à-vis India because of relatively higher labor productivity and lower
infrastructural costs. The reports like above highlight the concerns of local industries and policy
makers about the Chinese competition threat to India’s manufacturing sector. Therefore, the
empirical evidence presented in the study can be useful for the policymakers and industry
stakeholders in formulating future trade policies.
1.4 Related Literature
In addition to studies mentioned above, this paper relates to several strands of the literature.
First, there is a growing literature that explores the gains from trade in heterogeneous firm
models of trade pioneered by Melitz (2003) and facilitated by increasing availability of firm-
level data. The recent literature focuses on three main types of gains from trade (Melitz and
Trefler 2012)–owing to increasing availability of varieties with the rise in intra-industry trade
(“love-of-variety gains”); reallocation of factors of production from less to more-productive
firms (“allocative efficiency gains”) and increase in trade induced innovation (“productive
efficiency gains”). The first source of gains from trade arises from increased availability of
varieties to the consumers. Further, trade liberalization also expands the set of available inputs
to firms. Availability of new intermediate inputs facilitates the creation of new varieties,
leading to further gains from trade (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova 2010b).
The second source of gains arises as a result of reallocation of resources between firms (Melitz
2003; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). In this literature trade does not affect firm productivity but
increases aggregate productivity by reallocating market shares from low-productivity firms to
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high-productivity firms. The third source of gains from trade arises from increase in firm
productivity. Trade liberalization can increase firm productivity through several channels
(Melitz and Redding 2014): by encouraging firms to invest in technology adoption and
innovation activities; by upgrading the organization of production; and by changing the set of
products produced. Increased trade can affect innovation by inducing more competition. The
endogenous growth theory (Aghion et al. 2001) highlights the relationship between product
market competition and productivity growth. Aghion et al. (2005) suggest that competition
may encourage innovation via escape competition effect or discourage innovation via
Schumpeterian effect. This study suggests that in industries where cost of production is
approximately same across firms, competition incentivizes the firms to innovate more (escape
competition effect) by increasing the incremental profits from innovation. One the other hand,
in industries where production costs differ across firms, competition discourages innovation.
Economic integration can increase firm productivity by greater utilization of imported inputs,
which generally embed modern technology and superior quality (Amiti and Konings 2007;
Topalova and Khandelwal 2011; Kasahara and Rodrigue 2008; Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl
2015). Trade liberalization encourages technology adoption by incentivizing firms to enter the
export market (Bustos 2011; Lileeva and Trefler 2010). Fall in trade barriers can also increase
firm productivity by reallocation of resources within-firm (BRS 2011; Eckel and Neary 2010;
Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano 2014; Pavcnik 2002). This paper is more closely related to the
last channel, particularly studies that explore the impact of trade on firm productivity by
highlighting the role of product churning within-firm.
Third, this study also relates to the literature that examines the impact of economic reform in
general and trade liberalization in particular on productivity growth in a developing country
context. Using data from India’s organized manufacturing sector, the majority of these studies
confirm that trade reforms played an important role in driving productivity growth in India,
17
and the effects of input tariff liberalization is substantially greater than that of output tariff
(Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj 2012; Nataraj 2011; Topalova and Khandelwal 2011; Sivadasan
2009). But the underlying within-firm adjustment mechanism of such productivity
improvement remains unknown. This paper differs from the above studies in a number of
dimensions. First, in previous studies, such productivity gains to developing countries’
manufacturing sector are explored in the era when North-North and North-South trade
dominated the host country trade regime. This paper explores plant-level productivity
dynamics in the context of booming South-South trade, a new era of globalization history.
Second, in previous studies, the source of identification of the impact of reform is mainly
domestic policy changes, which embeds an element of selection across industries (see Topalova
and Khandelwal 2011, for a discussion on this issue). In this study, I examine the impact of a
large international event, the rise of China in the aftermath of WTO accession that has been
affecting the economic environment across countries. Third, the distinction of the trade shock
by source country allows me to draw a line between low-wage and high-wage countries.
1.5 Review of Recent Empirical Evidence
Recent studies based on firm-level data from developed economies document several
margins of adjustment at the firm-level in response to low-wage country trade competition.
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) find a significant within-firm effect of Chinese trade
on various measures of technical change: patents, IT intensity, R&D, management practices
and TFP. For example, both OLS and IV estimation for the industries (textiles and clothing)
where quotas were applicable, they find that Chinese import growth significantly increases
patents, IT intensity and TFP. On the reallocation effect of trade, they find that the rise in the
share of import from China negatively affects both employment growth and firm survival: (e.g.
a 10 percentage point rise in imports from China is associated with a 3.2 percent fall in
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employment). Moreover, the industry-level negative effect of China trade is larger than the
firm-level, which is consistent with their earlier result that the rise of trade competition leads
to exit of less productive firms. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) show that import
penetration from low-wage countries increases the probability of plant death, significantly.
Capital-intensive plants are more likely to survive compared to labor-intensive plants,
especially in industries with greater exposure to low-wage country imports. Second, low-wage
country import penetration is negatively and significantly correlated with employment growth
rate at the plant-level. Again, the effect of low-wage import exposure is smaller for more
capital-intensive plants. One interesting new result in this paper is that on an average 7.8
percent of the surviving plants switch industries over a five-year period. These switches are
inclined towards skill- and capital-intensive industries, and probability of switching rises with
low-wage country import exposure. Martin and Mejean (2014) explore the impact of low-wage
competition on product quality using dataset of French exporters from 1995 to 2005. They find
that product quality upgrading is more pronounced in sectors and destinations where firms face
more intense competition from low-wage countries. Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2013) and
Liu (2010) also find that there are heterogeneity across products within-plant in the way plants
adjust their product mix in response to import competition. Utar and Ruiz (2013) investigate
the performance of Mexican export processing plants in response to rising export growth from
China in the U.S. market. Bugamelli, Fabiani, and Sette (2015) examine the price adjustment
at the firm-level in Italy in response to intensified growth of imports from China, while Auer
and Fischer (2010), and Auer, Degen, and Fischer (2013) explore the impact of low-wage
import competition on industry-level producer prices in the United States and selected
European countries, respectively.
Recent research by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) show that import competition from a
low wage country has important implications for the local labor markets in U.S. In this paper
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differential import exposure of the local labor market stems from their differences in
employment concentration in manufacturing relative to non-manufacturing activities, and more
importantly, from the variation across manufacturing industries in terms of specialization.
These studies add new insights to the trade literature, particularly in understanding the impact
the low-wage country trade exposure on advanced economies. The growth of trade between
low-wage countries is a relatively recent phenomenon. Hitherto, how firms in low-wage
countries respond to trade shocks from other low-wage countries has been little researched.
The goal of this paper is to fill this vacuum in the international trade and plant performance
literature in the developing country context in general and low-wage country in particular. In
this paper, I explore the impact of trade shock originating from a large low-wage country,
China, on several margins of adjustment at the plant-level in another large low-wage
developing country, India.
1.6 Outline of Chapter 2
I separate the empirical analysis of the chapter into three stages: in the first part of this
chapter, I explore some key stylized facts about the multiple-product vis-à-vis single-product
plants in the ASI data with reference to GKPT (2010a) and BRS (2010) and against the cross-
sectional predictions of multiple-product models. For this purpose, I use detailed product level
data available in the ASI survey from 2000 to 2009. In the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
data, each product is identified by a unique product code named as ASI commodity
classification (ASICC) system. In order to convert the ASI product level information to an
internationally recognizable classification system, I reclassify the ASICC products to 5-digit
Central Product Classification (CPC) system of the United Nations. In this study, using CPC
system a multi-product plant is defined as the plant that produces more than one 5-digit CPC
products. Firstly, I find that approximately 50 percent of the plants in the ASI data produce
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multiple products that account for 75 percent of manufacturing output. Secondly, multi-product
plants are significantly larger than the single-product plants in the same industry. But in
contrast to GKPT (2010a), I find that plants in India exhibit substantial product churnings in
the 2000s, about 63 percent of the ASI plants change their product mix over a five-year period
of which 10 percent of plants only add and 11 percent only drop products, while 42 percent of
plants both add and drop products.
In the second part of Chapter 2, I first explore the impact of Chinese competition on revenue
productivity of the plant. I use Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin approach to estimate plant
productivity. I find that increase in Chinese import exposure leads to an improvement of plant
productivity. The result is robust to alternative identification schemes. Secondly, I find that
large plants rationalize their product range in the face of heightened import competition from
China. Again this finding is robust to alternative identification schemes.
In the final part of Chapter 2, I investigate the impact of Chinese competition on selection of
products within-plant. First, I examine the impact of Chinese competition on plants’ decision
to drop a product and whether there is any asymmetry across products within-plant in the
response to competitive shocks. The result suggests that the impact of competition on selection
of products is not symmetric within-plant, plants drop the product in which Chinese import
exposure is greater but the closer the product to the core competence of the plant, the less likely
it is to be dropped. Overall, the findings of the paper are consistent with the theoretical models
of multiple-product firms. The results are also consistent with the empirical findings of the
earlier studies that explore the impact of low-wage import competition shocks in the high-wage
country context.
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1.7 Outline of Chapter 3
In this chapter, I focus on two core labor market issues in the context of international trade,
–wage inequality and employment. I further examine whether the impact of trade shocks differ
by the flexibility of labor markets in India. To the extent that labor market inflexibility or
restrictions on plants’ ability to adjust to shocks is not uniform across Indian states,
consequences of trade shocks can also differ across labor regulation regimes. The variation in
India’s labor market environment presents an ideal setup to test whether there is any difference
between plants located in flexible and inflexible states in terms of their response to trade
shocks.
In the first part of this chapter, I explore the impact of import competition shocks on wage
inequality within-plant. I define wage inequality or skill premium at the plant level as the ratio
of average wages of paid to white-collar workers to the average wages of blue-collar workers
in the same plant. The set of paid white-collar workers includes supervisors, managers and
other employees and that of blue-collar workers include regular and contractual production
employees.
In the empirical specification, I examine whether skill premium increases with the increase
in import competition from China. In order to understand the underlying forces behind the
changes in skill premium, I further investigate how wages of different categories of workers
respond to changes in the competitive environment. I observed that the rise in import
competition from China leads to a general increase in within-plant wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers of large plants; a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import
exposure leads to a 1.35 percent increase in skill premium within-plant overall. However, a
separate analysis of average wages of white-collar and blue-collar workers suggests that import
competition from China induces a significant increase in average wages of white-collar
22
workers only, while there is no such impact on average wages of blue-collar workers. Then I
move on to examining whether the impact of competition on wage inequality differs by the
flexibility of labor market. Here, I find that the overall pattern is driven by the much larger
adjustment of within-plant skill premium in the flexible markets. Again the average wages of
white-collar workers rise in the face of import competition in the flexible market only. On the
other hand, import competition from China has no significant impact on wage inequality in the
inflexible market.
In the final section, I examine the impact of competition from China on employment of
different categories of workers. I find that, in the sample of large plants, import competition
from China leads to reallocation of labor from less to more productive plants. But consistent
with the literature of labor market flexibility, I find that the reallocation occurs only in the
flexible labor market suggesting that there is evidence of adjustment costs associated with labor
market inflexibility.
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Chapter 2
Low-wage Import Competition, Product Switching and
Performance of Manufacturing Plants: Evidence from
India in the Wake of China Trade Shock
2.1 Introduction
The extraordinary growth of China’s manufacturing exports in the aftermath of its WTO
accession in 2001 reshaped the competitive environment across countries. While a few recent
studies (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006; Khandelwal 2010; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013;
Utar 2014; Acemoglu et al. 2016; Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen 2016) investigate the impact
of low-wage import competition on high-wage economies, there is little research on its impact
on low-wage countries. This research is particularly interesting because firms in developing
countries are often protected from competition by high trade-barriers, entry regulation and
licensing requirements. The lack of competition allows low-productivity firms to survive and
produce relatively low-quality products that would otherwise have not been produced in a
competitive environment. In this paper, I explore the impact of low-wage import competition
emanating from China on plant revenue-productivity, product scope and reallocation of
products within-plant in India using factory-level data from the Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI). In particular, I exploit China’s WTO accession in December 2001, and the ensuing rise
in import competition in India as the key identification strategy.
To guide my empirical framework, I draw on the recent theoretical models of multi-product
heterogeneous firms. In single-product models of firm heterogeneity (Melitz 2003; Melitz and
Ottaviano 2008), trade liberalization increases aggregate productivity by inducing reallocation
of resources across firms as a decline in trade cost encourages less-productive firms to exit and
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more-productive firms to enter the export market. In this setup, the entry and exit of products
and their corresponding firms occur simultaneously. The multi-product extension of the single-
product heterogeneous firms literature predicts that trade liberalization improves firm
performance as firms drop their least attractive products and reallocate resources towards core
competent products (Eckel and Neary 2010; Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2011; Mayer,
Melitz, and Ottaviano 2014). Using detailed U.S. firm-level census data Bernard, Redding, and
Schott (hereafter BRS 2010) document that firms churn products frequently; and BRS (2011)
show that firms reduce their product scope in response to trade liberalization. In a developing-
country context, however, Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (henceforth GKPT
2010a) find that firms in India rarely drop products and that the reduction in output tariffs does
not affect firms’ product-rationalization decision.4
The lack of “creative destruction” in India during the 1990s is difficult to reconcile with the
fact that the Indian economy went through extensive tariff liberalization and a substantial
structural reform over the same period.5 One reasonable explanation is that the United States
and India differ from one another both in terms of internal economic environment (e.g. labor
market rigidities) and level of economic development (GKPT 2010a). Instead, GKPT (2010b)
show that trade liberalization can lead to an increase in firm product scope as the decline in
input tariffs paves the way for firms to use new intermediate inputs, which helps to create new
varieties. One particular feature of the 1990s reform regime in India is that high-wage countries
dominated the share of India’s imports. For example, during 1996-2000, the European Union
(EU-25), Japan and the United States jointly (EJU hereafter) accounted for more than 49
percent of India’s non-oil imports on average, while all the low-wage countries including China
4 GKPT (2010a) report that while 22 percent of the firms in Prowess database add at least one product, over a
five year period, only 4 percent of the firms drop a product and only 2 percent both add and drop a product.
5 The term “creative destruction” is a concept of Joseph Schumpeter, -defined as a process in which innovations
not only create new products but also drive out products generated by preceding innovations.
25
comprised just around 10 percent of imports over the same period. The scenario has now
changed: the average share of EJU dropped to 32 percent, while that of low-wage countries’
increased to 22 percent in 2006-10, where the average share of Chinese imports alone increased
by 11 percent.
The staggering change in the composition of India’s imports in a short period has important
implications for firm dynamics. The change in the origin of trade also alters the nature of the
product market competition faced by the firms. More specifically, product market competition
between low-wage and high-wage countries is distinct from the competition that occurs
between different low-wage countries. The current evidence shows that within a particular
product category, varieties originating in high-wage countries are of superior quality than those
originating in low-wage countries (Schott 2004; Hummels and Klenow 2005). More recent
studies document that import competition leads to product quality upgrading (Amiti and
Khandelwal 2013; Fernandes and Paunov 2013; Martin and Mejean 2014). Taken together, this
may affect firms’ product selection decision and thereby productivity. For instance, in a recent
paper, Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2013) find that Chinese import exposure induced product
churning within-firms in Mexico.
In the 2000s, the Indian economy experienced a new wave of trade shocks in the aftermath
of China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001. Guided by the theoretical predictions of
multi-product firm models of trade, several questions are explored in this context. Have plants
managed to improve their revenue productivity in the face of intensified import competition
from China? Has import competition shock from China affected the process of creative
destruction in India’s manufacturing industry? Is the within-plant adjustment mechanism
consistent with the theoretical prediction of multiple product model? The sharp rise in China’s
share of India’s manufacturing imports provides an ideal setting for identifying the impact of
import competition originating from China. I primarily exploit the variation in the changes of
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China’s import share across industries and over time as a source of low-wage import
competition shock in India. To control for concurrent changes in the import share of other
sources, I allow the import share of high-wage countries and other low-wage countries to affect
plant performance. However, there are reasons to worry about the strength of such
identification scheme. For instance, the measure of Chinese import exposure may be correlated
with different unobserved demand or supply side shocks to Indian industries. Another concern
is measurement error in the import competition variables. I address these identification
challenges by exploring alternative identification strategies. First, I exploit an instrumental
variable approach to identify Chinese import competition shock. In line with recent literature
on import competition, I use the lag changes in China’s share of imports of a large low-wage
country, Indonesia, as an instrument for changes in China’s share of India’s imports. A second
alternative specification examines robustness of the primary identification scheme by allowing
sector-specific trends as additional control variables.
I separate the empirical analysis of the paper into three stages: in the first part of the paper, I
explore the characteristics of the multi-product plants in the ASI data and evaluate the findings
in comparison to GKPT (2010a) and BRS (2010). For this purpose, I aggregate ASI product
level information to their corresponding internationally recognized Central Product
Classification (CPC) codes. I define a multi-product plant as the one that produces more than
one 5-digit CPC products. I observe that the cross sectional features of the multi-product plants
in ASI data are consistent with the earlier studies. First, I find that approximately 50 percent of
the plants produce multiple products that account for 75 percent of manufacturing output.
Second, multi-product plants are significantly larger than the single-product plants in the same
industry. Third, in contrast to GKPT (2010), I find that about 63 percent of the ASI plants
change their product mix over a five-year period; this is even higher rate of change than that of
U.S. firms (54 percent) during 1987-1997.
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In the second part of the paper, I investigate the impact of rising Chinese import competition
on plant revenue-productivity. Based on plant-level data from 1998 to 2009, I document that
the increase in Chinese import exposure leads to an improvement in plant revenue productivity.
The relationship between plant performance and Chinese import exposure remains consistent
in instrumental variable 2SLS regressions and OLS regressions with 2-digit sector fixed effects.
Overall, I find that a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import exposure leads to a 3.7
percent increase in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for the sample of large plants in the OLS
regression. Consistent with the findings with earlier studies, the IV estimates are generally
higher than their corresponding OLS counterparts. Using product-level data from 2000 to 2009,
I find that plants rationalize their product scope in the face of heightened import competition
from China. In the case of OLS, a 10 percentage point increase in share of India’s imports from
China leads to a 1 percent decrease in the number of products produced by the plants.
In the final section, I investigate the impact of import competition on the selection of products
within-plant. I find that the higher the level of import competition from China on a particular
product of a plant in the initial period the more likely it is that the plant drops the product in
the current period. But the chance of deleting the product decreases with the proximity of the
product to the core competence of the plants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses China’s integration
into WTO and its economic implications. Section three presents the data and section four
presents some stylized facts about the multi-product plants in India. Section five shows the
methodology for productivity estimation. Section six discusses the link between competition,
productivity and product scope. Section seven documents the link between import competition
and plant-product level adjustment, and section eight concludes.
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2.2 China’s Integration into WTO and its Economic Implications
On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of WTO. One of the key
implications of China’s accession to the WTO is that it has been granted “the most favored
nation (MFN)” status permanently, like all other member countries. Literally, this means that
no nation can discriminate against imports from China (e.g. by imposing higher tariff), which
has significantly lowered the cost of trade for Chinese products to other member countries.
Prior to China’s WTO accession, any WTO member country could, in principle, raise the tariff
rate unilaterally or resort to any of the non-tariff barriers (antidumping) to restrain Chinese
imports (Bown 2010).
Another key implication for developed and developing countries alike is that China also gets
the facility of Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) quota relaxation following its incorporation
into WTO. In the pre-accession period, China was excluded from the benefits of MFA quota
relaxation in the first two phases, which were effective from 1995 and 1998 respectively. The
U.S. extended the quota relaxation facility of the first two phases to China simultaneously with
the third one, on January 1, 2002, the scheduled the effective date of phase III (Brambilla,
Khandelwal, and Schott 2010).6 Therefore, within a month of China’s WTO entry, it gained
access to the first three rounds of quota relaxation.
A key reason China sought WTO membership and agreed to extensive liberalization of its trade
and investment regimes was to gain unfettered market access for its exports to other member
nations. WTO inclusion enables Chinese exporters to resort to the WTO dispute settlement
system whenever they consider any other member country’s actions regarding Chinese exports
6 The Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) was signed at the Uruguay Round in 1994 to end the MFA
quotas sequentially and to integrate the textiles and clothing products into WTO. The signing of MFA in 1974
protected textiles and clothing products from integration into WTO negotiations. The MFA quotas were
scheduled to be withdrawn in four phases: Phase-I, Phase-II, Phase-III, and Phase-IV respectively on 1995,
1998, 2002 and 2005, effective from 1 January of each year.
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to be discriminatory. Thus, accession to WTO has been crucial in ensuring stability in markets
for Chinese exporters, particularly in WTO member countries.7 On the other hand, membership
obliges China to gradually implement further economic reforms in important areas such as
trade liberalization, reducing barriers to foreign direct investment, and adhering to global
intellectual property rights standards. As expected, after integration into the WTO, China
further reduced barriers (tariffs and non-tariff) to trade and subsidies on exports. As a result of
trade liberalization, the cost of imported inputs plummeted, which reduced the cost of
production for Chinese firms, and increased the competitiveness of its exports worldwide
(Bown, 2010).
China’s WTO accession from India’s Perspective: The pattern of India’s foreign trade has
undergone significant changes over the last three decades, with China playing an increasingly
large role. Before the beginning of trade liberalization in India, China averaged just 0.3 percent
of Indian imports during 1987 to 1991 period. In the first five years of liberalization, 1992-
1996, China’s average share climbed to 2 percent, which increased to around 3 percent in the
1997-2001 period. But things have changed dramatically after China’s accession to WTO in
December 2001; China became one of India’s major trading partners with an average share of
about 11 percent of imports during the 2007-2011 period. Consequently, India’s manufacturing
industry faced a sudden rise in competition from China within a short period of time. Figure 1
shows the overall share of China and other low-wage countries in India’s total non-oil imports.8
7 In the pre-accession era, China’s MFN status in the United States was subject to an annual approval by the US
Congress. Because the United States accounts for a large share of China’s export, even in the pre accession era,
this raised a major uncertainty about Chinese exports in the U.S. market.
8 I exclude HS 1996 commodity codes (270900 and 271000) for petroleum from both imports and exports.
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Figure 1–Share of India’s (Non-Oil) Imports from China and Other LW countries
Source: UN Comtrade
2.3 Data
2.3.A Plant-level Data: In order to explore the impact of a low-wage country trade shock on
the performance of the manufacturing entities of a low-wage country, I combine plant-level
micro data from India with the country level bi-lateral commodity trade data. The source of
plant-level data is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), a survey of formal sector
manufacturing plants in India conducted by Central Statistical Office (CSO), a division of
National Statistical Office (NSO) under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme
Implementation, Government of India.
I use plant-level ASI panel data from 1998-1999 to 2009-2010 period. The choice of period
is based on following considerations. First, the main identification strategy set out in this paper
is based on the sharp increase in bi-lateral trade between China and India, following China’s
WTO accession in December 2001. To evaluate the impact of this bi-lateral trade shock, I need
plant-level panel data from India that cover the periods both before and after this event. Second,
a common factory identifier for ASI sample is available from 1998-1999 onwards, which
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allows me to use the panel data directly. Third, previous studies report that 1996-97 and 1997-
98 data are not comparable with the rest of the sample owing to differences in sampling
methodology and survey instrument; in addition the 1995-96 survey was not conducted.9
The ASI sampling frame includes all the plants registered under Sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii)
of the Factories Act, 1948: (i) factories that use power for manufacturing activities and employ
more than 10 employees (ii) those that conduct manufacturing without power and employ more
than 20 workers. The ASI also includes bidi and cigar factories satisfying one of the two criteria
above, and all the electricity generation plants. The sampling frame is based on the list of
registered entities maintained by chief inspector of factories in each state. The frame is
regularly updated on a periodic basis to include newly registered plants and exclude the de-
registered ones.
Though the ASI is the principal source of statistics for the Indian manufacturing sector, and
is increasingly popular among the applied micro researchers, there are important caveats of this
dataset that need careful consideration. In general, the unit of ASI survey is a plant in the case
of manufacturing entities. However, plants owned by the same company can submit the return
jointly if they operate in the same state and belong to same industry and sampling frame (census
or sample). The ASI sampling frame is divided into census and sample sectors. I label these
two categories as “census plants” and “sample plants”. Factories with employment above a
given threshold are considered to be “census plants,” and they are surveyed each year. In
addition, all the factories in less industrially developed states are always surveyed. The sample
plants are randomly selected. I utilize the ASI sampling weight (inverse of the sampling
frequency) for each plant in each year in all regression analysis. The employment threshold for
9 Few recent studies use this dataset for exploring the impact of various liberalization changes on firm performance
See Sivadasan (2009); Harrison, Martin and Nataraj (2012); and Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013) for recent
works. Earlier studies used some form of matching method to construct an imperfect panel of survey data prior to
1998-1999 (excluding the years mentioned above), which is then added with the panel dataset with common
factory codes from 1998-1999 onwards.
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the Census plants was 200 or more workers per plant for the year 1998 and 1999, which was
reduced to 100 or more workers from the year 2000 onwards. The ASI reports the year of initial
production for each plant and hence I can identify entrants and survivors. The ASI also provides
information about the current status of the plant (open or closed or others) but this information
is not enough to identify plant closure exactly. Identification of plant exit is also constrained
by the fact that only a fraction of the sample plants are surveyed in each year.
The ASI plant data are available on the basis of the financial year. For example, the 1998-99
survey reports plant data for the financial year that starts on April 1998 and ends on March
1999. Throughout the paper, I refer the survey year 1998-99 as year 1998 and so on.
Table A.1 shows the distribution of ASI-all plants by usability across years. The table shows
that plant-level variables such as output, labor, capital, materials, and fuels are missing for a
significant proportion of plants. I treat a plant as missing in a given year if at least one of these
variables is missing in the data. There are 417,006 plant-year observations in the “ASI-all”
sample, of which around 14 percent of observations are coded as missing. The non-missing
“ASI-all” sample includes 135,581 individual plants and 357,097 plant-year observations,
where 57,274 plants appear only once, and 2,160 plants appear in all the years (Table A.2).
I use only manufacturing units for the analysis, i.e. sectors 15 to 36 of NIC-2004 industry
codes. I refer the full ASI manufacturing sample “ASI-all”, which includes all the “census
plants” and “sample plants” after excluding non-manufacturing industries and the electricity
generation and distribution sector. Plants report information about output, labor, capital,
materials, fuels, and investment in each financial year. Table A.3 shows the distribution of ASI
plants by initial NIC-2 digit sector and technology intensity.10 A large percentage of the plants
10 I use OECD (2011) technology classification of the industries based on R&D intensities to categorize the ASI
plants by technology groups: High-tech., Medium-high-tech., Medium-low-tech., and Low-tech. industries.
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(43 percent) belong to low-technology intensive industries, while only a small proportion of
the plants (6 percent) belong to the high-technology category.
In addition to information about key plant-level variables, the ASI also reports plant location
(state and rural/urban) and other characteristics such as type of organization, ownership and
firm (multi-plant or single-plant). Plants report the opening and closing book value of fixed
capital (net of depreciation) for each financial year. I measure capital as the average of opening
and closing net book value of fixed capital in each year. Plants also report gross additions to
fixed capital, which I use as the main measure of investment. Both capital and investment are
deflated by the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) of machinery.
The real value added is computed as the difference between real output and real values of
intermediate inputs. Total output includes the value of all products and by-products, the
increase in the stock of semi-finished goods and the other income.11 Real output of a plant is
obtained by deflating total output with the corresponding WPI of the 3-digit NIC industry.
Input includes the value of material, fuels and other expenses. The value of material is deflated
by the material price deflator of the corresponding NIC 3-digit industry constructed by
combining WPIs with India’s Input-Output table. The value of fuels is deflated by WPI for fuel
price.
Labor employed by the plant is categorized into blue-collar or production employees and
white-collar or non-production employees. The ASI further classifies blue-collar labor into
regular and contractual workers. The number of blue-collar workers is calculated as the average
number of production workers employed in the plant in a given year, and the number of white-
collar workers is the difference between average number of total employees and blue-collar
11 I follow the ASI tabulation manuals to construct the plant-level value of output and input measures.
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workers. In the ASI data, white-collar workers are comprised of supervisors, managers and all
other non-production employees.
In terms of initial employment (LFirst), a significant percentage of the ASI-all (non-missing)
sample are small: around 34 percent of the plants employ less than 20 employees in the initial
year.12 Therefore, about 66 percent of the plants report at least 20 employees, where only
around 20 percent of the plants employ more than 200 employees in the beginning year. In this
paper, I am primarily interested in the impact of Chinese competition on medium and large
plants. Therefore, I exclude all small-sized plants from the baseline sample. After the cleaning
exercise, I end up with 235,186 plant-year observations of 74,162 plants with at least 20
employees. Hereafter, I refer the baseline sample as LFirst20. All the key inputs and output
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles by NIC 2-digit sector.
2.3.B Plant-Product-Level Data: The ASI data contain detailed product-level information for
all ASI plants from 2000 to 2009. Therefore, I use only 2000-2009 survey data for the plant-
product level analysis. The ASI survey questionnaire requires plants to identify their products
by specific ASI commodity classification (ASICC) codes.13 Factories report product-specific
information such as quantity manufactured, quantity sold, gross sale value, taxes, per unit net
sale value, and ex-factory value for each manufactured product. Based on the information, I
construct plant-product level panel data from 2000 to 2009 to investigate the product level
adjustment within plants in response to trade shocks.
In order to directly relate the plant-product level adjustment with the product-specific
measure of import competition by source country, I map ASICC product-level data to the
12 Initial employment is the total number employees reported when a plant first time observed in the ASI data
(1998-2009).
13 ASICC is a 5-digit product classification system
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Central Product Classification (CPC-version 2, hereafter CPC).14 Though the ASICC is a very
detailed product classification scheme, it is developed independently of the other
internationally recognized product and industrial (NIC) classification systems. As a result,
under the ASICC scheme it is not possible to establish a one-to-one relationship between these
two variables. I use a concordance published by Central Statistics Office (CSO) of India to map
the ASICC codes to the CPC level. Throughout the paper, I use the CPC codes as the main
product classification system and define the number of unique CPC-product codes as the
number of products produced by the plants.
As in the case of plant-level analysis, the product-level analysis is also based on non-missing
manufacturing sector plants with at least 20 employees. Further, I exclude the plants that do
not report detailed product codes or any manufacturing sector products. The final sample for
the plant-product-level dataset consists of 68,986 non-missing manufacturing plants from the
2000 to 2009 ASI sample. In this sample, all the plants jointly report 5,546 distinct ASICC-
2008-09 product codes that correspond to 945 unique CPC 5-digit product codes. Defining
products by the CPC five-digit classification system therefore provides a more conservative
estimate of product level adjustment within plants. For the sake of comparison, I also report
additional results based on ASICC product codes.15
2.4 Multi-Product Plants in India: Some Stylized Facts
Theoretical models of multi-product firms present several predictions about the distribution
and characteristics of the firms in the cross-section. This section explores some stylized facts
14 The commodity trade data are observed at HS 6-digit level, which is converted at CPC level by using HS to
CPC concordance provided by the United Nations. Both HS 1996 and CPC are the official product classification
systems of the United Nations.
15 Some plants report a fraction of their output under other-products and by-products category (ASICC-99).
Thus, I treated the products under this category as a single ASICC product.
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about the multiproduct plants in India through the lens of the multi-product models developed
by BRS (2010), Eckel and Neary (2010) and Eckel et al. (2015).16
I use the CPC codes as the main product classification system to distinguish between
multiple- and single-product plants. A single-product plant (SpC) is considered as one whose
set of products can be aggregated to a single CPC code. Therefore, if a plant produces single
or multiple ASICC product categories that fall within a single CPC 5-digit code, it is considered
as a single-product plant. Similarly, a multi-product plant (MpC) is one that produces multiple
CPC 5-digit categories. In addition, I also categorize plants by 4-digit CPC class and 2-digit
CPC division, i.e. whether the plants produce more than one CPC class or division.
Table 1–Proportion of Plants Producing Multiple Products in 2000
Percent of
Plants
Percent of
Output
Average No.
of 5-digit, 4-
digit or 2-digit
Products
Multiple Product (MpC) 0.50 0.75 2.8
Multiple Class (MpI) 0.38 0.64 2.6
Multiple Division (MpS) 0.28 0.48 2.3
Multiple ASICC Product (MpA) 0.52 0.77 3.0
Notes; Table reports the distribution of multi-product plants classifying them in
terms of their production of multiple 5-digit CPC, 4-digit CPC, 2-digit CPC and
multiple ASICC product categories. Sampling weights for the plants are used to
create the tabulated statistics. This table is based on LFirst20 sample excluding the
plants that do not report detailed product codes.
Table 1 reports the proportion of single and multi-product plants in India’s formal
manufacturing sector and their respective output share in the total manufacturing output in
2000. The table shows that around 50 percent of the plants in the ASI data are multi-product
plants that account for 75 percent of manufacturing output. These ratios are quite close to
Prowess firm sample, where 47 percent of the plants produce multiple products and contribute
16 I show that the characteristics of the multi-product ASI plants are consistent with the inferences of theoretical
models and resemble the cross-section feature India’s Prowess dataset and U.S. census studied by GKPT (2010)
and BRS (2010), respectively. Since classification of products varies across studies, such comparisons should be
considered with this caveat in mind.
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80 percent of manufacturing output.17 For the sake of comparison, 39 percent of the firms in
the U.S. produce multiple products and share 87 percent of total output. Rows (2) and (3)
indicate that 38 percent and 28 percent of ASI plants manufacture products that range more
than one class (i.e. 4-digit CPC) and division (i.e. 2-digit CPC) of CPC products, contributing
64 percent and 48 percent of total manufacturing output, respectively.
These figures are also consistent with GKPT (2010a), where 33 percent and 24 percent of
plants produce multiple-industry and multiple-sector products and account for 62 percent and
54 percent of output shares, respectively. In contrast, only 10 percent of U.S. firms operate in
multiple sectors but they produce 66 percent of total output. Therefore both ASI and Prowess
data show that plants/firms in India are more likely to operate in more than one segments but
these multiple division plants account for relatively lower share of output compared to firms in
U.S.
One of the key predictions of multiproduct model is that higher productivity firms produce a
larger range of products than the lower productivity firms. In BRS (2010) higher productivity
firms derive higher revenues per product, therefore can manage the fixed costs of a greater
range of products. Table 2 provides a comparison between multi-product and single-product
plants in India using ASI data in 2000.18 The table shows that multi-product plants are
significantly larger than the single-product plants in the same industry in terms of all the
measures of plant size. In the same industry, multi-product plants produce 95 percent higher
output and employ 54 percent more labor than single-product plants. The table also indicates
that MpC plants outperform their single-product counterparts both in terms of revenue based
TFP and labor productivity. In the same industry MpC plants have 9 percent higher TFP than
17 Based on ASICC product classification 52 percent of the plants in ASI data produce more than one product
and 77 percent of output.
18 Results for the other years are similar. The year 2000 is selected for reporting purposes to compare the results
with GKPT (2010a) and BRS (2010).
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SpC plants. The TFP coefficient is much larger than the corresponding estimates in GKPT
(2010a) and BRS (2010), where it is reported as 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The
results are similar for plants producing multiple class (MpI) and division (MpS) of CPC
products. Though the TFP difference is relatively smaller for MpI and MpS plants and
statistically insignificant, they are greater than GKPT (2010a) and BRS (2010) estimates.19
Table 2–Comparison between Multi-product and single-product plants
(1) (2) (3)
Variable MpC MpI MpS
Output (Y) 0.95 0.70 0.54
Value Added (RVA) 0.99 0.77 0.60
Employment (L) 0.54 0.48 0.40
Labor Productivity (LP) 0.30 0.20 0.14
TFP 0.09 0.03 0.01
Notes: Each row in this table reports results from regression of a plant-
level outcome measure on a dummy variable indicating whether the
plant produces multiple CPC 5-digit (MpC), CPC 4-digit (MpI) and CPC
2-digit (MpS) products respectively while controlling for plant main
industry fixed effects. Numbers reported in each cell are in percent form.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of plants’ main industry.
ASI data for 2000 is used in this Table. TFP is estimated by Woolridge-
Levinsohn-Petrin approach. All the coefficients are significant at 1
percent level, except log of LP in MpS, which is significant at 5 percent
and TFP in MpI and MpS, which are insignificant.
Table A.4 looks at the time series pattern of the proportion of multi-product plants and mean
number of products from 2000 to 2009. The last two rows show that the proportion of multi-
product plants in the ASI data decreased from 51 percent on average in 2000-04 to 46 percent
in 2005-09 period.20 This pattern is also reflected in the percentage of multiple CPC-class and
division plants. In a similar pattern, the average number of 5-digit, 4-digit and 2-digit products
decline from 2004 onwards though the changes are marginal. Column (4) shows that mean
number of CPC 5-digit products produced by the plants decreased from 1.92 in 2000-04 to 1.84
19 The TFP coefficient for MpI plants ranges from 4 percent to 9 percent from 2001 to 2009 and remain
statistically significant in most cases. For MpS plants it ranges from 0 percent to 8 percent from 2001 to 2008
but turns negative (1 percent) in 2009 though statistically insignificant.
20 This pattern is also consistent with the un-weighted mean of the sample.
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in 2005-09 period. The observed downward trends in the proportion of multi-product plants
and the mean number of products suggest that, overall, Indian plants have been shrinking their
product range in the second half of 2000s. GKPT (2010a) reports that average number of
products increased from 1.4 in 1989 to around 2.3 in 2003. The question of interest is what has
caused this turnaround at the aggregate level. In this paper, I find that changes in competitive
environment in India driven by the rising share of Chinese imports induced plants to shrink
their product range.
Another key prediction of multi-product firm model (BRS 2010; Eckel and Neary 2010) is
that firms output is skewed towards its core competence. Table A.5 represents the average share
of a product in total sales of the plants, where products are sorted in terms of their output share
in descending order. I show the results for the plants producing up to ten products (CPC 5-
digit). These plants represent 99.89 percent of the LFirst20 sample. The table portrays the
evidence of product heterogeneity within plants in line with the prediction of multi-product
firm models. As in BRS (2010) and GKPT (2010a), distribution of the ASI product-level data
also show high skewness. The average share of the largest product declines gradually as the
number of product increases: starting from 92 percent for plants producing two products to 46
percent for plants producing 10 products. These figures are close to the corresponding figures
reported in GKPT (2010a): 86 and 46 percent, respectively.
In order to understand the within-plant adjustment mechanism behind the observed decline
in the proportion of multi-product plants and the fall in product scope in India’s formal
manufacturing sector from 2000 to 2009, it is important to investigate how plants change their
product mix over the same period. The product switching analysis is based on the plants for
which data are available both in the beginning and end point of a period. I categorize the plants
into four mutually exclusive activities: N, A, D and AD. The group “N” only includes the plants
that keep their product mix unaltered over time or take “no action”. The group “A” contains
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plants that “only add” products and “D” includes plants that “only drop” products. The “AD”
group comprises plants that “both add and drop” products at the same time. A plant is
considered in group “A” if it adds at least one product in period t that is not produced in period
t-τ and it does not drop any product over the same time. Similarly, a plant is considered in
group “D” if it drops at least one product in period t from a set of products that are produced
in t-τ and it does not add any product in the same period. In all cases τ represents lag time 
period (e.g. 1 or 5).
In Table 3, I find that Indian plants change their product mix quite frequently between 2000
and 2009. The table portrays product switching activity of the plants over five-year horizon
based on main 5-digit CPC products produced by the plants. Therefore, I exclude “other
product and by-products” category from the product-switching analysis as this code cannot be
treated as a unique CPC product. Each column shows the distribution of a particular type (all,
single-product and multi-product) of plants according to their activity. Columns (1) to (3)
present the results for the LFirst20 sample, and (4) to (6) show the results for the LFirst200
sample. In column (1), I find that more than 63 percent of the ASI plants change their product
mix over a five-year period on average in the 2000s: 10 percent of plants only add (“A”) and
11 percent only drop (D) products, while 42 percent of the plants both add and drop products
(“AD”).
These figures are strikingly different than those reported in GKPT (2010a): 22 percent only
add, 4 percent only drop and 2 percent both add and drop products in 1990s. Though the product
switching pattern observed here is much different than the GKPT (2010a) for India, this pattern
is reasonably similar to activity of U.S. firms between 1987 and 1997 reported by BRS (2010):
14 percent only add, 15 percent only drop and 25 percent both add and drop products.
Therefore, results provide new insights about the behavior of the plants in India in the 2000s.
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The key difference between the present study and GKPT (2010a) is that, this study
investigates the plant-product level dynamics in 2000s, while GKPT explore firm-product level
dynamics in the 1990s. The difference between these two periods in the context of India is that
during 1990s, India’s imports and exports were dominated by developed countries. In contrast,
during 2000s, India experienced a sharp rise in growth of imports from low-wage sources in
general and China in particular. The difference in the plant-product level dynamics between
the two studies, therefore, may arise from the distinction in product market competition that
emanates from developed countries and that originates from low-wage countries. The main
objective of this paper is to investigate whether intensified import competition from China is
an important contributing factor behind this new “creative destruction” phenomenon in Indian
economy.
Table 3–Product Switching Activity of the Plants
The table also shows that plants that produce more than one product are more active than
those produce single-product. Only 39 percent of the single-product plants changed their
product mix over a five-year period compared to 80 percent of the multi-product plants in
LFirst20 sample.
LFirst20 LFirst200
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Activity All Single-
Product
Multi-
product
All Single-
Product
Multi-product
No Activity 37 61 21 35 64 22
Only Add 10 10 10 11 11 10
Only Drop 11 - 19 12 - 18
Both Add & Drop 42 29 51 42 24 50
Notes: Table presents the classification of the plants in terms of four mutually exclusive product-
switching activities: No Activity, only added, only dropped and both added and dropped. Columns
(1) to (3) show the results for the LFirst20 sample and (4) to (6) show the results for the LFirst200
sample. Each column of this table is based on five-year average of the activities. A product is
considered as added in year t if it was not produced in t-5 and a product is dropped in year t if it
was produced in t-5.
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2.5 Measuring Productivity
I estimate productivity at the plant-level by using ASI data over the period 1998 to 2009 and
implementing Woolridge’s (2009) production function estimation approach, which is a
modified version of Levinsohn and Petrin (hereafter LP, 2003). The modified estimation
strategy is known as Woolridge-Levinsohn-Petrin (WLP) approach and it is robust to criticism
of Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (hereafter ACR, 2006).
I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function,
௜߭௧ = ߙ+ ߚ௟݈ ௜௧+ ߚ௞ ௜݇௧+ ߱௜௧+ ߝ௜௧ (1)
௜߭௧ is the log real value added of plant i at year t. ௜݈௧ is a vector of variable inputs (log number
of blue-collar, ௕݈,௜௧ and white-collar employees, ௪݈ ,௜௧) and ௜݇௧ is the log of plant capital. ߱௜௧
represents shocks to productivity that are observed by plants while choosing their inputs but
unobservable to the econometrician. ߝ௜௧ represents all other shocks to productivity that are not
known either to the plants or the econometrician. Thus, a plant’s input choices are correlated
with the predictable component of productivity shocks, ߱௜௧. In this case, application of OLS
regression leads to bias in the coefficients of the production function and thereby causes bias
in the estimated productivity.
In order to solve the problem of simultaneity of productivity and variable inputs, Olley and
Pakes (hereafter OP, 1996) propose a proxy variable approach, where investment is used as a
proxy variable for productivity, ߱௜௧. OP show that if investment is a strictly monotonic function
of productivity and capital, then the function can be inverted to obtain the relationship:
߱௜௧ = ݓ( ௜݇௧,݉ ௜௧) (2)
where ݉ ௜௧ is a vector of proxy variables: investment in OP and intermediate inputs in LP.
However, in practice, investment appears to be zero for a large fraction of plants. To circumvent
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this zero investment problem, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest using intermediate inputs
as proxy variables.
௜߭௧ = ߙ+ ߚ௟݈ ௜௧+ ߚ௞ ௜݇௧+ ݓ( ௜݇௧,݉ ௜௧) + ߝ௜௧ (3)
Since ௜݇௧ appears both as a variable and in the function ݓ(∙,∙), it is not identifiable in this
equation. ACR (2006) show that if intermediate inputs and labor inputs are determined
simultaneously, then ߚ௟is also not identified in equation (3). Woolridge (2009) suggests a one-
step GMM framework, where the moment conditions of OP and LP approach are modified to
estimate ߚ௟ and ߚ௞ jointly.
The next stage calculates productivity as the difference between annual value-added (or
output) and estimated value-added obtained by adding the factors of production multiplied by
their respective elasticity coefficients.
߮௜௧ = ݒ௜௧− ߚመ௕௦ ௕݈,௜௧− ߚመ௪௦ ௪݈ ,௜௧− ߚመ௞௦ ௜݇௧ (4)
I use fuels consumption at the plant level as a proxy variable and estimate the production
function coefficients for each sector (NIC 2-digit) separately. The superscript s on the
coefficients of input represents a sector.21
2.6 The Link between Competition, Productivity and Product Scope
The incorporation of multi-product firms into the international trade models of firm
heterogeneity highlights a new channel of within-firm adjustment in response to trade
competition in addition to the across firm selection (entry-exit) effect that arises in the single-
product heterogeneous firm models. The main prediction from these models is that firms
change their product mix or drop the least performing products in the face of trade competition
21 I use a slightly modified version of the Stata program for production function estimation available at the
website of Amil Petrin: https://sites.google.com/a/umn.edu/amil-petrin/home/Available-Programs.
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in a way that results in productivity gains within the firm (BRS 2011; Eckel and Neary 2010;
Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano 2014).
BRS (2011) develop a multi-product extension of the single-product heterogeneous firm
model of Meltiz (2003) with constant elasticity of substitution preferences and monopolistic
competition. The key implication of these two assumptions combined is that the markup is
fixed and unaffected by a trade shock. In this model, opening up to trade increases product
market competition by encouraging entry of domestic firms, which leads to a reduction in
average prices of varieties. Surviving firms drop their least successful products in the domestic
market but derive more revenue for their higher quality products in the export market. The
productivity of firms increases as firms focus on their higher attribute products.
Eckel and Neary (2010) build a model of multi-product firms by combining the supply side
connection between the varieties through flexible manufacturing and the demand side linkage
through a cannibalization effect. Under flexible manufacturing, marginal cost differs across
varieties. Marginal cost is lowest for the core competence variety, which the firm can produce
most efficiently. On the other hand, the cannibalization effect arises when a large firm in a
particular market faces declining demand for its existing varieties when it introduces a new
variety. A rise in competition increases productivity as firms focus on core competence
products and drop the high marginal cost varieties.
While I emphasize on the role of within-firm product selection mechanism as the main
channel of improvement in revenue productivity, there are other important channels through
which import-competition can affect firm performance. The endogenous growth theory
(Aghion et al. 1997, 2001) highlights the relationship between product market competition and
productivity growth. Aghion et al. (2005) suggest that the relationship between product market
competition and productivity growth is U-shaped. Competition may encourage innovation via
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escape competition effect or discourage innovation via Schumpeterian effect. Bloom, Romer,
Terry, and Van Reenen (2013, 2014) build a new theoretical framework that shows how low-
wage (southern) import competition can induce firms in the high-wage (northern) countries to
innovate more. They argue that some factors of production are firm-product specific. These
can either be used to produce an existing good or to innovate a new good. An increase in low-
wage import competition that lowers the profitability of an existing firm product, by driving
down its price, also lowers the opportunity cost of the trapped factors for innovating relative to
producing the old good. This is a North-South model where only the northern firms innovate.
Though the underlying mechanism is different, this model also predicts reallocation of
resources within firms in the face of import competition, in line with the multi-product firms
above.22
Based on the mechanism prescribed by the firm heterogeneity and trade literature in the
context of trade liberalization, we can postulate that the pro-competitive effect of China’s WTO
accession unfolds through the inward shift of the demand curve of the firms operating in
industries that experience a rise in Chinese imports. Firms respond to this change in competitive
environment by reducing prices and markups.
2.6.A Import Competition and Plant Performance
The primary empirical strategy of this paper draws upon the framework adopted in the earlier
studies that explore the impact of low-wage (China) import competition shocks on the
22 Another competition channel of productivity improvement is through inducing better quality management and
decentralization in decision making (Van Reenen 2011; Bloom et al. 2010). In a recent study, Bloom et al. (2013)
find that low-quality management practices are the major reasons behind low-productivity in India’s
manufacturing sector. In this case, competition can improve firm productivity by encouraging firms to improve
management quality (Van Reenen 2011), and decentralize where both the factors can increase productivity
(Bloom et al. 2010).
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productivity of manufacturing establishments. The main left-hand side variable is a particular
measure of productivity for the manufacturing plant i in industry j at time t.
݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ = ߙ௜+ ߚଵ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟+ ߦ௜௝௧ (5)
The key coefficient of interest in equation (5) is β1 corresponding to (ܯூே஼ு )௝௧ି ௟that measures
China’s share of India’s imports in industry j in period t-l. The term i denotes plant fixed
effects that account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, which are likely to be
correlated with the plant productivity and its exposure to international trade. The last term, ξijt,
is idiosyncratic error assumed to be uncorrelated with the measures of trade shocks and other
right hand side variables.
In this study, the measure of import competition follows the “value share” approach proposed
by Schott (2002), and Bernard and Jensen (2002),
ܫூே
ௌ ,௝௧ = ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೄೖ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೈೖ (6)
where ܫூேௌ ,௝௧ is the ratio of the sum of the value of all products imported from source S (China
or high-wage countries) and the sum of the value of all products imported from the world
(W).
Vkjt,s is the import value of product k in industry j at time t from source S and Vkjt,w is the import
value of product k in industry j at time t from world. k represents a particular HS 6-digit product
category that corresponds to industry j (ISIC 4-digit industry).23
The trade exposure at the industry-level masks the true competition component of trade.
Industry-level aggregation of product codes (HS 6-digit) includes four different types of
products in general: consumer goods, capital goods, intermediate goods and raw materials
23 Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) use this approach as the main measure of Chinese import competition.
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(according to UNCTAD standard product group classification). Aggregating all types of
products may underestimate competitive impact of increasing import exposure. In order to
obtain a more precise measure of competition at the industry-level, I modify the above measure
of import competition by excluding all the raw materials (RM) from the numerator of equation
(6). That is, the degree of import competition in industry j, ܯூேௌ ,௝௧, is the ratio of the sum of the
value of all products except raw materials imported from China (or high-wage countries) and
the sum of the value of all products including raw materials imported from the world. The
measure of import competition is as follows:
ܯூே
ௌ ,௝௧= ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೄೖ,ೖಯೃಾ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೈೖ (7)
I take the five-year difference of the key variables of interest to control for plant fixed effects
and estimate the following equation:
Δହ݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ࣆܺ௜+ ߚଵΔହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟+ ߦ௜௝௧ (8)
where Δହ݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ represents the change in productivity of plant i at time t compared to t-5.
Δହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟indicates the change in the value share of import from China in industry j in
period t-l. ௦߬௧ is the set of state-year fixed effects and ܺ௜ is a vector of control variables: a set
of initial technology classification (based on R&D intensity) dummies and a rural/urban
location dummy, which equals 1 if a plant is located in a rural location or 0 otherwise. In this
difference form specification, inclusion of the initial technology dummies addresses the issue
that the productivity growth may differ across different technology intensity groups. Similarly,
the rural/urban dummy controls for differential trend in productivity growth rate between plants
located in rural areas and those located in urban areas.24 Since I measure the trade shock at the
24 To the extent that production environment in rural area may be different from that of urban area, dynamics of
plant growth can also differ between the two areas. Another important observation in the context of this paper is
that average age of rural plants in ASI data is significantly smaller than the average age of urban plants. This
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industry (NIC 4-digit) level, I cluster the standard errors at the level of the plant’s main industry
in all the regressions. In the baseline specification, I use lag length l=1 for the changes in import
value shares.25
According to the theory of multi-product firms, β1 would be positive if the increase in
Chinese import competition leads to an improvement in plant performance as plants reallocate
resources towards core competence product and drop their higher marginal cost products.
Alternatively, β1 can be positive if competition induces plants to increase efficiency by
adopting advanced technology or better management practices.26
In the above specification (8), I do not control for import competition from other sources,
which may bias the coefficient β1. One possibility is that increase in imports from China in a
particular industry drives out imports from other sources (e.g. developed economies) in that
industry. Another possibility is that an industry which is not exposed to Chinese competition
may nonetheless face competition from developed countries. As a result, competition from
China and developed countries would be negatively correlated. If competition from developed
countries also has a positive effect on plant performance measure, omission of this alternative
source of shock can cause a downward bias in β1. However, the coefficient β1 may over-
estimate the impact of Chinese competition if it is positively correlated with a simultaneous
rise in import share from other sources, where the latter itself is also positively correlated with
the productivity measure. In order to address this issue, I modify the plant performance
regression equation as follows:
Δହ݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ࣆܺ࢏+ ߚଵΔହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟+ ߚଶΔହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧ି ௟+ ߦ௜௝௧ , (9)
evidence suggests that more new plants have been formed in rural than in urban areas. Therefore, the inclusion of
rural (or urban dummy) is expected to capture differences in patterns of plant growth dynamics.
25 UN Comtrade records trade data in calendar years, whereas the ASI data are available in financial years. For
example, 1998-99 ASI data and 1998 trade data in Comtrade are considered in the same year.
26 β1 can also be positive if plants invest in innovating high-quality products in the face of competition.
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where Δହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧ represents the change in the combined share of EU, Japan and US in India’s
industry-wise imports. As a robustness check, I also report results after controlling for changes
in import competition from other low-wage countries, Δହ(ܯூே௅ௐ )௝௧, along with two main
sources of import shocks. For notational simplicity, in the discussion that follows, I use ΔCHN 
for Δହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧, ΔEJU for Δହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧ and ΔLW for Δହ(ܯூே௅ௐ )௝௧.
Table 4 shows the regression results of changes in plant revenue productivity measured by
the WLP approach on changes in import competition measured at industry (NIC 4-digit) level.
In order to check the sensitivity of the results to outliers in TFP, I report the regression results
separately both for unwinsorized and winsorized TFP series. Since ASI data contain both
census and sample plants and the impact of import competition might differ by plant size, I
perform regressions by different size threshold of the plants. Block-A reports the results for the
LFirst200 sample (at least 200 employees) and Block-B reports the results for the LFirst100
sample (at least 100 employees). In Table A.6, I report the regression results for the LFirst20
(at least 20 employees) sample. In Table 4, the first and fourth columns in each table show the
results when only lagged changes in the Chinese import ratio are included in the regression.
The second and fifth columns add the lag changes in EJU’s import share; and third and sixth
columns add lag changes in both EJU’s and other LW’s import share in addition to changes in
China’s share. Note that regressions include the plants that are sampled and non-missing at the
starting and end point of the five-year interval. In this table, standard errors are clustered at the
4-digit industry level and reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients.
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Table 4–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Productivity (OLS)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.374** 0.408** 0.438** 0.400** 0.427** 0.451**
(0.186) (0.206) (0.199) (0.191) (0.213) (0.213)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.103 0.15 0.077 0.116
(0.138) (0.138) (0.136) (0.148)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.134 0.108
(0.094) (0.109)
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027
Panel-B Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt (winsorized)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.392** 0.427** 0.447** 0.420** 0.446** 0.459**
(0.183) (0.201) (0.195) (0.189) (0.211) (0.211)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.102 0.135 0.074 0.096
(0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.142)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.092 0.06
(0.097) (0.110)
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028
Observations 22618 22618 22618 31976 31976 31976
Plant 4970 4970 4970 7906 7906 7906
NIC4 118 118 118 118 118 118
NIC4-Year 750 750 750 787 787 787
Clusters 118 118 118 118 118 118
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in TFP on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s
and other LW’s import share in India. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A include only LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in
Block-B include LFirst100 sample. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at plant’s main (NIC 4-
digit) industry level. All the regressions include rural/urban location dummy, technology intensity dummies and
state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant”
indicates number of unique ASI plants included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit
industry codes and number of NIC4-year combination included in each regression. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Of particular interest is β1, the coefficient of changes in Chinese import value share across
various regression specifications. The results are economically and statistically significant. In
Panel-A, column (1), the coefficient indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in China’s
share of India’s imports causes a 3.7 percent increase in plant TFP. In all the specifications, the
coefficient β1 is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level. The size of the β1
coefficient is also slightly higher for the LFirst100 sample compared to corresponding
estimates of LFirst200 sample.
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In columns (2) and (5), I introduce controls for other sources of import competition by
including the first lag of ΔEJU (which represents European, Japanese and US imports). The 
size of the β coefficient increases further in columns (3) and (6) after including lag of other
LW’s import share in addition to lag of ΔEJU. In the table, both the import shocks of high-
wage countries and other LWs are positive but remain statistically insignificant. Taken
together, results suggest that there is a slight downward bias in the coefficient ΔCHN, when I 
do not control for the import shocks from high-wage and other LW countries. As discussed
above, this downward bias is plausibly arising from negative correlation between Chinese
import share and high-wage (or other low-wage) import share, where the latter is positively
associated with plant productivity. Panel-B shows the regression results after correcting for
outliers in estimated TFP. The baseline TFP series is winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles
before taking the five-year difference. The coefficient of interest, β1, is slightly higher in Panel-
B in comparison to their corresponding estimates in Panel-A. However, the level of
significance and overall pattern of β1 remain unchanged. Thus, the presence of outliers in base
TFP slightly underestimates the impact of Chinese competition on plant TFP.
Endogeneity emanating from unobserved Shocks: Our baseline estimation strategy is not free
from endogeneity concerns, such as bias emanating from unobserved demand and supply
shocks. One possibility is that industry-specific unobserved technology shocks are partly
correlated with the changes in import demand from China and productivity growth of the
industry. An unobserved positive technology shock that raises aggregate productivity of an
industry may discourage growth of imports from China in that Industry. As a result, the OLS
estimate of the coefficient β1 would be biased downward. Similar bias can also arise from other
supply side shocks such as fall in input prices. In contrast, positive demand shocks will generate
an upward bias in β1. Another potential source of endogeneity lies in the fact that industry-level
import competition variables could be measured with error. Such measurement error would
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cause attenuation bias in our estimate of interest. Therefore, whether OLS underestimates or
overestimates the import competition coefficient is an empirical issue.
In order to identify the causal effect of Chinese import exposure on India’s manufacturing
performance, I employed instrumental variable (IV) strategy. Since I am interested in
estimating China’s contribution to the improvement of plant performance in India, the best way
to identify that mechanism is to find an instrument that would capture China’s supply-side
driven component of its export growth to low-wage countries, but uncorrelated with the
demand- and supply-side shocks in India. For this purpose, we need another low-wage country
that is comparable to India in terms of economic conditions and that faces increase in import
competition from China within the period under consideration. In the spirit of the recent studies
of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016), I use the lag changes in
Chinese import value share in Indonesia, a large low-wage country, as the instrument for
changes in Chinese import value share in India. In particular, I use τ-1'th lag changes in Chinese
import share in Indonesia as the instrument for τ’th lag changes in Chinese import share in
India. The legitimacy of this identification strategy relies on the assumption that growth of
China’s exports to India and exports to Indonesia share a common component, which is mainly
driven by China’s rising competitiveness and falling barriers to trade.
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) argue that measured import exposure can also be correlated
with domestic shocks to U.S. industries (e.g. labor demand shocks) that in turn affect the U.S.’s
demand for import. In order to identify the effect of the supply-side driven component of
imports from China, they use concurrent growth of Chinese imports in eight other developed
economies.
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Table 5–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Productivity (2SLS)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.831* 0.882** 0.913** 0.753* 0.785* 0.808*
(0.432) (0.446) (0.443) (0.447) (0.461) (0.460)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.211 0.277 0.161 0.216
(0.170) (0.175) (0.176) (0.193)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.195** 0.158
(0.093) (0.117)
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Panel-B Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt (winsorized)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.906** 0.959** 0.985** 0.807* 0.840* 0.857*
(0.421) (0.433) (0.431) (0.435) (0.447) (0.449)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.224 0.279* 0.166 0.207
(0.162) (0.167) (0.171) (0.186)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.162* 0.115
(0.088) (0.110)
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027
Observations 22618 22618 22618 31976 31976 31976
Plant 4970 4970 4970 7906 7906 7906
NIC4 118 118 118 118 118 118
NIC4-Year 750 750 750 787 787 787
Clusters 118 118 118 118 118 118
Panel-C
Dependent Variable: Δ5(CHN)(t-1)
First Stage Results
Instruments Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1
R-sq. 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.38 0.43 0.45
F(2,117) 53.39 40.87 34.22 57.27 48.24 40.32
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Table reports results from 2SLS regression of changes in TFP on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s as well as
LW’s import share in India. All regressions are based on five-year difference data. In the first stage, Δ5(CHN)(t-1)
is instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Columns
(1)-(3) in Block-A include only LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B include LFirst100 sample. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. All the regressions include rural/urban location
dummy, technology intensity dummies and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied
in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants included in the regression.
NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and number of NIC4-year combination included in
each regression.
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) use three alternative identification strategies to
identify the effect of trade on technical change. Their main identification strategy is the China’s
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accession to WTO in 2001 and subsequent removal of most of the MFA quotas. It is implicitly
assumed that the level of quotas in 2000 were exogenous to technology shocks in the future as
these quotas were initiated during the 1950s and their phasing out was designed during the late
1980s prior to Uruguay Round. Secondly, they utilize pre-accession (1999) exposure to
Chinese import as an initial condition in instrumenting the growth of import from China.
Lastly, an industry trend is used to control for technology shocks.
In Table 5, Panel-A and Panel-B report 2SLS regression estimates for unwinsorized and
winsorized samples and Panel-C reports corresponding first stages. Block-A reports the results
for LFirst200 sample and Block-B for LFirst100 sample. For LFirst200 sample, results in
Block-A suggest that 2SLS estimates of the impact of Chinese import competition on plant
TFP are much larger than their corresponding OLS estimates both for unwinsorized and
winsorized TFP and the results are statistically significant at 5 percent level in most cases. In
Panel-A, for unwinsorized TFP, the estimate is statistically significant at 10 percent level in
column (1), and at 5 percent level in columns (2) and (3). In Panel-B of Block-A, the coefficient
of interest is significant at 5 percent level in all cases. On the other hand, in the case of
LFirst100 sample (Block-B), the estimates of β1 are still much larger than their OLS
counterparts and statistically significant at 10 percent level in all the columns. Again, I find
similar results for LFirst20 sample reported in appendix of this chapter (Table A.6).
Panel-C shows strong first stage regression results across all the specifications. In column
(1), the adjusted r-squared from first-stage regression is 0.39 and the F-statistics is 53.39. The
corresponding 2SLS estimate of the coefficient of interest β1 is 0.831 for unwinsorized (column
1, Panel-A) and 0.906 for winsorized TFP (column 1, Panel-B). As in the case OLS, the
magnitude of the impact of Chinese import competition increases after adding changes in EJU’s
(column 2), and both EJUs and other LW’s imports (column 3).
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Therefore, it appears that the OLS coefficient of Chinese competition shock is biased
downward. The results are consistent with the findings of the earlier studies. For example,
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reneen (2016) find that the 2SLS estimates are generally larger than
the OLS counterparts. As discussed earlier, unobserved technology shocks coupled with error
in measurement of import exposure variable may cause OLS to underestimate the competition
effects of China.
In order to verify that our results are not driven by plant entry and exit or missing data
problem, I re-estimate the model with a balanced sample of plants, which are available from
1998 to 2009 period. Table A.8 (appendix) reports the results for balanced sample. The table
confirms that the main results of this chapter hold in the balanced panel. In fact, in each
specification, the coefficient of Chinese import exposure is larger than the corresponding
unbalanced counterpart.
Preexisting Industry Confounds and Pre-Trend: In this section, I investigate the sensitivity of
the results from OLS regressions in five-year difference form to alternative specifications by
incorporating 2-digit initial sector specific fixed effects. In this case, I exclude the initial
technology intensity dummies and replace them with NIC 2-digit dummies.
Table 6 reports the regression results with NIC 2-digit sector fixed effects. Inclusion of these
sector specific fixed effects addresses the concern that changes in import competition from
China are likely to be correlated with the technological progress within sectors. Given that our
regression is in difference form, incorporation of these fixed effects is equivalent to allowing
for sector-specific differential trends in the levels. The specification with sector fixed effects,
therefore, exploits the variation in import exposure across industries within sector to identify
the plant-level impacts of import competition shocks. However, if the industry-level import
exposure is measured with error, inclusion of these sector-specific dummy variables may
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exacerbate attenuation bias in the import exposure coefficients. Moreover, as Acemoglu et al.
(2016) point out, a rise in import competition in a particular industry within a sector may induce
plants in other industries in the same sector to adjust to this shock in anticipation of a rise in
competition.
Panel-A in Table 6 reports OLS regression results for the unwinsorized TFP and Panel-B
reports the results for winsorized TFP with 2-digit sector fixed effects. In the case of LFirst200
sample, in column (1) of Panel-A, the estimate of the impact of Chinese import competition on
productivity is 0.287 with NIC 2-digit sector fixed effects, which is significant at 10 percent
level with a standard error of 0.15. This estimate is about 9 percentage points smaller than the
corresponding coefficient of 0.374 in the base model results in Table 4. In column (2), after
adding the changes in EJU’s share in imports the coefficient remains almost unchanged
compared to column (1) and significant at 10 percent level. As in the base specification, after
controlling for the changes in other LW’s share in imports in column (3), the coefficient of
ΔCHN is slightly larger compared to estimates in columns (1) and (2) and significant at 5 
percent level. In Panel-B, for winsorized TFP the estimates of β1 are larger than their
corresponding unwinsorized counterparts in Panel-A but all the coefficients are significant at
5 percent level.
In column (4) of Panel-A, I find that for the LFirst100 sample, after controlling for NIC 2-
digit fixed effects, the magnitude of the coefficient is marginally higher and the coefficient is
now significant at 5 percent level rather than at 10 percent level. Though the estimates of β1
are smaller in columns (5) and (6) compared to their corresponding estimates in the base
specification, these coefficients are also significant at 5 percent level. Overall, the impact of
Chinese import competition on plant productivity remains significant even when we control
for sectoral trends.
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Remarkably, the coefficient of changes in high-wage countries’ import competition has the
“opposite” sign and is statistically insignificant in Panel-A. A possibility is that the coefficient
of changes in high-wage countries’ imports shock appears with a positive sign in the base
specification because of positive correlation between industry-level import exposure from
high-wage countries and technological progress of the sector. On the other hand, the sign of
the LW coefficient remains positive and insignificant in all the specifications.
Table 6–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Productivity (OLS with
Sector Fixed Effects)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.287* 0.286* 0.318** 0.356** 0.347** 0.373**
(0.152) (0.159) (0.150) (0.170) (0.168) (0.162)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) -0.002 0.031 -0.02 0.01
(0.140) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.082 0.072
(0.106) (0.109)
NIC-2 Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Panel-B Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt (winsorized)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.326** 0.326** 0.345** 0.404** 0.397** 0.409**
(0.147) (0.153) (0.144) (0.166) (0.163) (0.158)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.00 0.02 -0.015 -0.002
(0.137) (0.129) (0.133) (0.130)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.049 0.033
(0.116) (0.116)
NIC-2 Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046
Observations 22618 22618 22618 31976 31976 31976
Plant 4970 4970 4970 7906 7906 7906
NIC4 118 118 118 118 118 118
NIC4-Year 750 750 750 787 787 787
Clusters 118 118 118 118 118 118
Notes: Table reports results from regression of changes in TFP on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s and
other LW’s import share in India and NIC 2-digit industry fixed effects. All regressions are based on
five-year differenced data. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A include only LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in
Block-B include LFirst100 sample. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at plant’s
main (NIC 4-digit) industry level. All the regressions include rural/urban location dummy and state by
year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel,
“Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply
number of 4-digit industry codes and number of NIC4-year combination included in each regression.
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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2.6.B Import Competition and Product Scope
The empirical results in the previous section provide evidence that Chinese import
competition played a significant role in increasing the revenue productivity of plants in India.
The ensuing question is how plants have managed to improve their productivity in the face of
heightened import competition. The theories of multi-product firms suggest that in the face of
changing trade costs firms can increase their productivity through rationalization of product
scope. In this section, I investigate the impact of rise in import competition from China on
product scope of plants. I begin by examining impact on the number of products produced by
a plant, using the following specification:
Δହ݈݊ ܰ݌௜௝௧ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ܴߤ + ߚଵΔହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟+ ߚଵΔହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧ି ௟+ ߦ௜௝௧ (10)
where Δହ݈݊ ܰ݌௜௝௧ is the change in log number of products of plant i at time t compared to t-5,
R represents a rural/urban dummy and the rest of the variables are as defined earlier.
Table 7 shows the OLS regression results based on five-year difference specification.
Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A report results for the LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B
report results for the LFirst100 sample. In Block-A, I observe that an increase in Chinese
imports is associated with a statistically significant reduction in plant product scope for the
LFirst200 sample. In column (1) the coefficient β1 is -0.10, which indicates that a 10 percentage
point increase in an industry’s exposure to Chinese import competition leads to a 1 percent
decrease in the number of products produced by the plants in that industry. This coefficient is
significant at 1 percent level. Column (2) shows the results after adding changes in import share
of high-wage countries and column (3) shows the results after adding both changes in high-
wage and other LWs import share. Inclusion of these other source of imports shocks has
minimal effect on the coefficient of interest β1 and the coefficient remains significant at 1
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percent level in column (2) and at 5 percent level in column (3). Interestingly, unlike the
productivity regression, the coefficients of ΔEJU and ΔLW appear with a sign opposite to 
ΔCHN for the LFirst200 sample, though the results are statistically insignificant in all cases for 
these two sources.
In Block-B, I find that the impact of Chinese import competition on plant product scope is
negative but the magnitude of the coefficients is much smaller than the corresponding estimates
for the LFirst200 sample reported in Block-A. The coefficients are also statistically
insignificant for the LFirst100 sample. Again, the coefficient of high-wage countries import
shocks appears with a positive sign in Block-B, but the coefficient of other LWs appears with
a negative sign. Both remain statistically insignificant.
Table 7–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Product (CPC) Scope
(OLS)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100)
  Dependent Variable: Δ5lnNPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) -0.104*** -0.099*** -0.095** -0.047 -0.039 -0.041
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.015 0.021 0.025 0.022
(0.045) (0.048) (0.040) (0.042)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.019 -0.009
(0.028) (0.028)
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
Observations 18226 18226 18226 26993 26993 26993
Plant 4815 4815 4815 7669 7669 7669
NIC4 117 117 117 117 117 117
NIC4-Year 537 537 537 564 564 564
Cluster 117 117 117 117 117 117
Notes: Table reports results from regression of changes in log number of CPC products on lag changes in
China’s as well as EJU’s and other LW’s import share in India. All regressions are based on five-year
difference data. Years 1998 and 1999 are excluded from regression as number of products is not available
at CPC level in these years. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A include only LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in
Block-B include LFirst100 sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit)
level. All the regressions include rural/urban location dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific
sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique
ASI plants included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and
number of NIC4-year combination included in each regression.
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Table 8–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Product (CPC) Scope
(2SLS)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5lnNPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) -0.129** -0.128** -0.125* -0.016 -0.013 -0.014
(0.063) (0.065) (0.067) (0.076) (0.078) (0.080)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.009 0.013 0.031 0.03
(0.045) (0.049) (0.044) (0.047)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.015 -0.005
(0.030) (0.030)
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
Observations 18226 18226 18226 26993 26993 26993
Plant 4815 4815 4815 7669 7669 7669
NIC4 117 117 117 117 117 117
NIC4-Year 537 537 537 564 564 564
Cluster 117 117 117 117 117 117
Panel-B
First Stage
Results Dependent Variable: Δ5(CHN)(t-1)
Instruments Δ5(CH)IDN (t-1)-1
R-sq. 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.42 0.43
F(2,117) 27.21 27.21 22.13 30.46 31.11 25.65
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Table reports results from 2SLS regression of changes in log number of CPC products on lag
changes in China’s as well as EJU’s and other LW’s import share in India. All regressions are based on
five-year difference data. In the first stage, Δ5(CHN)(t-1) is instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year
changes in Chinese Import Share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Years 1998 and 1999 are excluded from
regression as number of products is not available at CPC level in these years. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-
A include only LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B include LFirst100 sample. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. All the regressions include rural/urban location
dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In
the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants included in the regression. NIC4 and
NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and number of NIC4-year combination included in
each regression.
Overall, the OLS regression results suggest that Chinese import competition induces plants
to rationalize their product scope. But the impact is statistically significant only for plants with
at least 200 employees in the initial period. One plausible explanation for this finding is that
Chinese competition was high in labor-intensive sectors or sectors in which significant
proportion of plants are large. Another issue is that a significant proportion of large plants in
ASI data were producing multiple products in the initial year. For instance, in 2000,
approximately 68 percent of large plants were producing more than one product (averaging
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2.44 products per plant), whereas 48 percent of small- and medium-sized plants (employing
between 20 and less than 200 workers) were producing multiple products (averaging 1.83
products per plant). As a result, product level adjustment is more significant in the case of large
plants. As in the case of the revenue productivity regression, there is no statistically significant
evidence of the impact of high-wage countries and other LW countries on plant product scope.
Endogeneity and Negative Supply Shocks: Plants may drop products for reasons unrelated to
import competition but the decision may coincide with the rise in Chinese import share in India
in that particular industry. One such source of endogeneity is negative supply shock. For
example, a negative supply shock may raise the marginal cost of producing a particular product
causing the product to be unprofitable to produce. As a result, plants may drop the product. The
reduction in supply by the domestic producers as a result of this negative supply shocks is then
replaced by increasing supply of similar products from China.
Panel-A of Table 8 presents the 2SLS estimates of coefficient of interest, β1 for the one period
lag specification and panel-B reports corresponding first stage results. Again the coefficients
2SLS regressions are larger than their OLS counterparts (Table 7). Columns (1)-(3) report
results for the LFirst200 sample and columns (4)-(6) for the LFirst100 sample. The estimated
coefficient of β1 in column (1) is -0.129, significant at 5 percent level. In column (2), β1 is
significant at 5 percent level and in column (3) at 10 percent level. On the other hand, β1 tends
to zero for the LFirst100 sample. Therefore, the IV results confirm the strong impact of Chinese
competition on the LFirst200 plants only.
Controlling for Sector Specific Trends: Table 9 reports results of OLS regressions with sector
specific trends for plant product scope. In this table, I include NIC 2-digit sector specific fixed
effects in addition to import competition variables.
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Table 9–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Product (CPC) Scope with
Sector (NIC 2-digit) Specific Trend
In Block-A, for the LFirst200 sample, the estimates of the impact of Chinese import
competition are very close to the corresponding OLS coefficients reported in Table 7. In
column (1) the coefficient is -0.102, which is only slightly smaller than its OLS counterpart -
0.104 in absolute terms. However, the coefficient is now significant at 5 percent level instead
of 1 percent level. In column (2), I add the changes in import competition from high-wage
countries, which leads to a slightly smaller coefficient of -0.094 and the estimate is now
significant only at 10 percent level. Though the coefficient in column (3) is quite close to its
corresponding OLS coefficient, it is now statistically insignificant. Therefore, the magnitude
of β1 coefficient remains close to its OLS counterpart even after including initial sector (NIC
2-digit) fixed effects for LFirst200 sample, though its statistical significance moves downward.
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100)
  Dependent Variable: Δ5lnNPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) -0.102** -0.094* -0.091 -0.023 -0.012 -0.019
(0.051) (0.053) (0.057) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.02 0.023 0.027 0.020
(0.056) (0.062) (0.046) (0.049)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.009 -0.018
(0.029) (0.025)
NIC-2 Fixed
Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009
Observations 18226 18226 18226 26993 26993 26993
Plant 4815 4815 4815 7669 7669 7669
NIC 117 117 117 117 117 117
NICYear 537 537 537 564 564 564
No.Cluster 117 117 117 117 117 117
Notes: Table reports results from regression of changes in log number of CPC products on lag
changes in China’s as well as EJU’s import share in India and NIC 2-digit industry fixed effects.
All regressions are based on five-year difference data. Years 1998 and 1999 are excluded from
regression as number of products is not available at CPC level in these years. Columns (1)-(3) in
Block-A include only LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B include LFirst20 sample. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. All the regressions include
rural/urban location dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are
applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants
included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and number
of NIC4-year combination included in each regression.
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However, inclusion of sector fixed effects causes a significant decline in the size of the β1
coefficient for LFirst100 sample.
The negative impact of import competition on product scope in conjunction with the positive
impact on plant productivity supports the theoretical implication of multi-product firms: plants
rationalize their product portfolio to increase productivity in response to heightened
competition. In order to explore this channel of within-plant growth of productivity further, I
next investigate the impact of import competition at product level on the selection of the
products at the plant-level.
2.7 Import Competition and Plant-product Level Adjustment
In the plant-level analysis, I find that a rise in import competition from China leads to an
improvement in revenue productivity and rationalization of the product range within plants.
Together these two margins of adjustment at the plant-level suggest that reallocation of
products within plants may be a potential channel of improvement in plant performance as
predicted by the literature of multi-product firms. In order to confirm this channel, I investigate
the impact of Chinese competition at the plant-product level.
2.7.A Decision to Drop a Product
In this section, I examine the impact of Chinese import competition on plants’ decision to
drop products. I present an empirical framework of within-plant product selection mechanism
guided by the theoretical models of multi-product firms. I relate a firm’s decision to drop a
product with the level of import competition in that particular product in the initial period. I
construct a product-level measure of import competition by aggregating HS 6-digit product
categories to their corresponding CPC 5-digit product categories. In the case of plant-product
level response to trade shocks, product-specific measure of import competition provides a more
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direct measure of exposure to import competition than an industry-specific measure.27 The
specification below jointly tests whether the probability of decision to drop a product increases
due to increased Chinese import competition in that product and whether the chance of
eliminating the product because of this trade shock is even higher for the one further away from
a plant’s core competence. For the purpose of analysis, the share of a product in total revenue
from all products is used as a measure of core competence: the higher the revenue share of a
product, the closer the product is to a plant’s core competence (Eckel et al. 2015 and Eckel and
Neary 2010).
ܦ௜௞௧ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ߩ௜+ ߚଵ(ܯூே஼ு)௜௞௧ି ହ + ߚଶ൫ܯூோ௃௎൯௜௞௧ି ହ + ܵߛ ௜௞௧ି ହ
+ߜଵ( ௜ܵ௞௧ି ହ × (ܯூே஼ு)௜௞௧ି ହ) + ߜଶ ቀܵ ௜௞௧ି ହ × ൫ܯூோ௃௎൯௜௞௧ି ହቁ+ ߦ௜௞௧ (11)
The dependent variable, ܦ௜௞௧, is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a plant i produces a
product k in period t-5 but does not produce it in period t, and 0 if the product is still in
production in period t. To test whether a plant is less likely to drop a product that is close to its
core competence, I add the variable ௜ܵ௞௧ି ହ, the revenue share of product k of plant i in period
t-5, in the main specification. The expected sign of the coefficient ߛ is negative, implying that
a plant is less likely to drop a product which is nearer to its core competence. The term ρi
represents plant fixed effects. As the regression is based on pooled plant-product data, plant
fixed effects control for any plant specific attributes that are constant across products within a
given plant.
27 This is because the industry-level measure of competition represents the average of the mix of products in that
industry. Therefore, industry-level measure of competition may be subject to measurement error bias in the
plan-product selection model.
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I hypothesize that the sign of the coefficient of product-specific Chinese import shock, β1, is
positive: the higher a product’s (k’s) exposure to import competition from China, the greater is
the likelihood that a product is dropped in the subsequent period.
Table 10–Impact of Import Competition on Decision to Drop a product (OLS)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100) Block-C (LFirst20)
Dependent Variable: Dropped (1 if dropped or 0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Share(t-5) -0.215*** -0.129* -0.105 -0.239*** -0.158** -0.120* -0.226*** -0.143*** -0.110**
(0.050) (0.070) (0.067) (0.045) (0.066) (0.065) (0.039) (0.055) (0.055)
CHN(t-5) 0.220** 0.225** 0.215** 0.195** 0.212*** 0.204** 0.188** 0.204** 0.205**
(0.092) (0.088) (0.090) (0.087) (0.081) (0.084) (0.088) (0.081) (0.083)
Share(t-
5)×CHN(t-5)
-0.244 -0.300* -0.327** -0.218* -0.268* -0.313*** -0.276** -0.315*** -0.357***
(0.151) (0.159) (0.134) (0.130) (0.139) (0.120) (0.124) (0.122) (0.115)
EJU(t-5) 0.150** 0.149** 0.173*** 0.172** 0.181*** 0.184***
(0.067) (0.072) (0.062) (0.068) (0.051) (0.056)
Share(t- 5)
×EJU(t-5)
-0.261*** -0.300*** -0.249*** -0.301*** -0.260*** -0.302***
(0.088) (0.094) (0.088) (0.093) (0.074) (0.076)
LW(t-5) -0.112 -0.113 -0.046
(0.109) (0.098) (0.078)
Share(t-5)
×LW(t-5)
0.022 -0.002 -0.037
(0.135) (0.123) (0.100)
Plant FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.216 0.22 0.222 0.236 0.241 0.242 0.28 0.284 0.285
Observations 36106 36106 36106 50014 50014 50014 65823 65823 65823
Plant 4455 4455 4455 7033 7033 7033 11143 11143 11143
Plant-Product 14553 14553 14553 21624 21624 21624 32072 32072 32072
Product
(Cluster) 680 680 680 706 706 706 738 738 738
Notes: Table reports results from regression of a dummy variable indicating whether a plant drops a product in year t on the level of China’s,
EJU’s and LW’s import share in India in t-5. Years 1998 and 1999 are excluded from the regressions as detail product level data are not
available in these years. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A include LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B include LFirst100 and columns (7)-
(9) in Block-C include results for LFirst20 sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at product level (5-digit CPC) level. All
the regressions include plant and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower
panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants included in the regression. Plant-product and product imply number of plant product
combination and unique product (CPC 5-digit) included in each regression.
In order to explore whether import competition disproportionately affects products that are
further away from the core competence, the revenue share of each product, ௜ܵ௞௧ି ହ, is interacted
with the measures of import competition. The theoretical models of multi-product firms suggest
that the coefficient of interaction terms, δ1 and δ2, are negative: while import competition
increases the probability of dropping a product, the plant is less likely to drop the product if it
is close to its core competence.
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Table 10 reports the OLS regression results of decision to drop a product at plant i in year t
on the level of import competition at period t-5 and its interaction with the share of that product
in total revenue from all products. All the regressions include plant fixed effects. Columns (1)-
(3) in Block-A present results for LFirst200 sample. Columns (4)-(6) in Block-B and columns
(7)-(9) in Block-C show results for LFirst100 and LFirst20 sample respectively. Columns (2),
(5) and (8) present results for the base specification given in equation (11).
The first row shows the coefficient on the share of a product in period t-5, ߛ. In all the
columns, the estimates of ߛare negative and remain statistically significant in most of the
specifications except in column (3), in the case of LFirst200 sample, where the import shock
from other low-wage countries is added. The result implies that everything else constant the
higher the share of a product or the closer the product to the core competence in the initial
period (t-5), the less likely it is for the plant to drop the product in the current period (t).
The second row of Table 10 shows that the main coefficient of interest 1 is positive and
statistically significant at 5 percent level in all the specifications. The third row reports the
coefficient of the interaction term (δ1) between the five-year lag level of Chinese import
competition and the share of the product in that period, which is negative and statistically
significant at least at 10 percent level in most of the specifications except in column (1), where
only import shocks from China is considered for LFirst200 sample.
In column (2) of Block-A, the baseline specification for LFirst200 sample, the coefficient on
five-year lag of Chinese import exposure (β1) is 0.225 and the coefficient of interaction between
the Chinese import exposure and initial share of a product, δ1, is -0.300. Together these two
coefficients imply that the impact of Chinese import exposure on selection of a product depends
on the position of the product within the portfolio of the plants. For example, a 10 percentage
point increase in Chinese import exposure in a particular product increases the probability that
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the plant drop the product by 1.95 percentage points if the product holds only 10 percent share
of plant revenue from all products in the initial period. However, the same amount of increase
reduces the probability to drop a product by 0.4 percentage point for a product that holds 90
percent share of revenue from all products. The results suggest that the impact of Chinese
import competition is asymmetric across products. The remarkable feature of the results is that
the asymmetry in plant-product level margin of adjustment to Chinese import exposure remains
robust for alternative threshold level of plant employment in Block-B and Block-C.
Another interesting observation is that the import competition from EJU also has similar
asymmetric impact on selection of products within-plant as in the case of Chinese competition.
The coefficient of EJU and its interaction with the initial period share of a product remains
statistically significant at least at 5 percent level in all the specifications. In contrast, the sign
of the coefficient of other low-wage country import shocks is negative and statistically
insignificant in all the cases.
Table 11 reports the 2SLS regression results for decision to drop a product at the plant-level.
In this case, the (t-5)-1 lag of Chinese import exposure in Indonesia for a particular product k
is used as an instrument for the t-5 lag of Chinese import exposure in product k in India. Panel-
A reports 2SLS estimates and Panel-B reports their corresponding instruments. In Panel-A, I
observed that the sign of the estimates of the product level measure of Chinese import
competition (β1) and the associated coefficient of interaction, δ1, remain unchanged but the
magnitudes are much larger than their corresponding OLS coefficients in Table 10. Therefore,
the IV estimates magnify the asymmetric impact of import competition shocks.
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Table 11–Impact of Import Competition on Decision to Drop a product (2SLS)
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100) Block-C (LFirst20)
Dependent Variable: Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Share(t-5) -0.125** 0.005 0.061 -0.161*** -0.043 0.022 -0.164*** -0.06 0.005
(0.062) (0.094) (0.106) (0.055) (0.085) (0.092) (0.044) (0.063) (0.072)
CHN(t-5) 0.789** 0.684** 0.791*** 0.740** 0.662*** 0.759*** 0.712*** 0.632*** 0.676***
(0.334) (0.297) (0.297) (0.294) (0.256) (0.254) (0.231) (0.196) (0.195)
Share(t-5)×CHN(t-5)
-1.455*** -1.640*** -1.640*** -1.267*** -1.411*** -1.449*** -1.182*** -1.253*** -1.304***
(0.422) (0.495) (0.463) (0.345) (0.403) (0.391) (0.268) (0.288) (0.295)
EJU(t-5) 0.159** 0.165** 0.182*** 0.190*** 0.185*** 0.197***
(0.066) (0.069) (0.062) (0.064) (0.049) (0.051)
Share(t-5)×EJU(t-5)
-0.337*** -0.412*** -0.314*** -0.398*** -0.298*** -0.379***
(0.104) (0.122) (0.097) (0.108) (0.075) (0.086)
LW(t-5) -0.074 -0.083 -0.024
(0.100) (0.090) (0.071)
Share(t-5)×LW(t-5)
-0.121 -0.123 -0.139
(0.149) (0.126) (0.104)
Plant FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.202 0.203 0.207 0.226 0.229 0.231 0.272 0.277 0.278
Observations 36106 36106 36106 50014 50014 50014 65823 65823 65823
Plant 4455 4455 4455 7033 7033 7033 11143 11143 11143
Plant-Product 14553 14553 14553 21624 21624 21624 32072 32072 32072
Product (Cluster) 680 680 680 706 706 706 738 738 738
Panel-B
First Stage Dependent Variable: CHNt-5 and Share(t-5)×CHN(t-5)
Instruments (CH)IDN (t-1)-5 and Share(t-5)× (CH)IDN (t-1)-5
Notes: Table reports 2SLS results from regression of a dummy variable, indicating whether a plant drops a product in year t on the level of China’s,
EJU’s and LW’s import share in India in t-5. Years 1998 and 1999 are excluded from the regressions, as detailed product level data are not available
in these years. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A include LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B include LFirst100 and columns (7)-(9) in Block-C
include results for LFirst20 sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at product level (5-digit CPC) level. All the regressions include
plant and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of
unique ASI plants included in the regression. Plant-product and product imply number of plant product combination and unique product (CPC 5-
digit) included in each regression.
For example, in column (2) for the sample of plants with at least 200 employees, the 2SLS
estimate of β1 is 0.684 and δ1 is -1.640, implying that an increase in import competition from
China in a particular product by 10 percentage point raises the probability of dropping the
product by 5.2 percentage points if it holds only 10 percent share of revenue in the initial period.
In contrast, the same amount of change causes a 7.9 percentage point decline in the probability
to drop a product that contributes 90 percent share of total revenue from all products.
The sign of the coefficient of import exposure from high-wage countries and the corresponding
interaction term remain similar in the 2SLS regression and statistically significant at least at 5
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percent level. On the other hand, import shock from low-wage countries remains statistically
insignificant as in the case of OLS.
2.7.B Decision to Add a Product
In this section, I examine whether Chinese import exposure has any effect on plant’s product
choice.
ܣ௜௞௧ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ߩ௜+ ߚଵ(ܯூே஼ு)௜௞௧ି ହ + ߚଶ൫ܯூோ௃௎൯௜௞௧ି ହ + ߦ௜௞௧ (12)
ܣ௜௞௧ indicates whether a plant add a product in period t which was not produced in period t-5.
Rest of the variables are as defined in specification (11). The expected sign of the coefficient
β1 is negative implying that a plant would be less likely to add a product in which import
competition from China is high. The difference between add and drop regression is that in the
case of the latter, the share of the product is used to represent the distance from core
competence.
Table 12 reports the results from regression of plants’ product adding decision on the level
of import competition from China in the initial period based on specification (12). All the
regressions include plant fixed effects to control for plant characteristics that are common
across products within-plant and state by year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic
shocks.
Panel-A of Table 12 reports the estimates from OLS and Panel-B reports, the estimates from
IV regressions. In the case of OLS regression, Chinese import exposure coefficient remains
statistically insignificant in all the specifications. In Block-A, I find that the magnitude of the
coefficient is close to zero for LFirst200 sample. In columns. (1) and (2), β1 appears with a
positive sign, but it becomes negative in column (3). In Block-B and Block-C of Panel-A, for
LFirst100 and LFirst20 sample respectively, the sign of the β1 coefficient becomes negative
and its magnitude is larger than the corresponding columns in Block-A. Similarly, import
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competition from high-wage countries also has no statistically significant effect on plants’
decision to add a product. Interestingly, the coefficient of import competition shocks from other
low-wage countries is negative, statistically significant and much larger than the estimates of
β1 and β2.
Table 12–Product Add Regression (OLS and IV)
Panel-A OLS Regression
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100) Block-C (LFirst20)
Dependent Variable: Added (1 if added or 0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CHN(t-5) 0.008 0.006 -0.005 -0.023 -0.026 -0.038 -0.016 -0.021 -0.031
(0.049) (0.05) (0.057) (0.044) (0.046) (0.053) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039)
EJU(t-5) -0.009 -0.022 -0.012 -0.027 -0.017 -0.029
(0.021 (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018)
LW(t-5) -0.089** -0.096*** -0.085**
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.06 0.06 0.062 0.069 0.069 0.071
Panel-B 2SLS Regression
Block-A (LFirst200) Block-B (LFirst100) Block-C (LFirst20)
Dependent Variable: Added (1 if added or 0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CHN(t-5) -0.291 -0.296 -0.183 -0.338** -0.347* -0.249* -0.275** -0.279** -0.214**
(0.214) (0.219) (0.165) (0.172) (0.178) (0.133) (0.118) (0.12) (0.096)
EJU(t-5) -0.024 -0.032 -0.031 -0.040* -0.034* -0.041**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) (0.02)
LW(t-5) -0.096** -0.105** -0.092**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.039)
R-squared 0.055 0.055 0.061 0.054 0.054 0.059 0.066 0.066 0.069
N 50295 50295 50295 70895 70895 70895 96829 96829 96829
Plant 4701 4701 4701 7616 7616 7616 13230 13230 13230
Plant-Product 21215 21215 21215 32036 32036 32036 50234 50234 50234
Product
(Cluster) 726 726 726 759 759 759 783 783 783
Notes: Table reports 2SLS results from regression of a dummy variable indicating whether a plant add a product in year t on the level of
China’s, EJU’s and LW’s import share in India in t-5. Panel-A reports OLS regression and Panel-B reports 2SLS regression results. Years
1998 and 1999 are excluded from the regressions as detailed product level data are not available in these years. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-
A include LFirst200 and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B include LFirst100 and columns (7)-(9) in Block-C include results for LFirst20
sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at product level (5-digit CPC) level. All the regressions include plant and state by
year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique
ASI plants included in the regression. Plant-product and product imply number of plant product combination and unique product (CPC
5-digit) included in each regression.
In Panel-B of Table 12, I observe that the magnitude of the 2SLS coefficient of Chinese
import competition (β1) dramatically increases across all specifications and the sign of the
coefficient also appears to be negative as expected. However, the coefficient β1 remains
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statistically insignificant for LFirst200 sample. In column (5), the estimate of β1 is -0.347 for
LFirst100 sample, which implies that a 10 percentage point increase in China’s share of India’s
imports of a particular product leads to a decline in the probability that a plant adds the product
by 3.4 percentage points.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I examine the impact of import competition from China on the performance of
India’s manufacturing plants. The empirical analysis of the paper is guided by the mechanism
highlighted by the multi-product firm models of trade. For this purpose, I use the ASI data on
India’s formal manufacturing sector plants over the period 1998 to 2009, which contain
detailed product level data from 2000 onwards. First, I document that the ASI data resemble
the general cross-sectional features of multi-product firms predicted by the theoretical literature
and are consistent with the characteristics of India’s prowess database (publicly listed firms)
studied by GKPT (2010a) and U.S. census firms studied by BRS (2010). Next, I show that the
Indian formal sector plants exhibit significant amount of creative destruction in the 2000s. This
finding stands in stark contrast to the GKPT’s (2010) finding that the firms in India rarely
churns products. However, the behavior of product churning in ASI data during the 2000s is
consistent with the behavior of the firms in the United States during 1987-1997. At the
aggregate level, I find that the proportion of plants producing multiple products as well as
average number of products produced by the plants marginally declined in the second half of
the 2000s (2005-09). The fact that India’s manufacturing sector experienced a sharp rise in
import competition from China in the 2000s provides a primary motivation to examine the role
of this trade shock in the creative destruction process.
Using the 1998-2009 ASI data, I find that the increase in Chinese imports exposure leads to
an increase in plant revenue productivity measured by WLP approach. I address the
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endogeneity concern pertaining to changes in Chinese import competition by employing the
2SLS regression analysis and allowing for sector specific trends in the baseline regression. The
relationship between plant performance and Chinese import exposure remains robust to
alternative identification strategies. In the next step, I explore the relationship between Chinese
import competition and plant product scope using product-level data from 2000 to 2009. The
results suggest the plants reduce their product range in response to import competition from
China. Again, this finding remains robust to alternative identification strategies mentioned
above. On the other hand, I find that import competition from both high-wage countries and
other low-wage countries have no significant effect on plant product scope. Together these two
margins of adjustment at the plant-level suggest that plants may be improving their
performance by eliminating products that are away from their core competence as predicted by
the theoretical models of multi-product firms. A further examination of the impact of Chinese
competition on selection of products within plants finds that plants are more likely to drop a
product that faces a heightened import exposure from China but the closer the product to the
core competence of the plants, the less likely it is to drop the product. In contrast to plant-level
finding, in the plant-product level analysis, I find that import competition from high-wage
countries also contributes towards reallocation products within-plant and the impact is
quantitatively similar to that of China. However, again I find that import competition from
other low-wage countries has no effect on plant product level adjustment.
Overall, the findings in the paper suggest that trade with a low-wage country played an
important role in the process of creative destruction in India. One interesting extension of the
study is to investigate the role of import competition on quality upgrading of the products
within-plant. Another possible area of investigation is to explore the role of intermediate input
imports from China on the performance of plants.
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2.9 Appendix
Figure A.1–Share of Import from China in Each Group of Products Imported in India
Figure A.2–Scatter Plot of Changes in Chinese Import Exposure in India and Indonesia
The graph is a scatter plot of five-year changes in China’s share of India’s imports and one
year lag of five-year changes in China’s share of Indonesia’s imports by industry from 2002
to 2009. Each dot represents a particular NIC 4-digit industry in a particular year. The line
represents fitted values from OLS regression.
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Table A.1–Distribution of ASI plants
Year ASI-all Useable Missing (percent)
1998 22799 19129 16.1
1999 23541 19988 15.1
2000 29680 25546 13.9
2001 31929 27744 13.1
2002 32234 28105 12.8
2003 43265 37251 13.9
2004 37863 32163 15.1
2005 41540 35259 15.1
2006 41533 35604 14.3
2007 36827 31627 14.1
2008 36110 30850 14.6
2009 39685 33831 14.8
Total 417006 357097 14.4
Only open plants are considered in the ASI-all Sample. In addition, a small
fraction of plants with non-missing observations is also treated as open. Plants
are coded as missing if at least one of the key variables (i.e. output, labor,
capital, materials, and fuels) is missing. Only manufacturing sector plants
(NIC 2-digit sector 15 to 36) are included.
Table A.2–Frequency Distribution of Non-missing ASI-all plants
Frequency Observations Plants Percent
1 57274 57274 42.24
2 65960 32980 24.32
3 53223 17741 13.09
4 35956 8989 6.63
5 23800 4760 3.51
6 17532 2922 2.16
7 14147 2021 1.49
8 14744 1843 1.36
9 15489 1721 1.27
10 18180 1818 1.34
11 14872 1352 1.00
12 25920 2160 1.59
Total 357097 135581 100.00
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Table A.3–Distribution of Plants by NIC 2-digit Sector and Technology Intensity
NIC
2-digit
Sector Name
Technology
High-
tech.
Medium-
high-
tech.
Medium-
low-tech.
Low-
tech. Total
15 Food products & beverages 62500 62500
16 Tobacco products 6778 6778
17 Textiles 33106 33106
18 Wearing apparel; dressing & dyeing 10531 10531
19 Leather, luggage, footwear 6532 6532
20 Wood & wood products 7301 7301
21 Paper & paper products 10878 10878
22 Publishing, printing 7184 7184
23 Coke, refined petroleum prod. 3496 3496
24 Chemicals & chemical prod. 9649 25481 35130
25 Rubber & plastic prod. 17471 17471
26 Other non-metallic mineral prod. 36193 36193
27 Basic metals 22564 22564
28 Fabricated metal prod. 19580 19580
29 Machinery & equipment n.e.c. 27418 27418
30 Office, acc. & computing machinery 937 937
31 Electrical machinery & appa. n.e.c. 14279 14279
32 Radio, TV & comm. equipment 4616 4616
33 Medical, precision & optical instr. 4881 4881
34 Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trail 10450 10450
35 Other transport equipment 152 6142 564 6858
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 8414 8414
20235 83770 99868 153224 357097
Notes: Table shows the distribution of non-missing ASI-all plants by sector (NIC 2-digit) and technology (R&D)
intensity. Technology classification of industries is based on OECD (2011) definition.
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Table A.4–Proportion of Multi-product Plants in the Sample
Percentage of Plants Average CPC Products Average
ASICC
ProductYear MpC MpI MpS 5-digit 4-digit 2-digit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2000 50 38 28 1.91 1.61 1.37 2.09
2001 51 40 31 1.93 1.65 1.41 2.14
2002 51 41 32 1.90 1.66 1.42 2.12
2003 51 41 33 1.94 1.69 1.44 2.13
2004 51 41 33 1.92 1.68 1.44 2.13
2005 49 38 30 1.88 1.62 1.39 2.07
2006 47 37 30 1.85 1.61 1.39 2.02
2007 46 36 29 1.87 1.61 1.39 2.00
2008 46 36 28 1.82 1.59 1.38 1.98
2009 44 34 27 1.78 1.55 1.35 1.93
2000-2004 51 40 31 1.92 1.66 1.41 2.12
2005-2009 46 36 29 1.84 1.60 1.38 2.00
Notes: In this table MpC, MpI and MpS denote plants producing multiple CPC 5-digit products,
4-digit class and 2-digit division. The first three columns show the share of MpC, MpI and MpS
plants in ASI data. The final column shows the average number ASICC products produced by
the plants. Figures in the Table are adjusted for sampling weights. The pattern of unweighted
figures are similar.
Table A.5–Distribution of Product Outputs Within-plant
Number of CPC 5-digit products produced by the plant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A
ve
ra
ge
sh
ar
e
of
a
pr
od
uc
ti
n
to
ta
l
sa
le
s
1 100 92 80 73 67 61 57 53 49 46
2 8 16 18 20 21 21 20 20 19
3 3 6 8 10 11 11 12 12
4 2 4 5 6 7 7 8
5 1 2 3 4 5 5
6 1 2 2 3 4
7 1 1 2 3
8 1 1 2
9 1 1
10 1
Notes: Table shows the heterogeneity in distribution of products within-plant in the
sample (2000-2009) comprising plants that produce up to 10 products (CPC 5-digit).
Columns indicate the number of product produced by the plants. Rows indicate the
share of the products in total sale of the plants. Each cell is the average share of a
product within the set of products produced by the plant.
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Table A.6–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Productivity (LFirst20)
Block-A (OLS) Block-B (IV)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.354* 0.349 0.367* 0.763* 0.779* 0.798*
(0.183) (0.212) (0.217) (0.447) (0.463) (0.465)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) -0.013 0.015 0.088 0.134
(0.127) (0.142) (0.164) (0.185)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.082 0.147
(0.110) (0.122)
R-squared 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.023
Panel-B Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt (winsorized)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.371** 0.365* 0.374* 0.804* 0.821* 0.836*
(0.181) (0.209) (0.215) (0.435) (0.450) (0.454)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) -0.016 -0.002 0.091 0.125
(0.123) (0.137) (0.159) (0.178)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.042 0.11
(0.110) (0.117)
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024
Observations 41116 41116 41116 41116 41116 41116
Plant 11793 11793 11793 11793 11793 11793
NIC4 119 119 119 119 119 119
NIC4-Year 807 807 807 807 807 807
Clusters 119 119 119 119 119 119
Panel-C First Stage Results Dependent Variable: Δ5(CHN)(t-1)
Instruments Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1
R-sq. 0.37 0.43 0.45
F(2,117) 62.36 53.53 44.91
Prob > F 0 0 0
Notes: Table reports results from regression of five-year changes in TFP on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s
and other LW’s import share in India. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A report OLS regression results and
columns (4)-(6) in Block-B report 2SLS regression results for LFirst20 sample. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at plant’s main (NIC 4-digit) industry level. All the regressions include rural/urban
location dummy, technology intensity dummies and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling
weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants
included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and number of
NIC4-year combination included in each regression. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.7–Import Competition and Changes in Plant Product (CPC) Scope (LFirst20)
Block-A (OLS) Block-B (IV)
Dependent Variable: Δ5lnNPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) -0.068* -0.064 -0.071* -0.08 -0.08 -0.086
(0.035) (0.04) (0.04) (0.095)' (0.096)' (0.099)'
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.012 0.003 0.008 -0.001
(0.037) (0.041) (0.045)' (0.050)'
Δ5(LW)(t-1) -0.032 -0.035
(0.03) (0.035)'
R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Observations 34484 34484 34484 34484 34484 34484
Plant 10926 10926 10926 10926 10926 10926
NIC4 118 118 118 118 118 118
NIC4-Year 578 578 578 578 578 578
Cluster 118 118 118 118 118 118
Notes: Table reports results from OLS and 2SLS regression of changes in log number
of CPC products on lag changes in China’s as well as EJU’s import share in India
based on LFirst20 sample. All regressions are based on five-year differenced data. In
the first stage of 2SLS regression, Δ5(CHN)(t-1) is instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-
year changes in Chinese Import Share in Indonesia, Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Years 1998 and
1999 are excluded from regression as number of products is not available at CPC level
in these years. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit)
level. All the regressions include rural/urban location dummy and state by year fixed
effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower
panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI plants included in the regression. NIC4
and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and number of NIC4-year
combination included in each regression.
79
Table A.8–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Productivity (Balanced)
Block-A (OLS) Block-B (IV)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.420*** 0.403** 0.444*** 0.879** 0.898** 0.929**
(0.148) (0.177) (0.167) (0.376) (0.402) (0.387)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) -0.044 0.024 0.089 0.171
(0.132) (0.133) (0.176) (0.178)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.207*** 0.266***
(0.073) (0.081)
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.018
Panel-B Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt (winsorized)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.442*** 0.422** 0.457*** 0.974*** 0.998** 1.026***
(0.145) (0.174) (0.166) (0.364) (0.389) (0.378)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) -0.051 0.007 0.103 0.179
(0.128) (0.130) (0.171) (0.173)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.176** 0.246***
(0.076) (0.072)
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.016 0.017
Observations 12418 12418 12418 12418 12418 12418
Plant 1774 1774 1774 1774 1774 1774
NIC4 112 112 112 112 112 112
NIC4-Year 756 756 756 756 756 756
Clusters 112 112 112 112 112 112
Notes: Table reports results from OLS and IV regression of five-year changes in TFP on lag changes in China’s,
EJU’s and other LW’s import share in India using a balanced sample of plants. The balanced sample contains
non-missing ASI plants with at least 20 employees and that appear in all the years from 1998 to 2009. However,
as in the case of LFirst20 sample, only plants with positive value added, for which productivity measure is
available are included in the regressions. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A report OLS and columns (4)-(6) in Block-
B report IV results. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at plant’s main (NIC 4-digit) industry
level. All the regressions include rural/urban location dummy, technology intensity dummies and state by year
fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates
number of unique ASI plants included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry
codes and number of NIC4-year combination included in each regression. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.9–Impact of Import Competition from China on Plant Productivity (LFirst5)
Block-A (OLS) Block-B (IV)
Panel-A Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.317* 0.32 0.338 0.696 0.718 0.739
(0.178) (0.207) (0.217) (0.469) (0.490) (0.497)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) 0.007 0.034 0.106 0.152
(0.127) (0.147) (0.176) (0.205)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.082 0.148
(0.118) (0.139)
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.02 0.02 0.02
Panel-B Dependent Variable: Δ5TFPijt (winsorized)
Δ5(CHN)(t-1) 0.312* 0.308 0.322 0.691 0.71 0.728
(0.175) (0.205) (0.214) (0.460) (0.481) (0.488)
Δ5(EJU)(t-1) -0.008 0.012 0.091 0.132
(0.121) (0.140) (0.169) (0.197)
Δ5(LW)(t-1) 0.062 0.13
(0.118) (0.137)
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021
Observations 46791 46791 46791 46791 46791 46791
Plant 14259 14259 14259 14259 14259 14259
NIC4 119 119 119 119 119 119
NIC4-Year 812 812 812 812 812 812
Clusters 119 119 119 119 119 119
Notes: Table reports results from OLS and IV regression of five-year changes in TFP on lag changes in China’s,
EJU’s and other LW’s import share in India using plants with at least 5 employees in the initial period. However,
as in the case of LFirst20 sample only plants with positive value added, for which productivity measure is available
are included in the regressions. Columns (1)-(3) in Block-A report OLS and columns (4)-(6) in Block-B report IV
results. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at plant’s main (NIC 4-digit) industry level. All the
regressions include rural/urban location dummy, technology intensity dummies and state by year fixed effects. Plant
specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In the lower panel, “Plant” indicates number of unique ASI
plants included in the regression. NIC4 and NIC4-year imply number of 4-digit industry codes and number of
NIC4-year combination included in each regression. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Concordance between Industry and Trade data:
In ASI data industrial classification of the plants are reported according to 5-digit National
Industrial Classification (NIC)-2004 from 1998-99 to 2007-08 and NIC-2008 from 2008-09
onwards. NIC follows International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) up to 4-digit level.
Specifically, NIC-2004 is the 5-digit extension of the 4-digit ISIC-3.1 and similarly NIC-2008
is that of 4-digit ISIC-4.1. To obtain a unique 4-digit industry coding for the full sample, I
convert the NIC-2008 codes for 2008 and 2009 sample to their NIC-2004 counterparts using
the ISIC-4 to ISIC-3.1 concordance provided by the United Nations Statistics Division.28
Therefore, all the plants are identified by a unique NIC 4-digit (2004) industry code.
UN Comtrade Data:
I use country level bi-lateral imports and exports data from the UN Comtrade database, which
records various trade statistics at the HS 6-digit product level. The primary measure of import
competition is constructed from bi-lateral import data for India (as a reporter country), which
are available at HS 1996 classification. Country level HS 6-digit data are combined to construct
the country-group level trade data. I use yearly sample from 1996 to 2009 to construct the value
share of import by different source regions: China, EU-Japan-US and other low-wage
countries. Bi-lateral imports data for Indonesia are also available at HS 1996 level and therefore
the same procedure is followed to construct the share of China in Indonesia’s industry-specific
imports. Trade data for all the EU member countries, Japan and US are available in HS 1996
classification.
The product level trade data is then aggregated to industry-level by using HS 6-digit to ISIC
review 3.1 concordance file provided by World Integrated Trade Solution, WITS. HS 6-digit
28 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1
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products are classified into raw materials, intermediate goods, consumer goods and capital
goods using the HS-standard product group classification provided by WITS.29
Data for Product Level Analysis:
In the ASI survey, products are identified by ASI Commodity Classification (ASICC)
system. Plants report value of products and by-products produced in a given financial year
against specific ASICC product codes. There are two main versions of ASICC classification:
ASICC-1998 and ASICC-2008-09. In the ASI data all product-specific information are coded
under ASICC-1998 from 1998 to 2007 and ASICC-2008-09 from 2008 to 2009. The Central
Statistics Office (CSO) of India introduced a new 7-digit product classification system to record
all input and output items of the plants from 2010-11 survey onwards. This new classification
system is known as National Product Classification for Manufacturing Sector-2011 (NPCMS).
The NPCMS-2011 is a 7-digit extension of the 5-digit Central Product Classification (CPC), a
reference classification of the United Nations. In order to analyze the product switching
decision in light of the existing literature and in the context of international trade, it is useful
to convert the ASICC codes into an internationally recognized product classification system.
Fortunately, ASICC 2008-09 product codes can be mapped to CPC version-2 codes. Since I
can also measure trade shock at CPC product level, redefining ASICC products into CPC level
allows me to directly relate product switching decisions at the factory level with product level
trade exposure. I aggregate the ASICC products to CPC products in two steps. First, I map all
the ASICC-1998 product codes into their corresponding ASICC-2009 counterpart to identify
the products under a unique ASICC version. In the second stage, I collapsed all the ASICC
products to CPC products by using the concordance from ASICC-2009 to NPCMS-2011
published by CSO.
29 WITS tables are available at http://wits.worldbank.org/referencedata.html
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Moreover, in some cases a plant uses same ASICC code to report multiple rows of data.
Perhaps these products are identifiable at lower level of aggregation, hence, different from one
another in terms of their prices and quality, nonetheless, falls within the same ASICC product
category. So I aggregate multiple rows of same ASICC codes and keep a single ASICC codes
per plant per year.
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Chapter 3
Import Competition, Employment and Wage Inequality
in India’s Formal Manufacturing Sector: Does Labor
Market Regulation Matter?
3.1. Introduction
The impact of trade on wage inequality and on unemployment are the two core issues of the
globalization debate that has been reignited with the economic rise of China and the concurrent
increase in South-South trade. In 2011, world merchandise exports reached a level of USD (US
Dollar) 18 trillion from a level of USD 6 trillion in 2001 (at current prices and current exchange
rates). Remarkably, South-South trade alone has contributed 30 percent (or USD 3.6 trillion)
of this USD 12 trillion increase in world exports.30 Such a spectacular expansion of South-
South trade in a very short period has been driven largely by an extraordinary expansion of
China’s exports following its integration into WTO together with rapid export growth from
other major developing countries.
This paper investigates how import competition shocks from China affect the pattern of wage
inequality and employment in another large developing country, India. In particular, this paper
shows that import competition from China after its accession to WTO in 2001 increases wage
inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in large manufacturing plants and that the
institutional flexibility of the labor market influences the distributional consequences of trade
30 As of 2011, the share of South-South trade accounts for a quarter (or USD 4.4 trillion) of world merchandise
exports, almost twice as much compared to 2001. During 2002-2011, South-South export increased by 19 percent
on average annually, whereas manufacturing sector export alone grew by 17 percent. Developing Asia accounts
for 73 percent (or 3.2 trillion USD) of total South-South trade in 2011. Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics
2013.
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shocks. This paper finds that the rise in import competition from China leads to a general
increase in within-plant wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in large plants.
But when plants located in flexible labor markets are separated from those located in inflexible
markets, it appears that the overall pattern is driven by much larger adjustment of within-plant
skill premium in the flexible markets. But there is no evidence of skill premium adjustment in
response to intensified Chinese import competition in the inflexible markets. Another key
finding is that in the flexible labor markets, only the average wage of white-collar workers rises
in the face of rising Chinese import competition. Finally, for the sample comprising large
plants, it is observed that rising import competition from China causes a downsizing of low-
productivity plants through employment destruction, and an expansion of high-productivity
plants via employment creation, particularly in the flexible labor market.
Recent studies (Acemoglu et al. 2016; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; and Bloom, Draca,
and Van Reneen 2016) find that the rise in import competition from China after its WTO
accession has a strong destructive impact on the labor markets of developed economies. A few
recent studies (Mion and Zhu 2013; Utar 2014) document that Chinese import competition also
led to skill upgrading in the manufacturing sector of developed countries. In a recent study, Lu
and Ng (2013) show that though import competition affects skill content in the U.S.
manufacturing industries, this result is not driven by low-wage sources or China. However,
their paper is based on data that predate China’s accession to WTO in 2001. As mentioned
above, the pattern of international competition has dramatically changed after China’s
integration into WTO in December 2001. Against this backdrop, there are reasons to believe
that the integration of China into the world economy also has an impact on wage inequality in
labor-abundant countries. However, the impact of this huge trade shock on the evolution of
low-wage developing economies remains unexplored. The paper aims to fill this gap in the
literature by investigating the impact of this extraordinarily large trade shock on employment
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and wage inequality in low-wage developing country context. For instance, in the 2000s,
India’s formal manufacturing sector experienced a sharp rise in inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers – the ratio of the average wages of non-production and production employees
increased from 2.27 in 2001 to 3.03 in 2009. At the same time, China’s share of India’s imports
(non-oil) increased from 5 percent in 2001 to 16 percent in 2010. Is there a causal link between
the rise in India’s imports from China and rising wage inequality in India?
While I focus on the impact of import competition from China on labor market outcomes,
rigidity of the labor market can influence the consequences of such trade shock. Firstly, labor
market inflexibility can influence labor market effects of import competition by creating higher
cost of adjustment and impeding the reallocation of resources across firms. One key component
of labor market regulation in India is that a plant with more than 100 workers must obtain
permission from the government to retrench any worker or close its operation even while
incurring losses. This kind of labor market regulation imposes significant restrictions on plants’
ability to adjust to shocks. Secondly, labor regime is not uniform across Indian states (Besley
and Burgess 2004). As a result, labor market consequences of trade shock in the flexible states
may be different from those in the inflexible states. The variation in India’s labor market
environment presents an ideal setup to test whether plants located in inflexible labor markets
face any additional cost while adjusting to intensified import competition from China.
To investigate the impact of the rise in Chinese import exposure on plant-level outcomes, I
use plant-level micro data from India’s formal manufacturing sector and HS 6-digit product
level bilateral trade data from UN Comtrade database. I primarily rely on differential changes
in China’s import share across industries and over time to identify the impact of Chinese import
competition on wage inequality and employment. The rapidly growing trade between China
and India, particularly in the aftermath of China’s accession to WTO, coupled with intrinsic
diversity of the large Indian economy presents an appropriate setup for this analysis. It appears
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that China’s accession to WTO in 2001 occurred during a period when Indian economy was
relatively stable, which allows us to uniquely identify the effects of China’s emergence on
Indian economy.31
I separate my empirical analysis into two core labor market issues –wage inequality and
employment. In order to control for plant-specific unobserved heterogeneity, I use five-year
difference form of plant-level outcomes and associate them with a similarly differenced
measure of Chinese import competition. However, how such a trade shock affects plant-level
margin of adjustment depends on the labor market regulations of the state where the plant
resides. In order to address this potential heterogeneity in exposure to shocks across states, I
estimate the impact of Chinese import competition separately for different labor market
regimes using the classification of India’s labor market developed by Besley and Burgess
(2004). The authors developed a labor market classification of Indian states based on their
direction of amendment (pro-employer or neutral or pro-worker) to Industrial Disputes Act
(IDA) of 1947. In the baseline specification, I classify the states into two broad groups –flexible
(or pro-employer) and inflexible (either neutral or pro-worker). In order to control for state-
level macroeconomic shocks that are common to all the plants within a state, I include state-
year fixed effects. Another interesting feature of India’s labor market regulation is that the
extent of regulatory burden increases with size of the plants. In order to test whether import
competition has a disproportionate effect on plants within a particular labor market regime, I
perform regressions separately for different plant size thresholds.
Though the above framework addresses a number of important issues for the identification
of the impact of exposure to Chinese import competition, there are still potential sources of
31 Indian economy went through substantial changes in the first half of the 1990s following liberalization shock
in the early 1990s. The trade reforms in the late 1990s were rather slow and more selective, allowing the
economy to become settled in a new liberalized environment.
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endogeneity that may bias our coefficients of interest. First, there may be unobserved
technology shocks that can have a simultaneous effect on an industry’s relative demand for
skilled workers and imports in that industry. Second, there may be causality running from skill
premium or employment to changes in import demand in an industry. Third, industry-specific
policy shocks may affect firms in a particular industry and imports from China. Finally, the
import competition variable may be subject to measurement error that can lead to attenuation
bias in the coefficient of interest. I address these endogeneity concerns by applying an
instrumental variable (IV) estimation approach. I use one period lag changes in share of
Chinese imports at the industry-level in Indonesia as an instrument for changes in Chinese
import exposure in India.
This paper contributes to the literature on international trade by investigating the causal
effects of import competition from China on wage inequality and employment at the plant-
level in low-wage country context. There are a few recent studies that investigate the impact of
globalization on adjustment of wages and employment within-plant. Amiti and Cameron
(2012) and Amiti and Devis (2012) explore the impact of tariff liberalization on changes in
wage inequality, and wages within-firm, respectively, using firm-level data from Indonesia. A
few studies exploit the Indian liberalization episodes in the 1990s, particularly in the early
1990s, to identify the impact of trade reform on wage inequality in India. On the poverty impact
of trade reform, Topalova (2007, 2010) observes that the benefits of trade liberalization differ
across Indian districts corresponding to their exposure to international trade. Chamarbagwala
and Sharma (2011) using ASI data from 1980-81 to 1994-95 find that in pre trade liberalization
era industrial de-licensing played a role in increasing the demand for skilled labor via output-
skill or capital-skill complementarities, which is reflected in the rise of wage bill share and
relative employment of skilled workers in the de-licensed industries. However, there is weaker
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evidence of capital-skill and output-skill complementarities in post liberalization era, which
they argued as an indication of less significant role of trade on demand for skilled workers.32
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the theoretical link
between import competition, wage inequality and employment. Section three describes the
data. Sections four and five define the measures of import competition and labor market
flexibility, respectively. Section six presents the empirical strategy and section seven discusses
the regression results. Section eight concludes the paper.
3.2 The Link between Import Competition, Wage Inequality and
Employment
The link between trade and wage inequality is one of the principal predictions of Heckscher-
Ohlin (H-O) model of international trade. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem of H-O model
predicts that trade between skilled-labor-abundant North and unskilled-labor-abundant South
increases wage-inequality in the North and reduces it in the South. However, the overwhelming
finding is that trade liberalization increases wage inequality in both developed and developing
countries alike (for a survey Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007).33 There could be numerous
underlying factors including globalization, skill-biased technical change and urbanization that
may have contributed towards rising wage inequality in low-wage developing countries. This
paper emphasizes on the role of globalization in general and South-South globalization in
particular as the source of rising wage inequality in low-wage developing countries.
Understanding the patterns and causes of wage-inequality within firm can enrich our
understanding of overall wage inequality. In the discussion that follows, I delineate a few
32 They use repeated cross section of plant-level ASI data from 1980-81 to 1994-95.
33 This finding is supported by theoretical trade models developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Zhu and
Trefler (2005). Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) show that trade liberalization can increase wage inequality
across firms within-industry in both developed and developing countries but unemployment can rise or fall.
90
channels through which import competition can affect wage inequality and employment
changes within firm.
Quality upgrading: A new line of research proposes product quality upgrading as one of the
sources of rising wage inequality in developing countries. Trade can lead to quality upgrading
of products both through export incentive channel and import competition channel. Verhoogen
(2008) highlights the former channel of rising wage inequality by extending heterogeneous
firm model of trade developed by Melitz (2003). In this quality upgrading model, within
industry most productive plants export and as the income of consumers differ across countries,
exporters in developing countries produce higher quality goods for foreign than for the home
market and pay higher wages for high quality workers. The model predicts that a fall in
exporting cost incentivizes plants to improve product quality –as product quality improvement
requires higher productivity plants to demand more of high quality workers and pay higher
wages within the same industry, ultimately wage inequality rises within-industry.
Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) highlight the link between import competition and product
quality upgrading. The authors find that tariff liberalization encourages quality upgrading of
products that are close to world quality frontier but discourages for the products that are far
away from the frontier. Martin and Mejean (2014) explore the impact of low-wage competition
on product quality of French exports. They find that product quality upgrading is more
pronounced in sectors and destinations where firms face more intense competition from low-
wage countries. The observed relationship between import competition and quality upgrading
suggests that import competition can also affect relative demand for skilled and unskilled
workers and hence wage inequality within industry through the mechanism highlighted by
Verhoogen (2008). By the same token, if competition leads to an improvement of product
quality of the plants, then the wages of skilled workers may also rise relative to unskilled
workers within-plant.
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Product Mix: Recent developments in the theory of multi-product heterogeneous firms
suggest that firms reduce their product scope in response to trade liberalization and drop the
products away from their core competence. If skill-intensity of products differs from each other
within firm, then the relative demand for skilled workers will also be affected by trade shocks.
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011) show that trade liberalization induces the surviving firms
to drop their low quality products in the domestic market due to rise in product market
competition, and derive more revenue from higher quality products in the foreign market. Eckel
and Neary (2010) develop a multi-product model of firms where marginal cost differs across
varieties. A rise in competition induces firms to drop their higher marginal cost varieties and
focus on the core competence, which the firm can produce most efficiently. These multi-
product models of firms suggest that competition can affect firms’ relative demand for skilled
workers through its effect on firms’ product portfolio.
Cotemporary empirical evidence also supports the theoretical predictions of these models.
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) find that the U.S. firms alter their product mix in response
to low-wage import growth and these switches are biased toward skill- and capital-intensive
industries. Iacovone, Rauch, and Winters (2013) and Liu (2010) also find that in the face of
import competition plants are more likely to drop the products away from their core
competence and refocus on core competence products. The former study investigates the
impact of Chinese import exposure in Mexico during 1994-2004 and the latter explores the
effect of import competition in the United States over the period 1984-1996.
Innovation: Recent developments in endogenous growth literature (Aghion et al. 1997, 2001,
and Aghion et al. 2005) highlight the relationship between product market competition and
innovation. This literature suggests that heightened product market competition encourages
firms to innovate to help escape competition. Thoenig and Verdier (2003) suggest that
international competition may lead to wage inequality by encouraging firms to invest in skilled-
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biased technology. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) find significant within-firm effect
of Chinese trade on various measures of technical change: patents, IT intensity, R&D,
management practices and TFP in European firms. Utar (2014) documents that competition
from China has affected the skill composition within firm in Danish Textile and Clothing
industry by having a significant negative impact on the employment of low-educated workers.
Mion and Zhu (2013) using Belgian manufacturing firm data find that import competition leads
to skill-upgrading in low-tech industries.
3.3 Data
In this paper, I use the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) plant-level data from 1998 to 2009
period. The survey is conducted by Central Statistical Office (CSO), Government of India and
it collects detailed information about registered manufacturing establishments in India. Each
establishment in the survey is identified by a unique factory identifier from 1998 survey
onwards.34 The ASI data include all establishments registered under the Factories Act, 1948:
(i) factories that use power and employ more than 10 employees and (ii) factories that do not
use power and employ more than 20 workers. The Chief Inspector of Factories in each state
maintains a list of registered factories, which serves as a sampling frame. The frame is regularly
updated on periodic basis to take into account of entry and exit of plants. The ASI data are
recorded by financial year (e.g. April 1998 to March 1999). The ASI data reports the name of
the state where it is located and whether it is a rural or urban area.
Based on employment level, the ASI sampling frame divides the plants into census and
sample sectors. The census sector includes plants with at least 200 workers in the 1998 and
34 Factory identifiers are made available only recently and not available for surveys before 1998. As a result,
previous studies have been unable to use the panel information (Nataraj, 2011) or relied on a form of matching
algorithm (Harrison et al. 2011; Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma 2013) to construct a panel.
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1999 survey and with at least 100 workers from 2000 onwards. The census plants are surveyed
every year. The sample sector plants are randomly selected from the list of sample sector plants.
ASI sampling weight (inverse of the sampling frequency) is available against each of the plant
identifiers. The ASI data use National Industrial Classification (NIC) for the industrial
classification of the plants. From 1998 to 2007 survey plants are classified by NIC-2004 and
from 2008 to 2009 survey by NIC-2008. The first one follows Industrial Standard of Industrial
Classification (ISIC) Rev 3.1 and the second one ISIC Rev 4. I use NIC-2004 as the main
classification system by using a concordance from ISIC Rev 4 to ISIC 3.1. For the purpose of
this paper, I use only manufacturing sector plants for analysis,- sector 15 to 36 of NIC-2004
industry codes.
The ASI records information on employment and labor cost (wage bill) by occupational
categories – regular workers, contract workers, supervisors and managers, other employees and
unpaid workers. These categories are then broadly defined into two main groups –production
(or blue-collar) workers and non-production (or white-collar) workers. The set of production
workers comprises regular and contract workers, and that of non-production workers comprises
supervisors and managers, other employees and unpaid workers. The ASI reports total number
of employees (L) of a plant as the sum of the average number of production (Lbl) and non-
production workers (Lwh). The share of white-collar workers is defined as the ratio of number
of white-collar workers and total employees. Total wage bill is calculated as the sum of the
wages and salaries including bonuses, provident fund and welfare expenses. The average wage
of white-collar (blue-collar) workers is calculated as the total white-collar (blue-collar) wage
bill divided by the total number of paid white-collar (blue collar) workers –comprising
supervisors and managers and other employees. The skill premium at the plant-level is
calculated as the ratio of the average wage bill to paid white-collar workers to the average wage
bill to blue-collar workers. For the purpose of the analysis, I include the plants that report all
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the information required to construct employment, wages and skill premium. All the key inputs
and output variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles.
I restrict the sample size for the analysis to 16 major states in India which are included in the
study of Besley and Burgess (2004) for the construction of labor market flexibility variable.
Since the extent of labor market regulations depends on a certain predefined threshold number
of employees, I classify each ASI plant by its level of employment in the year when it is first
observed in the ASI data. As the sample of the ASI data only span from 1998 to 2009, I
calculate the initial size of the plants using the average number of total employees reported by
the plants in the year when it is first observed in ASI data. I refer to plant size in the initial year
as “LFirst”. For instance, a sample comprising only plants with at least 200 workers in the
initial period is denoted as “LFirst200” sample.
Table A.1.b (appendix) shows how wage inequality evolved over time in India’s formal
manufacturing sector across different labor markets. The table highlights few important points.
First, wage inequality increased steadily over the entire period, 1998-2009, in the
manufacturing sector overall. Second, the rising pattern of wage-inequality is a common
phenomenon in all the three different types of labor market. Third, average wage inequality in
the pro-employer states has always been higher than that of pro-worker states. Fourth, there is
no substantial difference between pro-employer and neutral states in terms of average wage
inequality during 1998-2009, though the latter frequently exceeds the former in most years
from 2000 to 2004. Therefore, the concern that high-skill-intensive firms may self select
themselves to establish plants only in pro-employer states and experience a faster increase in
skill premium is unlikely to undermine our identification strategy.
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3.4 Measure of Import Competition
In this paper, I use a variant of the “value share” approach proposed by Schott (2002) and
Bernard and Jensen (2002) as the measure of import competition. The authors define
ܫூே
ௌ ,௝௧ = ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೄೖ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೈೖ (1)
where Vkjt,s (Vkjt,w) is the import value of product k in industry j at time t from source S (W).
Here k represents a particular HS 6-digit product category that corresponds to industry j (ISIC
4-digit industry). ܫூேௌ ,௝௧ is the source S’s share of the value of India’s imports in Industry j.
However, this measure includes four different types of products - consumer goods, capital
goods, intermediate goods and raw materials.35 Industry-level aggregation of all the types of
(HS 6-digit) products may therefore hide the competitive effects that particular types of imports
may exert in some industries, leading to attenuation bias in the estimated impact of import
competition. In order to obtain a more precise measure of competition at the industry-level, I
modify the above measure of import competition by excluding all raw materials (RM) imports
from the numerator. That is, the degree of import competition in industry j is the ratio of the
sum of the value of all products imported from source S (China or high-wage countries) except
raw materials and the sum of the value of all products including raw materials imported from
the world.
ܯூே
ௌ ,௝௧= ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೄೖ,ೖಯೃಾ∑ ௏ೖೕ೟,ೈೖ (2)
35 The catagorization is based on UNCTAD standard product group classification.
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3.5 Labor Market Rigidity and its Implications for India’s Manufacturing
Sector Performance
India’s labor market regulation has been considered as one of the major obstacles to
efficiency in the organized manufacturing sector (Besley and Burgess 2004) in general and
growth of labor-intensive manufacturing sector in particular (Panagariya 2008). Even during
this spectacular era of liberalization, there were no major changes in India’s labor regulations.
India’s manufacturing firms are divided into formal (or organized) and informal (or
unorganized) sector. The organized sector includes factories that use power for manufacturing
activities and employ more than 10 employees (20 if operate without power) and are registered
under the Factories Act, 1948.36 All organized sector firms are subject to inspection on a range
of issues under the act: health and safety provisions, working hours, employment of women
and young persons, annual leave and facilities within the premise. The number of regulatory
issues increases as firms grow larger (in terms of employment). Once firms reach 20 or more
workers, a firm is required to set up retirement funds, while at 50 or more workers it has to
offer mandatory health insurance services.37 In addition, firms with more than 50 employees
are also subject to Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947 for settlement of disputes between
workers and management. IDA contains especially stringent set of rules and regulation for
firms with 100 or more workers. The most conspicuous part of the act is that any establishment
with more than 100 workers must get prior permission from the appropriate government agency
in order to layoff a worker or stop production.38 Because the state governments are generally
responsible for approving such authorizations, retrenchment of workers has become an
extremely difficult task for the large employers (Panagariya 2008). However, firms partially
36 Only around 10 percent of the manufacturing workers are employed in organized sector, while the rest belong
to informal sector.
37 The former is under Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1952 and the latter is
under the Employee State Insurance Act of 1948.
38 The amendment was originally introduced in 1976 with applicability for the plant having three hundred or
more workers and the threshold brought down to 100 or more with a further amendment in 1982.
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circumvent the stringency of IDA by employing contract workers who are not protected by
IDA.
Rigidity in the labor market limits the ability of the firms to adjust to shocks by increasing
cost of hiring and dismissal of labor. For example, Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti
(hereafter, ABRZ, 2008) show that the impact of industrial de-licensing on performance of
manufacturing sector differs across states with different labor market regulations.39 Lafontaine
and Sivadasan (2009) using outlet level data of a fast-food chain find that the responsiveness
of labor cost with respect to previous period labor cost (hysteresis) is higher in highly regulated
countries. Their study also find some evidence that labor cost responds less to sales revenue in
inflexible labor market. Another important implication of labor market rigidity is that it hinders
reallocation of resources from less to more productive firms. Kambourov (2009) highlights that
labor market rigidity in the form of high firing cost slows down reallocation of labor across
sectors in response to trade reforms.
The Measure of Labor Market Rigidity: In this paper, I exploit the variation in labor
regulations across states to identify the differential impact of labor market outcomes in
response to intensified import competition. State level differences in India’s labor regulations
arise from the fact that both central and state governments have concurrent jurisdiction over
industrial relation laws in India. State governments have the authority to amend labor
regulation legislation that was set at the federal level. For the purpose of this paper, I primarily
use IDA based labor market classification of Besley and Burgess (2004) to categorize the states
by labor market regime. Many studies (Panagariya 2008; ABRZ 2008; Dougherty 2008)
consider IDA as the key legislation for determining labor market stringency in India.
According to Panagariya (2008) the amendments to IDA, in 1976 and 1982, that impose
39 Industrial licensing was the key tool of the Central government in India to regulate the manufacturing
activities towards a desired direction: the characteristics of entrants, how much a plant can produce, the amount
of input firms are allowed to use among others.
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restriction on large plants ability to retrench workers, have severely impacted the efficiency of
the workers and thereby effective costs of labor. Besley and Burgess (2004) document a strong
positive relation between IDA based labor regulation measure and working time lost due to
strikes. In order to develop a measure of labor market stringency, Besley and Burgess (BB)
evaluate state level amendments to the IDA 1947, and assign a particular numeric code (1, -1,
0) to each amendment to indicate whether adjustments are made in favor of workers (1) or
employers (-1) or whether no considerable impact in either direction (0). For instance, an
amendment that prohibits strikes and lockouts is considered as a move towards pro-employer
direction, whereas an amendment that imposes a requirement to include union representative
in worker retrenchment negotiations is considered a move towards pro-worker direction. They
aggregate the index over time to obtain a summary measure of regulatory environment at state
level. Finally, they classify 16 major states of India into pro-employer, neutral and pro-worker
category: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are
classified as pro-employer states; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal as pro-worker
states; and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh as neutral
states.
The analysis of the paper is based on the ASI sample of these sixteen states covered by Besley
and Burgess (2004). Over the period 1998 to 2009, these sixteen major states account for 91
percent of employment and 89 percent of total output of the formal manufacturing sector, on
average. For the baseline analysis, I reclassify them into two groups –flexible or pro-employer
and inflexible comprising neutral and pro-worker states. In the appendix, I also report results
based on original BB classifications. ABRZ (2008) update the BB index until 1997, where they
noted that overall regulatory stance of the states remains unchanged over the 1980-1997 period
with one exception: Madhya Pradesh moved towards pro-employer direction in 1982 but
reversed to neutral status by a pro-worker change in 1983. OECD (2007) updates the BB study
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through 2005 and documents that after 1990 only three states brought some changes to IDA by
eight amendments in total and only change that has some labor market implication is that of
2004 amendment in Gujarat. Therefore, the original BB classification is still applicable for the
purpose of this study.
3.6 Empirical Strategy
3.6.A Import Competition and Wage Inequality
In order to estimate the effect of Chinese competition on plant-level skill premium and wages
of different categories of employees, I use the following specification,
∆ହ݈݊ (ݕ)௜௝௧ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ࣆܺ௜+ ߚଵ∆ହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝,௧ି ௟+ ߚଶ∆ହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝,௧ି ௟+ ߦ௜௝௧ (3)
where y is a particular outcome variable of interest: skill premium (ݓ௪ ݓ௕⁄ ), average wages of
production or blue-collar workers (ݓ௕) or average wages of non-production or white-collar
workers (ݓ௪ ). If y is (ݓ௪ ݓ௕⁄ ), then ∆ହ݈݊ (ݓ௪ ݓ௕⁄ )௜௝௧is the five-year change in log of the ratio
of average wages of non-production (or white-collar) employees to average wages of
production (or blue-collar) employees at plant i in industry j at time t. If y isݓ௕ (or ݓ௪ ), then
∆ହln(ݓ௕)௜௝௧ (or ∆ହln(ݓ௪ )௜௝௧) is the five-year change in employment of production (or non-
production) workers at plant i. The matrix ܺ௜includes a set of control variables –a set of initial
technology intensity dummies and a rural/urban location dummy. The term ξijt is an
idiosyncratic error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the measures of trade shocks and other
right hand side variables. The key coefficient of interest in equation (3) is β1 corresponding to
∆ହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟ that measures changes in China’s share of India’s imports in industry j in period
t-l. In this specification, I also control for changes in import competition from high-wage
countries (∆ହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧ି ௟) in order to address the issue that import competition from high-wage
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sources is also skill-intensive and can have an effect on plant-level outcomes. The set of high-
wage countries includes EU, Japan and USA (EJU). In the appendix, I also report results after
controlling for import competition from other low-wage (LW) countries.
Differencing eliminates the plant fixed effects that account for sources of time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, such as differences in production efficiency, managerial ability or
organizational characteristics that could be correlated with the plant-level skill premium and
the firms’ general capacity to face import competition.
The state-year fixed effects, ௦߬௧, control for macroeconomic shocks over time at the state
level that are common to all plants within state. The inclusion of the state-year fixed effects
also addresses the concern that labor market regulations in India can change over time across
states. ௦߬௧ also control for the potential changes in speed of adjustment to workforce due to
change in political regime at the state level. For example, if political power of a state switches
towards a pro-employer government then it may be easier for the plants to adjust their
workforce by retrenching workers.
3.6.B Import Competition and Employment
The empirical specification for plant employment analysis is similar to Bloom, Draca, and
Van Reenen (2016). I take five-year difference form of the employment and measures of import
competition to remove the influence of unobserved plant characteristics that may bias the
coefficient of interest. In a heterogeneous firm model of trade, Melitz and Ottavanio (2008)
predict that import competition intensifies competition in the domestic product market causing
the least productivity firms to exit and relatively higher productivity firms to survive. In line
with this prediction, I hypothesize that import competition causes reallocation of resources
(labor) from less to more productive plants. In order to capture this asymmetric impact of
import competition, I include five-year lagged plant Total Factory Productivity (TFP) along
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with its interaction with the measure of import competition. In order to examine the overall
impact of import competition on employment dynamics, I perform pooled regressions on the
sixteen state sample. To test whether labor market rigidity creates any additional adjustment
cost for plants, I perform regressions separately for flexible and inflexible labor market.
Δହ݈݊ ܮ௜௝௧
஼ = ߙ+ ௦߬௧+ ࣆܺ௜+ ߚଵΔହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟+ ߚଶΔହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧ି ௟+ ߜ݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ି ହ +
ߛଵΔହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ௟∗ ݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ି ହ + ߛଶΔହ൫ܯூோ௃௎൯௝௧ି ௟∗ ݈݊ ܲݎ௜௝௧ି ହ + ߦ௜௝௧ (4)
In equation (4), the dependent variable, Δହ݈݊ ܮ௜௝௧஼ , is the change in log employment of a
particular category of workers over a five-year period in plant i in industry j at time t. The
superscript c, refers to the type of workers: all, blue-collar or white-collar. The first coefficient
of interest is β1 that shows the effect of Chinese import competition on plant employment. The
second coefficient of interest isߛଵ, which shows whether import competition from China
disproportionately affects plants with different productivity levels. 
The expected signs of both β1 and β2 are negative. The reallocation coefficients γ1 and γ2
would be positive if there is a reallocation of resources from less to more productive plants in
response to import competition. When the lag operator l equal to 1, the trade variable becomes
Δହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ି ଵ or the first lag of the five-year difference in China’s value share. The state-year
fixed effects, ௦߬௧, control for any state specific macro shocks over time that affect all the plants
within the same state. For notational simplicity, in the discussion that follows, I use ΔCHN for 
Δହ(ܯூே஼ு)௝௧ and ΔEJU for Δହ(ܯூோ௃௎)௝௧.
3.6.C Endogeneity
The empirical frameworks mentioned above exploit the differential changes in Chinese
import exposure across industries and over time in the aftermath of China’s accession to WTO
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to identify the impact of intensified Chinese import competition on plant-level outcomes. The
structure also controls for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity by taking the five-year
difference of variable of interest, which can also help reduce measurement error bias. The
approach also controls for omitted variable bias emanating from changes in macroeconomic
policies and labor market regulations over time and across states. Nonetheless, there are still
potential sources of endogeneity that may bias our coefficients of interest.
First, there may be skill-biased technology shocks that may simultaneously affect the
relative demand for skilled workers in plants of a particular industry and imports from China
in that industry. A related concern is that an industry’s skill intensity in the home country may
affect the level and growth of imports in that industry. If India employs comparatively more
skilled workers vis-à-vis China in a particular industry, there could be observed or unobserved
import barriers in place to protect its domestic industry. This type of reverse causality may bias
the coefficient of Chinese import competition. Another source of concern is that India has been
experiencing gradual liberalization changes over the last two decades. Though, as a WTO
member, India cannot restrain Chinese imports differentially by tariff barriers, it can apply a
few non-tariff barriers, such as antidumping, to deter imports from China. This type of
measures can also bias the estimates of interest. Finally, though the five-year differencing helps
to reduce the error in the measure of import competition, there could still be some error leading
to attenuation bias in the coefficient of interest. In order to address the concerns mentioned
above, I utilize instrumental variable estimation approach to identify the impact of Chinese
import competition.
I use one period lag changes in China’s share of Indonesia’s imports by industry (ISIC Rev
3.1) as the instrument for corresponding changes in China’s share of India’s imports. The
instrument is similar to spirit of Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013),
where they use growth of Chinese imports in eight other developed economies as instrument
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for growth of U.S. imports from China. The aim here is to identify the impact of supply-driven
component of India’s imports from China, which has been contributed by several factors
including economic liberalization within China and its WTO accession in 2001. For example,
Khandelwal et al. (2013) show that removal of export quotas paved the way for more efficient
Chinese exporters to flourish in the global market. The dismantling of quotas induced entry of
more productive firms and thereby lowered the prices of exported products. The validity of the
instrument relies on the assumption that Chinese import growth is not driven by the shocks to
import demand in Indonesia. Since Indonesia is a much smaller economy relative to China, this
assumption seems innocuous.
Indonesia is the third largest low-wage economy after China and India, and it has experienced
a significant rise in imports from China in the 2000s. Importantly, Indonesia accounts for only
a fraction of India’s total trade –between 1998 and 2009, Indonesia contributed, on average,
only 2.2 percent of India’s total imports and 1.4 percent of total exports. More specifically, the
share of Indonesia’s imports increased from 2.0 percent in 1998 to only 2.9 percent in 2009,
while the share of exports increased from only 0.56 percent in 1998 to 1.70 percent in 2009,
though both series show some fluctuations over the period. In Figure 1, I find that both India
and Indonesia had roughly similar exposure to Chinese competition at the sector-level (NIC 2-
digit) during 1998-2001 period. In Figure 2, I observe that they have experienced
approximately similar pattern of changes in exposure to Chinese imports after China’s WTO
accession. A comparison between Figure 1 and 2 clearly suggests that both the countries
experienced increase in exposure to imports from China in most of the sectors.
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Figure 1–Share of Chinese Imports in India and Indonesia (1998-2001)
Source: UN Comtrade Database
Figure 2–Share of Chinese Imports in India and Indonesia (2002-2005)
Source: UN Comtrade Database
3.7 Results
This section presents the relationship between labor market outcomes and industry-level
import exposure from China. The analysis shows how plant-level skill premium, wages and
employment change in response to import competition and whether import competition effects
skilled and unskilled workers differentially. Further, in order to investigate the implications of
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labor market rigidities for the impact of import exposure on skill premium and wages, I present
regression results separately by different labor market regimes along with the full sample
results. To address the fact that regulatory burden in India increases with the size threshold of
the plants, the regression results are shown according to different threshold levels of initial firm
employment.
3.7.A Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality
Table 1 shows the impact of Chinese import exposure on changes in skill premium, blue-
collar wages and white-collar wages. Panel-A reports the results for LFirst200 sample and
Panel-B reports the results for LFirst100 sample and Panel-C reports the results for LFirst20
Sample. Columns (1)-(3) report results for the full sample, columns (4)-(6) include only the
flexible and (7)-(9) include only the inflexible market sample. All the regressions include state
by year fixed effects, rural/urban dummy and technology intensity dummies. Plant specific
sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at industry (NIC 4-digit) level.
Columns (1), (4), and (7) show the results for OLS regression for changes in skill premium.
Column (1) in Panel (A) shows that the coefficient of changes in Chinese import exposure
(ΔCHN), β1 is positive and statistically significant at 5 percent level. The estimate implies that
a 10 percentage point increase in share of Chinese imports leads to a 1.35 percent increase in
skill premium within-plant in the full sample. In column (4), I find that the same amount of
increase in Chinese import intensity leads to a 2.65 percent increase in skill premium in the
flexible market, which is statistically significant at 5 percent level. In contrast, in the inflexible
labor market, in column (7), the estimate of 1 is just 0.013 with a much higher standard error
of 0.05. The result suggests that the observed increase in skill premium, in the full sample, is
mostly driven by the rise in skill premium in the flexible labor market. In Table A.7 (appendix)
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separate regression results for neutral and pro-worker states show that skill premium is
negatively associated with Chinese import competition in the neutral regime and but not in the
pro-employer states.
Columns (2), (5) and (8) show the results of OLS regression for changes in blue-collar wages.
In columns (2) and (5) of Panel-A, the coefficient of ΔCHN is -0.02 and -0.105, respectively, 
though both the coefficients are statistically insignificant. In contrast, the sign of the same
coefficient of ΔCHN is actually positive (0.058) and statistically significant at 10 percent level 
in column (8). Table A.7 (section 3.9 appendix) reveals that Chinese competition positively
affects blue-collar wages only in the neutral labor market. One plausible explanation for this
finding is that there is some selection effect within the set of blue-collar workers. In the neutral
market, although it is difficult to retrench regular workers who are covered by IDA, plants can
retrench their contractual workers who are not protected by IDA and whose wages are relatively
lower than the regular workers. As a result, average wage of blue-collar workers increases in
the wake of rising import competition.
Columns (3), (6) and (9) show the results for changes in white-collar wages. In column (3)
of Panel-A, for the full sample, the estimate of β1 is 0.103 with a standard error of 0.045. In the
flexible market, in column (6), the estimate of β1 is 0.183 with a standard error of 0.082. The
latter result suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import exposure leads to a
1.8 percent increase in wages of white-collar workers in the flexible market. In column (9), the
β1 coefficient for the inflexible labor market is statistically insignificant and much smaller than
the flexible market. Again, the reading remains the same in Table A.7 (appendix), where the
regressions are shown separately for neutral and pro-worker market.
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Table 1–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality (OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.135** -0.022 0.103** 0.265** -0.105 0.183** 0.013 0.058* 0.038
(0.059) (0.04) (0.045) (0.113) (0.074) (0.082) (0.052) (0.034) (0.048)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.028 -0.022 -0.034 0.125 -0.126** 0.015 -0.138*** 0.054 -0.071
(0.049) (0.037) (0.054) (0.084) (0.054) (0.079) (0.039) (0.035) (0.048)
R-squared 0.007 0.016 0.018 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.008 0.019 0.02
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B OLS Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.104 0.024 0.118** 0.261** -0.046 0.231** -0.034 0.087** 0.025
(0.076) (0.046) (0.051) (0.13) (0.073) (0.096) (0.043) (0.035) (0.04)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.014 -0.036 -0.043 0.079 -0.123** -0.031 -0.085** 0.026 -0.056
(0.05) (0.037) (0.049) (0.086) (0.052) (0.078) (0.041) (0.036) (0.043)
R-squared 0.007 0.02 0.019 0.007 0.017 0.019 0.007 0.021 0.02
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Panel C OLS Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.099 -0.001 0.091 0.226** -0.079 0.165 -0.002 0.059 0.03
(0.064) (0.041) (0.056) (0.110) (0.071) (0.103) (0.051) (0.036) (0.047)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.005 -0.059 -0.045 0.069 -0.140** -0.06 -0.043 -0.002 -0.038
(0.042) (0.036) (0.046) (0.074) (0.059) (0.086) (0.041) (0.029) (0.039)
R-squared 0.009 0.024 0.022 0.007 0.021 0.018 0.01 0.025 0.025
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average white-
collar wages on lag changes in China’s and EJU’s import share in India. Here skill premium is measured as ratio of average wages
paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample and columns (4)-
(6) include flexible and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC
4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill premium (SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log
of average wages of blue-collar workers and columns (3), (6) and (9) use changes in log of average wages of white-collar employment
as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed
effects. Plant-specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly: Orissa,
Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh .
* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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The changes in import competition from high-wage countries (ΔEJU) has no statistically 
significant impact on skill premium, blue-collar wages and white-collar wages in the full
sample results reported in Panel-A and Panel-B of Table 1. In the flexible market, average
wage of blue-collar workers (column 5) is negatively correlated with import competition from
EJU, though there is no statistically significant impact on skill premium or white-collar wages.
In the inflexible states, skill premium is negatively associated with EJU import exposure
(column 7) for LFirst200 sample. The results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in
EJU import exposure leads to a 1.38 percent fall in skill premium in the inflexible market.The
results for LFirst100 sample in Panel-B and LFirst20 sample in Panel-C show that the
coefficient of ΔCHN becomes statistically insignificant in skill premium regression for the full 
sample (column 1), but remains statistically significant in the flexible sample in column (4).
The coefficient of ΔCHN for average wages of blue-collar workers remains positive and 
statistically significant for LFirst100 sample in the inflexible market, but becomes statistically
insignificant for LFirst20 sample.
Table 2 reports the 2SLS regression where (t-1) lag of five-year changes in Chinese import
competition in India is instrumented by ((t-1)-1) lag of five-year changes in Chinese import
share in Indonesia. The dependent variable in each columns of Table 2 remains the same to
corresponding columns in Table 1. Panel-A of Table 2 reports the IV regression results for
LFirst200 sample. In column (1), the IV estimate of ΔCHN coefficient is 0.236 with a standard 
error of 0.107. This is almost twice as much relative to the corresponding OLS estimates in
column (1) of Table 2. The result implies that a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import
competition causes a 2.3 percent increase in skill premium in India’s formal manufacturing
sector. Again, in the case of flexible labor market in column (4), the IV estimate of Chinese
import exposure is much stronger than the corresponding OLS estimate in Table 1. Though the
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coefficient of ΔCHN also increases in the case of inflexible labor market, it becomes 
statistically insignificant as in the case of OLS.
Table 2–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality (2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.236** 0.013 0.222** 0.362** -0.071 0.262** 0.09 0.115 0.186*
(0.107) (0.098) (0.091) (0.157) (0.152) (0.12) (0.106) (0.078) (0.101)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.012 -0.014 -0.009 0.136 -0.120* 0.029 -0.125** 0.067* -0.036
(0.06) (0.039) (0.057) (0.092) (0.062) (0.081) (0.051) (0.035) (0.055)
R-squared 0.007 0.016 0.018 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.01 0.019 0.019
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.098 0.072 0.145 0.259 -0.036 0.19 -0.069 0.175** 0.089
(0.137) (0.099) (0.108) (0.208) (0.14) (0.167) (0.096) (0.082) (0.095)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.014 -0.026 -0.038 0.079 -0.121** -0.038 -0.091* 0.047 -0.041
(0.063) (0.041) (0.055) (0.1) (0.058) (0.084) (0.048) (0.039) (0.05)
R-squared 0.007 0.02 0.019 0.007 0.017 0.019 0.008 0.02 0.02
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Panel C IV Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.034 0.133 0.099 0.079 0.069 0.15 -0.139 0.185** 0.048
(0.182) (0.106) (0.158) (0.244) (0.177) (0.225) (0.159) (0.084) (0.146)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.02 -0.031 -0.043 0.033 -0.112 -0.063 -0.064 0.027 -0.034
(0.068) (0.046) (0.053) (0.098) (0.070) (0.095) (0.061) (0.038) (0.048)
R-squared 0.009 0.023 0.022 0.006 0.019 0.018 0.011 0.023 0.025
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average white-
collar wages on lag changes in China’s and EJU’s import share in India. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) is instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of
five-year changes in Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Here skill premium is measured as ratio of average wages
paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample and columns (4)-
(6) include flexible and columns (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill premium (SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use
changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in log of average wages of white-collar
employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by
year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly: Orissa,
Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . *
p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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In columns (2), (5) and (8) of Panel-A, I find that there is no statistically significant impact of
Chinese import exposure on the wages of blue-collar workers for LFirst200 sample. In column
(8), the estimate is significantly greater than the OLS counterpart in Table 1, but it has become
statistically insignificant.
In columns (3), (6) and (9), I find that the coefficient of ΔCHN is much larger than the 
corresponding OLS estimates. In column (3), the IV estimate is 0.222 with a standard error of
0.09. In column (9), the IV estimate for ΔCHN coefficient is 0.186 with a standard error of 
0.10, which is quite close to full sample estimate in column (3). This IV estimate is statistically
significant at 10 percent level. Notice that, the corresponding OLS estimate was much smaller
and statistically insignificant.
Therefore, it appears that in general OLS underestimates the impact of import competition
shocks from China on skill premium for the sample of large plants. One potential explanation
for this finding is that unobserved skill-biased technology shocks in India may be negatively
correlated with India’s imports from China. This kind of reverse causality can bias the OLS
coefficient downwards. In addition, measurement error problem may also cause OLS to
underestimate the impact of Chinese import competition.
The 2SLS regressions for LFirst100 sample in Panel-B and LFirst20 sample in Panel-C find
no statistically significant impact of import competition from China on skill premium and
average wages of white-collar workers. However, in the inflexible labor market average wage
of blue-collar workers increases with the rise in import competition from China. In fact, Table
A.9 (section 3.9 appendix) reveals that this changes happen only in the neutral states.
The preceding analysis suggests that, overall, an increase in import exposure from China has
a statistically significant impact on skill premiums in the large plants (with at least 200
employees in the initial period). However, when plants are separated by the flexibility of labor
market, it appears that the skill premium increases in the face of rising Chinese import
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competition only in the flexible or pro-employer labor market, whereas the coefficient is much
smaller and statistically insignificant in the inflexible labor market. In the flexible market, the
rise in skill premium is mainly driven by rise in the plant-level wages of white-collar workers.
In the neutral labor market, the Chinese competition has some positive impact on average
wages of blue-collar workers.
The result suggests that even in the neutral labor market there may be some adjustment taking
place within the group of blue-collar workers. The findings in this section is consistent with
the quality upgrading or product mix channel that predicts an increase in wages of white-collar
workers in response to import competition. In Chapter 2, I find that import competition from
China induces plants to rationalize their product scope and the selection across products within-
plant plays an important role in the rationalization process. The finding that Chinese import
exposure has positive effect on skill premium is consistent with the findings of Bloom, Draca,
and Van Reneen (2016), Mion and Zhu (2013), and Utar (2014), who document similar results
in European context.
3.7.B Effect of Import Competition on Employment
Table 3.a and Table 3.b report results from OLS regression of five-year changes in
employment on five-year changes in measures of import competition based on equation (4),
the base specification for employment regression. In Table 3.a, Panel-A reports results for
plants with at least 200 employees (LFirst200) and Panel-B reports results for plants with at
least 100 employees (LFirst100) in the initial period. Table 3.b reports results for plants with
at least 20 employees (LFirst20) in the initial year. Columns (1)-(3) report results for the full
sample by pooling plants in both flexible and inflexible states and columns (4)-(6) include only
plants in flexible states, and columns (7)-(9) include plants in the inflexible states. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. All the regressions include
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state by year fixed effects, OECD technology intensity dummies and a rural/urban dummy.
Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions.
Table 3.a–Effect of Import Competition on Employment (OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.847** -0.849** -0.51 -1.297** -1.451** -0.78 -0.38 -0.27 -0.37
(0.383) (0.421) (0.469) (0.524) (0.585) (0.661) (0.465) (0.564) (0.452)
TFP(t-5) 0.011 0.008 0.034*** 0.008 0.005 0.040*** 0.014 0.01 0.030**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.106** 0.104** 0.057 0.173*** 0.190*** 0.09 0.032 0.017 0.037
(0.042) (0.046) (0.052) (0.062) (0.070) (0.071) (0.052) (0.065) (0.054)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.745*** -0.816** -0.17 -1.264*** -1.289** -0.36 -0.16 -0.23 -0.11
(0.265) (0.318) (0.394) (0.421) (0.503) (0.587) (0.323) (0.402) (0.345)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.082*** 0.091** -0.0 0.148*** 0.153*** 0.009 0.003 0.01 -0
(0.030) (0.036) (0.048) (0.045) (0.054) (0.069) (0.039) (0.051) (0.042)
R-squared 0.033 0.028 0.029 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.032 0.026 0.029
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B OLS Regression Results Lfirst100 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.56 -0.5 -0.48 -0.53 -0.43 -0.7 -0.52 -0.52 -0.36
(0.374) (0.396) (0.434) (0.516) (0.553) (0.548) (0.457) (0.529) (0.452)
TFP(t-5) 0.01 0.007 0.034*** 0.007 0.006 0.037*** 0.013 0.009 0.032***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.078* 0.07 0.06 0.084 0.071 0.084 0.062 0.06 0.046
(0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.065) (0.069) (0.059) (0.050) (0.060) (0.052)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.853*** -0.886*** -0.54 -1.372*** -1.351*** -0.76 -0.4 -0.47 -0.44
(0.223) (0.258) (0.368) (0.346) (0.400) (0.512) (0.299) (0.361) (0.331)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.098*** 0.103*** 0.048 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.06 0.041 0.048 0.044
(0.025) (0.029) (0.045) (0.039) (0.045) (0.061) (0.038) (0.047) (0.040)
R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.022 0.028 0.027 0.021 0.032
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import
exposure and lag TFP of plants. Panel-A reports results for LFirst200 and panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3)
include full sample, and columns (4)-(6) include flexible, and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total employment (L),
columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar employment
as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year
fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly:
Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
113
Table 3.b–Effect of Import Competition on Employment (LFirst20, OLS)
Columns (1), (4) and (7) show the results for total employment in full sample, flexible and
inflexible labor market, respectively, by regressing changes in log of total employment on one
year lag changes in industry import exposure from China (ΔCHN) and high-wage countries 
(ΔEJU) and five-year lag of plant TFP (TFPt-5) and its interaction with import exposure
variables. The key estimates of interest are the coefficient of ΔCHN, β1 and the coefficient of
interaction, between TFP and ΔCHN, ߛଵ.
In column (1) of Panel-A in Table 3.a, for LFirst200 sample, the coefficient β1 is -0.847 with
a standard error of 0.383 and ߛଵ is 0.106 with a standard error of 0.042. These results suggest
that Chinese import competition has a negative effect on the demand for labor in low
productivity plants, while a positive effect on the demand for labor in high productivity plants.
In order to estimate the impact of import competition for plants at different points of initial
TFP distribution, summary statistics of five-year lag TFP is calculated separately for the full
OLS Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.59 -0.565 -0.446 -0.924 -0.933 -0.699 -0.347 -0.305 -0.302
(0.425) (0.464) (0.412) (0.668) (0.729) (0.566) (0.412) (0.469) (0.435)
TFP(t-5) 0.011 0.008 0.030*** 0.006 0.003 0.030*** 0.014** 0.011 0.030***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.085 0.081 0.062 0.122 0.122 0.086 0.054 0.049 0.046
(0.052) (0.056) (0.047) (0.082) (0.089) (0.065) (0.047) (0.055) (0.050)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.719*** -0.795*** -0.351 -1.130*** -1.267*** -0.325 -0.376 -0.428 -0.334
(0.252) (0.297) (0.338) (0.395) (0.473) (0.502) (0.274) (0.317) (0.292)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.092*** 0.103*** 0.033 0.136*** 0.151*** 0.031 0.051 0.061 0.03
(0.027) (0.032) (0.042) (0.044) (0.053) (0.060) (0.032) (0.037) (0.036)
R-squared 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.019 0.025 0.021 0.028
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure
and lag TFP of plants. Table reports results for LFirst20 sample only. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample, and columns (4)-(6)
include flexible, and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC
4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-
collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include
initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied
in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly: Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral
states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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sample, flexible market and inflexible market at each threshold level of employment (200, 100
and 20) and reported in Table A.6 (appendix). In the sample of all states, a 10 percentage point
increase in China’s share of India’s imports leads to a 1.2 percent decline in total employment
of a plant at the 25th percentile of initial TFP (6.86), in the set of plants with at least 200
employees. On the other hand, the same 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import
exposure leads to a 0.5 percent increase in total employment of a plant at the 75th percentiles
of initial TFP (8.57).
Column (2) of Panel A in Table 3.a uses five-year difference of only blue-collar workers
(ΔlnLbl) as the dependent variable for LFirst200 sample. The results are almost unchanged: β1
is -0.849 and ߛଵ is 0.104, with standard error 0.421 and 0.046 respectively. A 10 percentage
point increase in Chinese import exposure induces a 1.36 percent decline in blue-collar
employment of a plant at the 25th percentile, but leads to a 0.3 percent increase in employment
of a plant at the 75th percentiles of initial TFP. Column (3) in Panel A shows the results for
changes in non-production or white-collar workers (ΔlnLwh) only. In this case, the size of the 
estimates of both β1 and ߛଵ has fallen, though the sign of the coefficients remain unchanged.
The estimates together imply that employment of non-production workers declines by 1.2
percent in plants at the 25th percentile and by 0.28 percent in plants at the 75th percentiles of
initial TFP. However, both the estimates are statistically insignificant for non-production
workers.
Columns (4)-(6) in Panel-A show the results for LFirst200 plants located in flexible labor
market only. The sign and statistical significance of the estimates of β1 and ߛଵ remain similar
to the full sample results, but the size of both the coefficients increases considerably –
magnifying the asymmetric response to plant employment toward high productivity plants in
the face of rising import exposure. The estimates in column (5) imply that in the flexible market
a 10 percentage point increase in Chinese import exposure leads to a decline in blue-collar
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employment by 0.9 percent for plants at the 25th percentiles, but leads to a 2 percent increase
for plants at the 75th percentiles. For the white-collar workers, the sign of the coefficients β1
and ߛଵ is negative and positive respectively, as in the case of full sample, but the magnitude of
the coefficients is higher in the case of flexible states. Again, the impact on the demand for
white-collar workers is statistically insignificant even in the flexible labor market.
Columns (7)-(9) in Panel-A present results for LFirst200 sample in the inflexible labor
market only. Though the estimates of Chinese import competition and its interaction with lag
TFP are statistically insignificant, there are some interesting observations. First, both β1 and ߛଵ
for white-collar workers (9) are slightly larger than blue-collar workers (8). Second, the
interaction coefficient ߛଵ is not large enough to command any reallocation of employment
toward high productivity plants. For example, in the case of plants at 75th percentiles of TFP
a 10 percent increase in Chinese import competition leads to a 1.1 percent fall in blue-collar
employment (column 8) and 0.6 percent fall in white-collar employment (column 9). A clearer
picture emerges from Table A.11 (appendix), which shows separate regression results for
neutral and pro-employer states. As in the case of inflexible sample regression, the impact of
Chinese competition remains statistically insignificant in both types of states. Though both β1
and ߛଵ appear with theoretically expected sign in neutral states, the sign of these coefficients is
not reasonably consistent in the pro-worker states.
OLS results for LFirst100 sample (Panel-B of Table 3.a) and LFirst20 sample (Table 3.b)
show that the sign of β1 and ߛଵ remains similar to their LFirst200 sample counterparts.
However, the coefficient of Chinese import competition and its interaction with initial plant
TFP become statistically insignificant for LFirst100 and LFirst20 sample.
The coefficient of initial TFP, δ, is positive in all the columns in Panel-A and Panel-B. A 
noticeable point is that the coefficient is larger for non-production employment compared to
the production or total employment in all the cases –full sample, flexible and inflexible labor
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market. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant only in the case of non-production
(white-collar) workers, column (3), (6) and (9). In column (1) of Panel-A, for LFirst200 sample,
the coefficient is 0.011 with a standard error of 0.012 for total employment, whereas the
coefficient is 0.034 with a standard error of 0.01 in the case of the non-production workers.
The latter is statistically significant at 1 percent level. The result suggests that holding the level
of import exposure fixed, higher the initial productivity of the plants, the greater the increase
in employment of white-collar workers. The relationship between initial productivity and
employment of white-collar workers holds in all cases irrespective of labor market rigidity and
size threshold of the plants.
Import competition from high-wage countries also causes reallocation of labor from less
productive plants to ones that are more productive. In Table 3.a, for LFirst200 sample, impact
of import competition from EJU on total employment is statistically significant in the full
sample (column 1) and flexible market sample only (column 4). Separate regressions for blue-
collar (columns 2 and 5) and white-collar employment (columns 3 and 6) suggest that in both
full sample and flexible market, the effect is statistically significant for blue-collar employment
only. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.a show that the coefficient of changes in high-wage
countries import share (ΔEJU) and the coefficient of interaction term between TFP and 
ΔEJUare similar in magnitude and statistical significance to the corresponding coefficient for
China. Therefore, the results suggest that import competition from China and from high-wage
countries have similar effects on reallocation of employment across large plants in India. But
interestingly, the impact of import competition shocks from high-wage countries remains
statistically significant for the sample of plants with initial employment of at least 100 workers
and 20 workers, respectively. In Panel-B of Table 3.a, both size and statistical significance of
the coefficients βand ߛଶ for LFirst100 sample remain close to that of Panel-A.
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IV regression Results:
Table 4.a and Table 4.b show the relationship between plant employment and Chinese import
penetration based on 2SLS regression. In Table 4.a, Panel-A and Panel-B report regression
results for LFirst200 and LFirst100 sample, respectively. Table 4.b shows 2SLS regression
results for LFirst20 sample. In general, I find that the size of the IV estimates for Chinese
import competition are much larger in comparison to corresponding OLS estimates and the
impacts are statistically significant for LFirst200 plants. In Panel-B, for LFirst100 sample, IV
estimates are again larger than their OLS counterparts, but statistically insignificant.
In this section, I discuss the key finding from LFirst200 sample reported in Panel-A. In
column (1), the coefficient of changes in Chinese import share, β1 is -2.442 and the coefficient
of TFP interaction, ߛଵ, is 0.315, where both are significant at 10 percent and 5 percent level,
respectively, for LFirst200 sample. Together the result implies that a 10 percentage point rise
in Chinese import competition leads to a 2.8 percent fall in total employment of a plant at the
25th percentiles of the TFP, whereas the same amount of increase causes a 2.2 percent increase
of employment of a plant at the 75th percentiles of TFP. In column (2), the IV estimates of β1
and ߛଵ for blue-collar workers are very close to total employment regression in column (1) as
in the case of OLS. Both the coefficients are statistically significant at 5 percent level. In
column (3), IV estimates for white-collar workers are again larger than the corresponding OLS
estimates, but remain statistically insignificant.
In the flexible labor market, for LFirst200 sample, both β and ߛଵ are larger for total
employment in column (4) and blue-collar employment in column (5) compared to full sample
regression. As already seen in the case of OLS regression, the growth of total employment in
the high-productivity plants is higher in the flexible market, which is driven by changes in
employment of blue-collar workers. The IV estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point
increase in Chinese import exposure leads to 5 percent increase in employment of blue-collar
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workers of plants at the 75th percentiles of TFP distribution, which is more than twice as much
of what we observe for the full sample.
Table 4.a–Effect of Import Competition on Employment (2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -2.442* -2.509** -1.517 -3.607** -3.883** -1.329 -1.583 -1.493 -1.773*
(1.246) (1.264) (1.138) (1.833) (1.839) (1.519) (1.024) (1.101) (1.071)
TFP(t-5) -0.003 -0.006 0.025** -0.011 -0.015 0.035** 0.004 0 0.018
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.315** 0.325** 0.197 0.471* 0.507** 0.169 0.188 0.176 0.230*
(0.161) (0.163) (0.135) (0.244) (0.246) (0.176) (0.123) (0.132) (0.129)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.025*** -1.106*** -0.34 -1.563*** -1.601*** -0.42 -0.43 -0.507 -0.43
(0.318) (0.375) (0.444) (0.474) (0.548) (0.638) (0.358) (0.438) (0.381)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.119*** 0.129*** 0.022 0.185*** 0.193*** 0.019 0.038 0.046 0.044
(0.037) (0.044) (0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.075) (0.043) (0.054) (0.047)
R-squared 0.029 0.025 0.027 0.03 0.027 0.03 0.03 0.025 0.026
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
Δ5CHN(t-1) -1.22 -1.233 -0.921 -1.727 -1.707 -0.89 -0.955 -1.005 -1.141
(1.300) (1.334) (1.076) (1.750) (1.767) (1.294) (1.023) (1.121) (1.048)
TFP(t-5) 0.004 0.001 0.029** -0.003 -0.005 0.035** 0.009 0.005 0.024
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.165 0.167 0.132 0.228 0.228 0.123 0.124 0.13 0.162
(0.179) (0.183) (0.128) (0.242) (0.245) (0.152) (0.128) (0.141) (0.121)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.974*** -1.020*** -0.618 -1.544*** -1.535*** -0.78 -0.5 -0.575 -0.612*
(0.301) (0.340) (0.396) (0.401) (0.452) (0.540) (0.342) (0.412) (0.350)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.114*** 0.120*** 0.061 0.177*** 0.179*** 0.066 0.055 0.064 0.070*
(0.038) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050) (0.056) (0.063) (0.042) (0.052) (0.041)
R-squared 0.025 0.02 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.028 0.026 0.021 0.03
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure and
lag TFP of plants. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) and Δ5CHN(t-1) ×TFP(t-5) are instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese
import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1 and its interaction with lag TFP, Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1×TFP(t-5). Panel-A reports results for
LFirst200 and panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample, and columns (4)-(6) include flexible, and (7)-(9)
include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4)
and (7) use changes in log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and
(9) use changes in white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies,
rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer
friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes
both worker friendly Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table 4.b–Effect of Import Competition on Employment (2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.744 -0.785 -0.288 -1.558 -1.739 -0.195 -0.296 -0.239 -0.513
(1.303) (1.352) (1.055) (1.759) (1.827) (1.325) (1.045) (1.150) (1.005)
TFP(t-5) 0.009 0.005 0.030** 0 -0.004 0.034** 0.014 0.01 0.027**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.118 0.125 0.061 0.212 0.236 0.047 0.061 0.056 0.089
(0.179) (0.185) (0.128) (0.246) (0.255) (0.162) (0.130) (0.143) (0.118)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.752** -0.841** -0.328 -1.233*** -1.397*** -0.242 -0.379 -0.43 -0.395
(0.337) (0.383) (0.367) (0.441) (0.515) (0.529) (0.343) (0.397) (0.310)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.099** 0.112** 0.035 0.151*** 0.169*** 0.025 0.054 0.065 0.042
(0.040) (0.045) (0.043) (0.054) (0.062) (0.062) (0.040) (0.046) (0.037)
R-squared 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.025 0.02 0.027
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure and
lag TFP of plants. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) and Δ5CHN(t-1) ×TFP(t-5) are instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese
import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1 and its interaction with lag TFP, Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1×TFP(t-5). Table reports results for LFirst20
sample only. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample, and columns (4)-(6) include flexible, and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total employment
(L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar employment as
dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects.
Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra
and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
In the inflexible labor market, though the impact of import competition appears to be
statistically insignificant for total (7) and blue collar employment (8), both the coefficients, β1
and ߛଵ are now statistically significant at 10 percent level for white-collar employment (9). For
plants at the 75 percentiles of TFP, a 10 percent point increase in the Chinese import exposure
leads to a 1.4 percent increase in employment of white-collar workers, but causes a 0.27 percent
decline in employment of blue-collar workers in the inflexible market.
Table 4.a shows that the impact of import competition from high-wage countries is now even
higher in the IV regression and statistically significant for total and blue-collar employment in
the full sample and flexible market, both in Panel-A and Panel-B.
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In IV regression, the coefficient of lag TFP becomes negative for total employment and
blue-collar employment but remains positive for white-collar workers. Though the TFP
coefficient for white-collar workers is also slightly smaller than the corresponding OLS
estimates, it is statistically significant at 5 percent level in the full sample and flexible market.
Overall, both OLS and IV estimates suggest that Chinese import exposure has a significant
impact on total employment and blue-collar employment for plants with at least 200 employees
in the initial period but has no statistically significant impact on white-collar employment in
the full sample and flexible labor market. However, in the inflexible labor market, the impact
of competition seems to have slightly stronger effect on white-collar employment. However,
plants located in the inflexible labor market show no statistically significant adjustment to
employment of blue-collar workers in response to import competition shocks.40
3.8 Concluding Remarks
Competition from imports can significantly affect labor market outcomes in destination
countries through both destruction and reallocation of employment and redistribution of
income across skill-categories. Based on plant-level data from 16 major Indian states this paper
documents that intensified import competition from China leads to an increase in within-plant
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in large plants. One key finding of the
paper is that the impact of trade shocks on within-plant wage-inequality differs by flexibility
of labor market. I find that in flexible labor markets, in large plants, only the average wage of
white-collar workers rises due to increase in Chinese import competition, while no significant
40 I have verified the robustness of the main results using a modified version of BB classification proposed by
Gupta, Hasan and Kumar (2009). The authors suggest that Gujrat should be considered as a neutral state rather
than a pro-worker state. Similarly, Madhya Pradesh should be treated as a neutral state rather than a pro-employer
state. Our main findings remain robust to this modified classification of labor market flexibility. Results are not
reported in the paper.
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adjustment of blue-collar wages occurs, which leads to rise in wage-inequality within-plant. In
the inflexible (neutral and pro-worker) labor markets skill premium does not respond to import
exposure from China.
However, import competition from high-wage countries is not associated with wage
inequality in the sample of 16 major states. Similar results appear in the flexible labor market
as well. But the picture changes dramatically for the inflexible labor market, where import
competition from high-wage countries has a negative on impact wage inequality. This finding
is consistent with Bloom, Draca, and Van Reneen (2016) and Mion and Zhu (2013), who also
find that competition from China is different from that of high-wage countries.
I observe that reallocation of labor across plants occurs in response to import competition, in
the sample of large plants. In the face of rising import competition from China, the low-
productivity plants shrink by reducing the number of employees, whereas the high-productivity
plants expand by hiring more employees. However, mainly blue-collar workers bear the brunt
of the shocks, while there is no significant impact on the employment of white-collar workers.
Therefore, the impact of Chinese import exposure on plant employment is not symmetric across
different skill categories of workers.
The results suggest that the impact of Chinese import exposure on plant labor adjustment
differs across labor market regime. This result is consistent with ABRZ (2008), who show that
the impact of reform differs by labor market flexibility in India, and with the cross country
evidence that speed of adjustment to shocks is slower in more rigid labor markets (Lafontaine
and Sivadasan 2009; Caballero et al. 2013). The findings also support the prediction of
Kambourov (2009), who shows that labor market rigidity hinders reallocation of labor across
sectors.
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3.9 Appendix
Table A.1.a–India's and Indonesia's Exposure to Chinese Imports by sector (NIC 2-
digit)
India's Imports from China Indonesia's Imports from China
1998-01 2002-05 2006-09 1998-01 2002-05 2006-09
Food 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04
Tobacco 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04
Textiles 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.08 0.21 0.33
Apparel 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.10 0.25 0.46
Leather 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.08 0.23 0.35
Wood 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.18
Paper 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.06
Printing 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.09
Petroleum prod. 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.03
Chemicals 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.12
Rubber & plastic 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.04 0.12 0.16
Other non-metallic 0.08 0.23 0.39 0.12 0.30 0.33
Basic metals 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.17
Fabricated metal 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.05 0.17 0.30
Machinery 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.16
Office machinery 0.09 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.20 0.33
Electrical machin. 0.06 0.13 0.28 0.05 0.14 0.23
TV & comm. Equi 0.08 0.23 0.43 0.06 0.15 0.25
Medical instrument 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.12
Motor vehicles 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03
Other transport 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.08
Furniture 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.43 0.45
Minimum 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Maximum 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.14 0.43 0.46
Standard Deviation 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.14
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Table A.1.b–Wage Inequality 1998-2009 and Labor Market Rigidity
Year Overall Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
1998 2.14 2.21 2.13 2.04
1999 2.20 2.38 2.16 2.01
2000 2.22 2.30 2.32 2.04
2001 2.27 2.31 2.34 2.15
2002 2.33 2.40 2.41 2.18
2003 2.38 2.45 2.43 2.24
2004 2.46 2.52 2.53 2.31
2005 2.52 2.56 2.66 2.35
2006 2.65 2.69 2.75 2.51
2007 2.77 2.81 2.85 2.64
2008 2.98 3.01 3.15 2.81
2009 3.03 3.10 3.24 2.78
1998-01 2.21 2.30 2.24 2.06
2002-05 2.42 2.48 2.51 2.27
2006-09 2.86 2.90 3.00 2.69
Note: The Table shows the ratio of the wage of white-collar to the wage
of blue-collar employees based on balanced sample of ASI plants from
1998 to 2009 period. Labor Market Classification is based on Besley
and Burgess (2004).
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Table A.2–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality with other LWs (OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.150*** -0.019 0.121*** 0.310*** -0.118 0.215*** 0.011 0.070** 0.048
(0.056) (0.041) (0.046) (0.101) (0.072) (0.073) (0.051) (0.032) (0.052)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.004 -0.017 -0.006 0.196** -0.147** 0.065 -0.140*** 0.072** -0.055
(0.049) (0.041) (0.057) (0.078) (0.059) (0.078) (0.041) (0.036) (0.054)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.065 0.014 0.078*** 0.183** -0.053 0.130*** -0.007 0.054 0.046
(0.044 (0.029) (0.029) (0.075) (0.042) (0.046) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036)
R-squared 0.007 0.016 0.019 0.008 0.014 0.018 0.008 0.019 0.02
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B OLS Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.119 0.025 0.134** 0.302** -0.057 0.260*** -0.035 0.096*** 0.031
(0.074) (0.048) (0.052) (0.123) (0.073) (0.093) (0.043) (0.037) (0.044)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.011 -0.034 -0.018 0.149* -0.142** 0.019 -0.087** 0.04 -0.047
(0.052) (0.042) (0.054) (0.087) (0.058) (0.083) (0.041) (0.038) (0.048)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.069 0.005 0.070* 0.185** -0.051 0.133** -0.005 0.039 0.028
(0.046) (0.031) (0.036) (0.08) (0.037) (0.055) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036)
R-squared 0.007 0.02 0.019 0.008 0.017 0.02 0.007 0.021 0.02
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Panel C OLS Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.104 -0.001 0.095 0.251** -0.091 0.179* -0.011 0.066* 0.028
(0.065) (0.042) (0.058) (0.108) (0.070) (0.105) (0.051) (0.037) (0.048)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.012 -0.059 -0.039 0.11 -0.159** -0.038 -0.055 0.007 -0.042
(0.046) (0.040) (0.052) (0.077) (0.066) (0.095) (0.043) (0.030) (0.043)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.02 0 0.018 0.117 -0.052* 0.062 -0.039 0.029 -0.012
(0.041) (0.023) (0.041) (0.076) (0.031) (0.065) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038)
R-squared 0.009 0.024 0.022 0.007 0.021 0.018 0.01 0.025 0.025
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average
white-collar wages on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s and LW’s import share in India. Here skill premium is measured as ratio of
average wages paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample,
columns (4)-(6) include flexible and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill premium (SK), column (2), (5) and (8)
use changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in log of average wages of white-
collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy
and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states
refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both
worker friendly Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.3–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality with other LWs (2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.250** 0.016 0.236** 0.396*** -0.079 0.285** 0.094 0.125 0.196*
(0.099) (0.100) (0.093) (0.131) (0.150) (0.121) (0.108) (0.082) (0.105)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.021 -0.008 0.024 0.212*** -0.138** 0.081 -0.117** 0.087** -0.015
(0.057) (0.044) (0.061) (0.082) (0.069) (0.083) (0.053) (0.037) (0.060)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.095* 0.018 0.094*** 0.205** -0.047 0.141** 0.024 0.061* 0.064*
(0.050) (0.028) (0.031) (0.085) (0.045) (0.056) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Adj_R2 0.008 0.016 0.018 0.009 0.014 0.017 0.01 0.019 0.019
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.111 0.074 0.156 0.288 -0.043 0.209 -0.068 0.183** 0.095
(0.13) (0.102) (0.108) (0.19) (0.139) (0.164) (0.096) (0.088) (0.097)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.015 -0.022 -0.012 0.15 -0.139** 0.007 -0.088* 0.064 -0.029
(0.065 (0.046 (0.061 (0.101 -0.065 (0.092 (0.049 (0.043 (0.054)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.082* 0.012 0.073* 0.194** -0.048 0.124** 0.007 0.051* 0.036
(0.048) (0.031) (0.037) (0.084) (0.039) (0.06) (0.029) (0.031) (0.035)
Adj_R2 0.008 0.02 0.019 0.009 0.017 0.02 0.008 0.02 0.02
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Panel C IV Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.033 0.135 0.102 0.092 0.065 0.159 -0.145 0.192** 0.046
(0.185) (0.110) (0.160) (0.240) (0.180) (0.228) (0.163) (0.087) (0.149)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.017 -0.025 -0.037 0.064 -0.122 -0.043 -0.077 0.041 -0.037
(0.076) (0.052) (0.060) (0.107) (0.082) (0.108) (0.068) (0.042) (0.054)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.009 0.02 0.019 0.089 -0.027 0.058 -0.042 0.046 -0.009
(0.047) (0.027) (0.044) (0.082) (0.043) (0.073) (0.038) (0.029) (0.041)
Adj_R2 0.009 0.023 0.022 0.006 0.02 0.018 0.011 0.023 0.025
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average white-
collar wages on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s and LW’s import share in India. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) is instrumented by (t-1)-
1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Here skill premium is measured as ratio of average
wages paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample and columns
(4)-(6) include flexible and columns (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill premium (SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use
changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in log of average wages of white-collar
employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by
year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly:
Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar
Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.4.a–Effect of Import Competition on Employment with other LWs (OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.802** -0.801* -0.363 -1.372** -1.542*** -0.556 -0.244 -0.116 -0.284
(0.389) (0.433) (0.471) (0.524) (0.584) (0.672) (0.483) (0.597) (0.462)
TFP(t-5) 0.011 0.008 0.035*** 0.007 0.004 0.042*** 0.015* 0.012 0.031***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.101** 0.099** 0.035 0.184*** 0.204*** 0.059 0.015 -0.003 0.025
(0.043) (0.047) (0.051) (0.061) (0.068) (0.071) (0.055) (0.070) (0.055)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.690** -0.751** -0.027 -1.327*** -1.357** -0.127 -0.043 -0.095 -0.037
(0.282) (0.342) (0.381) (0.439) (0.527) (0.566) (0.330) (0.413) (0.350)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.077** 0.085** -0.022 0.158*** 0.166*** -0.021 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011
(0.031) (0.039) (0.046) (0.045) (0.055) (0.065) (0.040) (0.052) (0.043)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.223 0.268 0.502*** -0.175 -0.179 0.688** 0.562* 0.666** 0.318
(0.169) (0.203) (0.186) (0.247) (0.308) (0.337) (0.285) (0.309) (0.210)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
-0.023 -0.026 -0.067*** 0.028 0.033 -0.089** -0.070** -0.082** -0.043
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.027)
R-squared 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.038 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.027 0.029
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B OLS Regression Results Lfirst100 Sample
Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.531 -0.492 -0.287 -0.583 -0.503 -0.472 -0.434 -0.439 -0.194
(0.374) (0.399) (0.441) (0.511) (0.548) (0.563) (0.469) (0.552) (0.461)
TFP(t-5) 0.01 0.007 0.036*** 0.007 0.005 0.039*** 0.014* 0.01 0.033***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.075* 0.071 0.032 0.093 0.085 0.053 0.05 0.05 0.021
(0.043) (0.045) (0.048) (0.064) (0.068) (0.060) (0.052) (0.064) (0.053)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.814*** -0.861*** -0.348 -1.393*** -1.392*** -0.474 -0.323 -0.394 -0.294
(0.236) (0.276) (0.355) (0.340) (0.394) (0.497) (0.308) (0.379) (0.335)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.095*** 0.103*** 0.021 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.024 0.031 0.039 0.022
(0.027) (0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.058) (0.039) (0.049) (0.040)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.152 0.116 0.649*** -0.032 -0.08 0.828** 0.331 0.307 0.555**
(0.201) (0.221) (0.224) (0.287) (0.315) (0.346) (0.272) (0.288) (0.232)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
-0.014 -0.007 -0.087*** 0.016 0.026 -0.102*** -0.043 -0.038 -0.079***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.029)
R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.029 0.027 0.021 0.032
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure
and lag TFP of plants. Panel-A reports results for LFirst200 and panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3) include full
sample, and columns (4)-(6) include flexible, and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and
(8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar employment as dependent variable.
All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific
sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly: Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra
and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05;
*** p<.01
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Table A.4.b–Effect of Import Competition on Employment with LWs (LFirst 20, OLS)
Panel C OLS Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.592 -0.592 -0.256 -0.987 -1.034 -0.449 -0.299 -0.275 -0.155
(0.430) (0.473) (0.424) (0.677) (0.740) (0.593) (0.417) (0.482) (0.441)
TFP(t-5) 0.011 0.007 0.032*** 0.005 0.002 0.032*** 0.015** 0.011 0.031***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.087* 0.087 0.035 0.134 0.139 0.052 0.048 0.047 0.025
(0.052) (0.056) (0.048) (0.083) (0.089) (0.068) (0.048) (0.057) (0.050)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.710*** -0.808** -0.153 -1.174*** -1.350*** -0.015 -0.328 -0.395 -0.202
(0.267) (0.317) (0.330) (0.403) (0.483) (0.497) (0.286) (0.336) (0.297)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.093*** 0.108*** 0.006 0.147*** 0.167*** -0.008 0.045 0.059 0.01
(0.029) (0.035) (0.040) (0.046) (0.054) (0.059) (0.034) (0.041) (0.036)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.082 0.024 0.688*** -0.074 -0.183 0.964*** 0.228 0.197 0.518**
(0.183) (0.198) (0.232) (0.268) (0.305) (0.367) (0.235) (0.254) (0.220)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
-0.003 0.008 -0.090*** 0.022 0.038 -0.117*** -0.026 -0.018 -0.073**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.042) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029)
R-squared 0.023 0.019 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.02 0.025 0.021 0.028
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure
and lag TFP of plants for LFirst20 sample only. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample, and columns (4)-(6) include flexible, and (7)-(9)
include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4)
and (7) use changes in log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and
(9) use changes in white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies,
rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer
friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market
includes both worker friendly: Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and
Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.5.a–Effect of Import Competition on Employment with other LWs (2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -2.580* -2.668* -1.386 -4.075** -4.429** -1.012 -1.469 -1.353 -1.783
(1.360) (1.381) (1.177) (2.066) (2.067) (1.550) (1.064) (1.152) (1.139)
TFP(t-5) -0.004 -0.008 0.026** -0.015 -0.02 0.038** 0.005 0.002 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.335* 0.348* 0.178 0.536* 0.583** 0.125 0.172 0.156 0.231*
(0.178) (0.181) (0.141) (0.279) (0.280) (0.179) (0.128) (0.139) (0.140)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.085*** -1.167*** -0.258 -1.842*** -1.907*** -0.213 -0.354 -0.41 -0.435
(0.366) (0.430) (0.461) (0.527) (0.598) (0.651) (0.375) (0.458) (0.406)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.129*** 0.141*** 0.011 0.224*** 0.237*** -0.009 0.029 0.035 0.045
(0.044) (0.052) (0.056) (0.061) (0.069) (0.075) (0.046) (0.057) (0.051)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.146 -0.125 0.266 -0.750* -0.801* 0.575 0.325 0.424 -0.013
(0.239) (0.262) (0.236) (0.409) (0.438) (0.429) (0.260) (0.282) (0.261)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.026 0.027 -0.035 0.102** 0.113** -0.074 -0.039 -0.049 0.002
(0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.051) (0.054) (0.048) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
R-squared 0.029 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.031 0.031 0.025 0.026
N 22596 22596 22596 9415 9415 9415 13181 13181 13181
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -1.279 -1.346 -0.665 -1.993 -2.055 -0.576 -0.86 -0.946 -0.95
(1.444) (1.493) (1.113) (1.962) (1.989) (1.326) (1.097) (1.215) (1.099)
TFP(t-5) 0.004 0 0.031** -0.005 -0.008 0.038** 0.01 0.005 0.026*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.174 0.184 0.096 0.265 0.276 0.079 0.111 0.122 0.135
(0.200) (0.207) (0.132) (0.274) (0.278) (0.154) (0.139) (0.155) (0.129)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.991*** -1.063** -0.445 -1.678*** -1.707*** -0.504 -0.44 -0.531 -0.505
(0.373) (0.417) (0.409) (0.472) (0.515) (0.549) (0.376) (0.456) (0.372)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.118** 0.129** 0.037 0.199*** 0.207*** 0.031 0.048 0.059 0.054
(0.050) (0.055) (0.047) (0.062) (0.067) (0.063) (0.048) (0.059) (0.043)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.014 -0.073 0.522* -0.305 -0.386 0.769* 0.221 0.18 0.343
(0.319) (0.334) (0.287) (0.423) (0.439) (0.415) (0.322) (0.345) (0.289)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.008 0.019 -0.068** 0.05 0.064 -0.093** -0.028 -0.02 -0.049
(0.042) (0.044) (0.035) (0.053) (0.054) (0.047) (0.043) (0.046) (0.037)
R-squared 0.025 0.02 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.031
N 31452 31452 31452 13106 13106 13106 18346 18346 18346
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure
and lag TFP of plants. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) and Δ5CHN(t-1) ×TFP(t-5) are instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in
Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1 and its interaction with lag TFP, Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1×TFP(t-5). Panel-A reports
results for LFirst200 and panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample, and columns (4)-(6) include
flexible, and (7)-(9) include inflexible labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit)
level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar
employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial
technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in
all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and
Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral
states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.5.b–Effect of Import Competition on Employment with other LWs (2SLS)
Panel C IV Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Full Sample Flexible Inflexible
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.83 -0.94 0.021 -1.848 -2.134 0.21 -0.243 -0.229 -0.298
(1.442) (1.506) (1.091) (2.003) (2.096) (1.368) (1.105) (1.224) (1.048)
TFP(t-5) 0.008 0.004 0.033*** -0.003 -0.007 0.037*** 0.014 0.01 0.029**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.022) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.131 0.147 0.018 0.253 0.292 -0.011 0.054 0.056 0.059
(0.200) (0.210) (0.131) (0.282) (0.296) (0.165) (0.141) (0.157) (0.123)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -0.782* -0.908** -0.11 -1.376*** -1.609*** 0.114 -0.337 -0.409 -0.265
(0.403) (0.451) (0.384) (0.525) (0.597) (0.544) (0.381) (0.442) (0.342)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.106** 0.125** 0.006 0.174** 0.202*** -0.019 0.05 0.065 0.023
(0.052) (0.057) (0.045) (0.068) (0.076) (0.063) (0.048) (0.056) (0.041)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.01 -0.097 0.690** -0.289 -0.459 1.049** 0.2 0.16 0.438
(0.314) (0.332) (0.289) (0.448) (0.484) (0.418) (0.300) (0.326) (0.286)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.011 0.026 -0.088** 0.051 0.075 -0.125*** -0.021 -0.012 -0.06
(0.042) (0.045) (0.036) (0.056) (0.061) (0.048) (0.042) (0.046) (0.038)
R-squared 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.025 0.02 0.028
N 38062 38062 38062 15915 15915 15915 22147 22147 22147
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure and lag
TFP of plants. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) and Δ5CHN(t-1) ×TFP(t-5) are instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese import
share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1 and its interaction with lag TFP, Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1×TFP(t-5). Table reports results for LFirst200 and
panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3) include full sample, and columns (4)-(6) include flexible, and (7)-(9) include inflexible
labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in
log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-
collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state
by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. Flexible or employer friendly states refer to Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu; inflexible labor market includes both worker friendly Orissa,
Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal, and neutral states: Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh . * p<.1;
** p<.05; *** p<.01
Table A.6–Summary Statistics for Initial TFP
Lfirst200 Lfirst100 Lfirst20
Full
Sample Flexible Inflexible
Full
Sample Flexible Inflexible
Full
Sample Flexible Inflexible
N: 22596 9415 13181 31452 13106 18346 38062 15915 22147
Mean: 7.73 7.94 7.59 7.69 7.85 7.57 7.62 7.76 7.53
p5: 4.84 5 4.75 4.89 5.01 4.82 4.84 4.89 4.82
p25: 6.86 6.99 6.75 6.81 6.92 6.73 6.71 6.79 6.64
p75: 8.45 8.66 8.33 8.42 8.57 8.31 8.39 8.52 8.3
p95: 11.23 11.54 10.88 11.03 11.37 10.68 10.91 11.24 10.59
SD: 1.74 1.81 1.68 1.69 1.75 1.64 1.69 1.76 1.63
Skewness: 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.3 0.31 0.27
Kurtosis: 4.02 3.77 4.22 4.13 3.93 4.26 4.05 3.87 4.16
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Table A.7–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality (BB, OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.265** -0.105 0.183** -0.111* 0.156*** 0.034 0.111 -0.022 0.039
(0.113) (0.074) (0.082) (0.057) (0.051) (0.067) (0.094) (0.047) (0.077)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.125 -0.126** 0.015 -0.151** 0.02 -0.121** -0.140** 0.099** -0.022
(0.084) (0.054) (0.079) (0.061) (0.049) (0.058) (0.066) (0.045) (0.077)
R-squared 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.006 0.026 0.022 0.011 0.016 0.017
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B OLS Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.261** -0.046 0.231** -0.159** 0.190*** 0.026 0.088 -0.021 0.018
(0.130) (0.073) (0.096) (0.064) (0.052) (0.084) (0.070) (0.048) (0.074)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.079 -0.123** -0.031 -0.085 0.01 -0.074 -0.104 0.058 -0.041
(0.086) (0.052) (0.078) (0.054) (0.050) (0.068) (0.064) (0.043) (0.071)
R-squared 0.007 0.017 0.019 0.006 0.027 0.026 0.008 0.02 0.016
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Panel C OLS Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.226** -0.079 0.165 -0.106* 0.158*** 0.038 0.107 -0.05 0.018
(0.110) (0.071) (0.103) (0.061) (0.059) (0.083) (0.076) (0.052) (0.073)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.069 -0.140** -0.06 -0.059 -0.007 -0.063 -0.034 0.012 -0.013
(0.074) (0.059) (0.086) (0.055) (0.038) (0.064) (0.063) (0.048) (0.067)
R-squared 0.007 0.021 0.018 0.008 0.033 0.029 0.012 0.021 0.021
N 15915 15915 15915 9917 9917 9917 12230 12230 12230
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average
white-collar wages on lag changes in China’s and EJU’s import share in India. Here skill premium is measured as ratio of average
wages paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include flexible or pro-
employer and columns (4)-(6) include neutral and (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor market sample. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill premium
(SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in log
of average wages of white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity
dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In
this table Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-employer; Orissa, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and West Bengal are pro-worker; and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are
neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.8–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality with other LWs (BB, OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.310*** -0.118 0.215*** -0.129** 0.176*** 0.036 0.118 -0.014 0.054
(0.101) (0.072) (0.073) (0.055) (0.050) (0.069) (0.097) (0.045) (0.085)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.196** -0.147** 0.065 -0.176*** 0.049 -0.118* -0.127* 0.111** 0.002
(0.078) (0.059) (0.078) (0.059) (0.048) (0.064) (0.070) (0.052) (0.085)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.183** -0.053 0.130*** -0.066 0.073** 0.008 0.043 0.041 0.082
(0.075) (0.042) (0.046) (0.050) (0.033) (0.045) (0.037) (0.050) (0.067)
R-squared 0.008 0.014 0.018 0.006 0.026 0.022 0.011 0.016 0.017
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B OLS Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.302** -0.057 0.260*** -0.173** 0.211*** 0.031 0.094 -0.019 0.025
(0.123) (0.073) (0.093) (0.066) (0.051) (0.088) (0.072) (0.046) (0.079)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.149* -0.142** 0.019 -0.103* 0.038 -0.067 -0.093 0.061 -0.029
(0.087) (0.058) (0.083) (0.056) (0.052) (0.077) (0.067) (0.052) (0.080)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.185** -0.051 0.133** -0.048 0.075** 0.017 0.031 0.008 0.037
(0.080) (0.037) (0.055) (0.037) (0.033) (0.051) (0.039) (0.059) (0.072)
R-squared 0.008 0.017 0.02 0.006 0.028 0.026 0.008 0.02 0.016
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Panel C OLS Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.251** -0.091 0.179* -0.118* 0.169*** 0.036 0.101 -0.047 0.014
(0.108) (0.070) (0.105) (0.064) (0.058) (0.084) (0.076) (0.051) (0.076)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.11 -0.159** -0.038 -0.075 0.007 -0.065 -0.045 0.017 -0.018
(0.077) (0.066) (0.095) (0.061) (0.040) (0.075) (0.063) (0.056) (0.074)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.117 -0.052* 0.062 -0.048 0.045 -0.008 -0.034 0.016 -0.017
(0.076) (0.031) (0.065) (0.043) (0.039) (0.061) (0.045) (0.056) (0.077)
R-squared 0.007 0.021 0.018 0.008 0.033 0.029 0.012 0.021 0.021
N 15915 15915 15915 9917 9917 9917 12230 12230 12230
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average
white-collar wages on lag changes in China’s, EJU’s and LW’s import share in India. Here skill premium is measured as ratio
of average wages paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include
flexible or pro-employer and columns (4)-(6) include neutral and (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor market sample. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill
premium (SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use
changes in log of average wages of white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial
technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied
in all regressions. In this table Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-
employer; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal are pro-worker; and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
132
Table A.9–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality (BB, 2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.362** -0.071 0.262** -0.091 0.361*** 0.336*** 0.225 -0.068 0.075
(0.157) (0.152) (0.120) (0.147) (0.095) (0.125) (0.167) (0.086) (0.143)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.136 -0.120* 0.029 -0.148* 0.077 -0.037 -0.127 0.090* -0.016
(0.092) (0.062) (0.081) (0.079) (0.060) (0.072) (0.079) (0.047) (0.085)
R-squared 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.01 0.021 0.018 0.011 0.016 0.017
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.259 -0.036 0.19 -0.17 0.373*** 0.235 0.027 -0.019 -0.054
(0.208) (0.140) (0.167) (0.110) (0.085) (0.157) (0.132) (0.097) (0.113)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.079 -0.121** -0.038 -0.079 0.065 -0.011 -0.118* 0.058 -0.054
(0.100) (0.058) (0.084) (0.066) (0.061) (0.086) (0.065) (0.046) (0.075)
R-squared 0.007 0.017 0.019 0.009 0.024 0.024 0.009 0.02 0.015
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Panel C IV Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.079 0.069 0.15 -0.163 0.378*** 0.221 -0.109 -0.035 -0.146
(0.244) (0.177) (0.225) (0.213) (0.099) (0.229) (0.163) (0.113) (0.128)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.033 -0.112 -0.063 -0.064 0.054 -0.012 -0.065 0.015 -0.042
(0.098) (0.070) (0.095) (0.085) (0.053) (0.085) (0.071) (0.053) (0.071)
R-squared 0.006 0.019 0.018 0.01 0.028 0.028 0.012 0.021 0.02
N 15915 15915 15915 9917 9917 9917 12230 12230 12230
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average
white-collar wages on lag changes in China’s and EJU’s import share in India. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) is instrumented by
(t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Here skill premium is measured as ratio
of average wages paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include
flexible or pro-employer and columns (4)-(6) include neutral and (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor market sample. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill
premium (SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use
changes in log of average wages of white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial
technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied
in all regressions. In this table, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-
employer; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal are pro-worker and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.10–Effect of Import Competition on Wage Inequality with other LWs (BB,
2SLS)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.396*** -0.079 0.285** -0.1 0.383*** 0.347*** 0.234 -0.063 0.086
(0.131) (0.150) (0.121) (0.150) (0.097) (0.125) (0.173) (0.087) (0.149)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.212*** -0.138** 0.081 -0.163** 0.115* -0.019 -0.105 0.101* 0.009
(0.082) (0.069) (0.083) (0.078) (0.063) (0.077) (0.085) (0.055) (0.094)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.205** -0.047 0.141** -0.04 0.101*** 0.049 0.075* 0.036 0.085
(0.085) (0.045) (0.056) (0.059) (0.033) (0.050) (0.040) (0.052) (0.067)
R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.017 0.01 0.022 0.018 0.011 0.016 0.017
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst100 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.288 -0.043 0.209 -0.177 0.396*** 0.247 0.031 -0.018 -0.05
(0.190) (0.139) (0.164) (0.114) (0.087) (0.159) (0.132) (0.097) (0.117)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.15 -0.139** 0.007 -0.09 0.102 0.008 -0.106 0.061 -0.045
(0.101) (0.065) (0.092) (0.069) (0.066) (0.096) (0.068) (0.054) (0.085)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.194** -0.048 0.124** -0.031 0.104*** 0.05 0.039 0.008 0.028
(0.084) (0.039) (0.060) (0.042) (0.039) (0.057) (0.040) (0.057) (0.075)
R-squared 0.009 0.017 0.02 0.009 0.025 0.024 0.009 0.02 0.015
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Panel B IV Regression Results LFirst20 Sample
Pro-Employer Neutral Pro-worker
 Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw Δ5lnSK Δ5lnWb Δ5lnWw
Δ5CHN(t-1) 0.092 0.065 0.159 -0.169 0.391*** 0.224 -0.115 -0.033 -0.15
(0.240) (0.180) (0.228) (0.219) (0.096) (0.233) (0.169) (0.114) (0.133)
Δ5EJU(t-1) 0.064 -0.122 -0.043 -0.074 0.077 -0.006 -0.08 0.02 -0.053
(0.107) (0.082) (0.108) (0.095) (0.056) (0.097) (0.075) (0.061) (0.081)
Δ5LW(t-1) 0.089 -0.027 0.058 -0.034 0.077* 0.02 -0.053 0.017 -0.038
(0.082) (0.043) (0.073) (0.056) (0.043) (0.068) (0.057) (0.054) (0.087)
R-squared 0.006 0.02 0.018 0.01 0.029 0.028 0.011 0.021 0.02
N 15915 15915 15915 9917 9917 9917 12230 12230 12230
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in log skill premium/average blue-collar wages/average
white-collar wages on lag changes in China’s and EJU’s import share in India. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) is instrumented by
(t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1. Here skill premium is measured as ratio
of average wages paid to non-production workers to average wages paid to production workers. Columns (1)-(3) include
flexible or pro-employer and columns (4)-(6) include neutral and (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor market sample. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log of wage skill
premium (SK), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log of average wages of blue-collar workers and (3), (6) and (9) use
changes in log of average wages of white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial
technology intensity dummies, rural dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all
regressions. In this table, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-employer;
Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal are pro-worker and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh are neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.11–Effect of Import Competition on Employment (BB, OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -1.297** -1.451** -0.776 -0.894 -0.895 -0.673 0.042 0.219 -0.169
(0.524) (0.585) (0.661) (0.887) (1.028) (0.852) (0.533) (0.631) (0.541)
TFP(t-5) 0.008 0.005 0.040*** 0.033** 0.031** 0.049*** 0.005 0.001 0.02
(0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.173*** 0.190*** 0.09 0.073 0.068 0.066 -0.001 -0.023 0.019
(0.062) (0.070) (0.071) (0.107) (0.124) (0.105) (0.056) (0.069) (0.062)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.264*** -1.289** -0.355 -0.568 -0.737 -0.523 0.074 0.068 0.187
(0.421) (0.503) (0.587) (0.476) (0.561) (0.382) (0.412) (0.493) (0.499)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.148*** 0.153*** 0.009 0.067 0.088 0.055 -0.039 -0.042 -0.041
(0.045) (0.054) (0.069) (0.058) (0.069) (0.047) (0.048) (0.061) (0.058)
R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.026 0.02 0.03 0.043 0.036 0.031
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B OLS Regression Results Lfirst100 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.533 -0.426 -0.699 -1.154 -1.216 -0.991 -0.09 -0.024 -0.007
(0.516) (0.553) (0.548) (0.771) (0.872) (0.719) (0.493) (0.565) (0.540)
TFP(t-5) 0.007 0.006 0.037*** 0.024* 0.02 0.042*** 0.008 0.004 0.026**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.084 0.071 0.084 0.13 0.135 0.123 0.02 0.012 0.005
(0.065) (0.069) (0.059) (0.093) (0.105) (0.088) (0.053) (0.063) (0.062)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.372*** -1.351*** -0.757 -0.882** -1.008** -0.984*** -0.132 -0.142 -0.066
(0.346) (0.400) (0.512) (0.399) (0.470) (0.336) (0.390) (0.449) (0.481)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.157*** 0.158*** 0.06 0.114** 0.130** 0.116*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.039) (0.045) (0.061) (0.050) (0.059) (0.041) (0.047) (0.056) (0.057)
R-squared 0.028 0.022 0.028 0.018 0.015 0.028 0.036 0.028 0.035
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import
exposure and lag TFP of plants. Panel-A reports results for LFirst200 and panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3)
include flexible or pro-employer and columns (4)-(6) include neutral and (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor market sample. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total employment
(L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar employment
as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban dummy and state by year fixed
effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In this table, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-employer; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal are pro-worker and Assam,
Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are defined as neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.12–Effect of Import Competition on Employment with LWs (BB, OLS)
Panel A OLS Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -1.372** -1.542*** -0.556 -0.797 -0.818 -0.605 0.198 0.423 -0.079
(0.524) (0.584) (0.672) (0.915) (1.064) (0.871) (0.551) (0.666) (0.547)
TFP(t-5) 0.007 0.004 0.042*** 0.034** 0.032** 0.049*** 0.007 0.003 0.021*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.184*** 0.204*** 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.055 -0.02 -0.049 0.007
(0.061) (0.068) (0.071) (0.110) (0.129) (0.107) (0.059) (0.074) (0.064)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.327*** -1.357** -0.127 -0.48 -0.672 -0.468 0.204 0.242 0.259
(0.439) (0.527) (0.566) (0.511) (0.608) (0.397) (0.414) (0.493) (0.510)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.158*** 0.166*** -0.021 0.054 0.076 0.045 -0.054 -0.061 -0.05
(0.045) (0.055) (0.065) (0.062) (0.074) (0.049) (0.048) (0.060) (0.060)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.175 -0.179 0.688** 0.358 0.26 0.213 0.740** 1.006*** 0.4
(0.247) (0.308) (0.337) (0.367) (0.398) (0.341) (0.304) (0.334) (0.262)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.028 0.033 -0.089** -0.052 -0.04 -0.036 -0.087** -0.115*** -0.048
(0.028) (0.035) (0.036) (0.045) (0.048) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.034)
R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.032 0.026 0.02 0.03 0.044 0.038 0.031
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B OLS Regression Results Lfirst100 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
 Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -0.583 -0.503 -0.472 -1.103 -1.202 -0.832 0.014 0.08 0.156
(0.511) (0.548) (0.563) (0.801) (0.907) (0.745) (0.515) (0.601) (0.549)
TFP(t-5) 0.007 0.005 0.039*** 0.024* 0.02 0.043*** 0.009 0.005 0.028**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.093 0.085 0.053 0.123 0.133 0.098 0.006 -0.001 -0.018
(0.064) (0.068) (0.060) (0.097) (0.110) (0.091) (0.056) (0.068) (0.063)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.393*** -1.392*** -0.474 -0.837* -0.996* -0.847** -0.045 -0.049 0.065
(0.340) (0.394) (0.497) (0.433) (0.507) (0.353) (0.388) (0.457) (0.484)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.164*** 0.169*** 0.024 0.107* 0.128** 0.093** -0.014 -0.015 -0.021
(0.038) (0.043) (0.058) (0.054) (0.064) (0.042) (0.046) (0.057) (0.057)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.032 -0.08 0.828** 0.146 0.041 0.395 0.431 0.468 0.630**
(0.287) (0.315) (0.346) (0.354) (0.401) (0.291) (0.337) (0.392) (0.298)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.016 0.026 -0.102*** -0.021 -0.005 -0.063* -0.055 -0.057 -0.084**
(0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.048) (0.038) (0.042) (0.048) (0.038)
R-squared 0.028 0.023 0.029 0.018 0.015 0.029 0.036 0.028 0.036
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import
exposure and lag TFP of plants. Panel-A reports results for LFirst200 and panel-B reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3)
include flexible or pro-employer and columns (4)-(6) include neutral and (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor market sample.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log total
employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and columns (3), (6) and (9) use changes
in white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural/urban
dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In this table, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-employer; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and
West Bengal are pro-worker and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are defined as neutral
states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.13–Effect of Import Competition on Employment (IV, BB)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -3.607** -3.883** -1.329 -3.125 -3.623 -2.038 -0.628 -0.196 -1.506*
(1.833) (1.839) (1.519) (2.314) (2.532) (2.304) (0.738) (0.766) (0.861)
TFP(t-5) -0.011 -0.015 0.035** 0.017 0.011 0.038** -0.002 -0.004 0.007
(0.024) (0.025) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.471* 0.507** 0.169 0.342 0.399 0.235 0.102 0.051 0.220**
(0.244) (0.246) (0.176) (0.275) (0.302) (0.280) (0.092) (0.094) (0.108)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.563*** -1.601*** -0.42 -1.081 -1.367 -0.843 -0.082 -0.038 -0.122
(0.474) (0.548) (0.638) (0.744) (0.850) (0.670) (0.421) (0.493) (0.516)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.185*** 0.193*** 0.019 0.129 0.164 0.095 -0.016 -0.024 0.005
(0.054) (0.062) (0.075) (0.091) (0.104) (0.082) (0.049) (0.060) (0.061)
R-squared 0.03 0.027 0.03 0.018 0.012 0.028 0.041 0.035 0.026
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B OLS Regression Results Lfirst100 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -1.727 -1.707 -0.89 -2.473 -2.999 -1.446 -0.086 0.174 -1.014
(1.750) (1.767) (1.294) (2.110) (2.399) (1.931) (0.775) (0.822) (0.900)
TFP(t-5) -0.003 -0.005 0.035** 0.012 0.005 0.035** 0.008 0.006 0.017
(0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.228 0.228 0.123 0.319 0.381 0.213 0.017 -0.013 0.14
(0.242) (0.245) (0.152) (0.255) (0.293) (0.223) (0.100) (0.104) (0.107)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.544*** -1.535*** -0.78 -1.210* -1.446* -1.108** -0.13 -0.102 -0.277
(0.401) (0.452) (0.540) (0.658) (0.771) (0.541) (0.356) (0.401) (0.463)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.177*** 0.179*** 0.066 0.162** 0.191** 0.141** -0.003 -0.009 0.026
(0.050) (0.056) (0.063) (0.082) (0.096) (0.064) (0.041) (0.047) (0.054)
R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.028 0.015 0.011 0.026 0.036 0.028 0.034
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure and
lag TFP of plants. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) and Δ5CHN(t-1)×TFP(t-5) are instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in Chinese
import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1 and Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1×TFP(t-5). Panel-A reports results for LFirst200 and panel-B reports
LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3) include pro-employer, columns (4)-(6) include neutral, and columns (7)-(9) include pro-worker labor
market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7) use changes in log
total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use changes in white-collar
employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural dummy and state by year fixed
effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In this table, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-employer; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal are pro-worker and Assam, Bihar, Haryana,
Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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Table A.14–Effect of Import Competition on Employment with LW (IV, BB)
Panel A IV Regression Results LFirst200 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Δ5CHN(t-1) -4.075** -4.429** -1.012 -3.078 -3.632 -1.99 -0.482 0.044 -1.603*
(2.066) (2.067) (1.550) (2.400) (2.633) (2.411) (0.784) (0.805) (0.942)
TFP(t-5) -0.015 -0.02 0.038** 0.018 0.011 0.039** 0 -0.001 0.007
(0.026) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.536* 0.583** 0.125 0.334 0.398 0.226 0.081 0.018 0.234*
(0.279) (0.280) (0.179) (0.287) (0.316) (0.295) (0.100) (0.100) (0.123)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.842*** -1.907*** -0.213 -1.065 -1.395 -0.83 0.02 0.125 -0.152
(0.527) (0.598) (0.651) (0.824) (0.944) (0.753) (0.426) (0.484) (0.542)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.224*** 0.237*** -0.009 0.124 0.164 0.09 -0.027 -0.042 0.011
(0.061) (0.069) (0.075) (0.100) (0.115) (0.093) (0.050) (0.058) (0.066)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.750* -0.801* 0.575 0.028 -0.15 0.004 0.544* 0.860** -0.035
(0.409) (0.438) (0.429) (0.401) (0.426) (0.487) (0.320) (0.336) (0.280)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.102** 0.113** -0.074 -0.011 0.011 -0.009 -0.059 -0.094** 0.013
(0.051) (0.054) (0.048) (0.051) (0.054) (0.062) (0.042) (0.043) (0.039)
R-squared 0.028 0.025 0.031 0.018 0.011 0.028 0.042 0.037 0.025
N 9415 9415 9415 5310 5310 5310 7871 7871 7871
Panel B IV Regression Results Lfirst100 Sample
Pro-employer Neutral Pro-worker
  Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh Δ5lnL Δ5lnLbl Δ5lnLwh
Δ5CHN(t-1) -1.993 -2.055 -0.576 -2.582 -3.215 -1.309 0.118 0.386 -0.83
(1.962) (1.989) (1.326) (2.294) (2.625) (2.070) (0.836) (0.895) (0.948)
TFP(t-5) -0.005 -0.008 0.038** 0.011 0.003 0.036** 0.01 0.008 0.019
(0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Δ5CHN(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.265 0.276 0.079 0.334 0.411 0.193 -0.011 -0.043 0.114
(0.274) (0.278) (0.154) (0.281) (0.326) (0.242) (0.110) (0.115) (0.114)
Δ5EJU(t-1) -1.678*** -1.707*** -0.504 -1.283* -1.591* -1.022 -0.015 0.026 -0.178
(0.472) (0.515) (0.549) (0.776) (0.909) (0.637) (0.354) (0.397) (0.469)
Δ5EJU(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.199*** 0.207*** 0.031 0.172* 0.212* 0.127* -0.019 -0.025 0.012
(0.062) (0.067) (0.063) (0.098) (0.115) (0.076) (0.041) (0.047) (0.054)
Δ5LW(t-1) -0.305 -0.386 0.769* -0.206 -0.412 0.215 0.467 0.543 0.391
(0.423) (0.439) (0.415) (0.462) (0.522) (0.457) (0.378) (0.415) (0.339)
Δ5LW(t-1)
×TFP(t-5)
0.05 0.064 -0.093** 0.029 0.057 -0.034 -0.06 -0.067 -0.052
(0.053) (0.054) (0.047) (0.061) (0.069) (0.059) (0.049) (0.052) (0.045)
R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.029 0.014 0.01 0.026 0.036 0.028 0.035
N 13106 13106 13106 7888 7888 7888 10458 10458 10458
Notes: Table reports results from IV regression of five-year changes in employment on lag of five-year changes in import exposure
and lag TFP of plants. In the first stage, Δ5CHN(t-1) and Δ5CHN(t-1)×TFP(t-5) are instrumented by (t-1)-1 lag of five-year changes in
Chinese import share in Indonesia Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1 and Δ5(CH)IDN(t-1)-1×TFP(t-5). Panel-A reports results for LFirst200 and panel-B
reports LFirst100 sample. Columns (1)-(3) include pro-employer, columns (4)-(6) include neutral, and columns (7)-(9) include pro-
worker labor market sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at industry (NIC 4-digit) level. Columns (1), (4) and (7)
use changes in log total employment (L), columns (2), (5) and (8) use changes in log blue-collar employment and (3), (6) and (9) use
changes in white-collar employment as dependent variable. All the regressions include initial technology intensity dummies, rural
dummy and state by year fixed effects. Plant specific sampling weights are applied in all regressions. In this table, Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are pro-employer; Orissa, Gujarat, Maharashtra and West Bengal are
pro-worker and Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are neutral states. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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